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LIFTING ‘THE LONG SHADOW’: KATEGORIA AND APOLOGIA IN THE LEGACY 
OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY 
 
Autumn R. Boyer, Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2010
 
The U.S. Public Health Service Study at Tuskegee, conducted from 1932-1972, is widely 
considered a paradigm of bioethics failure in American history. Twenty-five years after the end 
of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, no member of the U.S. government had yet offered an official 
apology to the victims. Entreated by an interdisciplinary committee of scholars and community 
members to help lift “the long shadow” of distrust and fear caused by the Study, President 
Clinton offered words of apology on May 16, 1997 for the deeds of government officials 
committed decades earlier. 
This dissertation examines Clinton’s address within the broader context of the Tuskegee 
legacy. Following the critical method proposed by Ryan, the request for an apology and 
Clinton’s speech are paired and criticized as a kategoria/apologia speech set, allowing for richer 
yields than analyzing the texts in isolation. The ethical and rhetorical implications of treating 
Clinton’s speech as apologia, interpersonal apology, or institutional apology are considered. 
Finally, the dissertation follows the rhetorical path of the Tuskegee legacy by analyzing a body 
of empirical research by public health scholars about the possible effects of lingering memories 
and attitudes about the Tuskegee Study on individuals’ willingness to participate as medical 
research subjects in the present day. The rhetorical situation, as conceptualized by Bitzer and 
modified by Vatz and Consigny, and McGee’s ‘ideograph’ also serve as critical tools in the 
analyses of the key rhetorical artifacts of the Tuskegee legacy. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY1 
On July 26, 1972, a New York Times headline announced startling news: “Syphilis Victims in 
U.S. Study Went Untreated for Forty Years.”2 Readers who delved further into Associated Press 
journalist Jean Heller’s shocking story learned the morbid details: Six hundred Black men from 
Tuskegee, Alabama, “were induced to serve as guinea pigs” in a study of untreated syphilis 
conducted by the U.S. Public Health Service from 1932 until 1972.3 The men who participated in 
the study, including 399 who had syphilis and 201 “controls” who did not have the infection, 
were not told they were part of an experiment or that the “treatment” they were offered to secure 
their cooperation would not actually effectively treat their disease.4 Furthermore, those with 
syphilis were actively prevented from receiving treatment from other sources, even after 
penicillin was discovered in the 1940s and 1950s to be an effective treatment for syphilis.5  
                                                 
1 The present name for this study, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is the U.S. 
Public Health Service Study at Tuskegee, a name that explicitly acknowledges that the project’s direction and 
responsibility resides with the U.S. government and not the Tuskegee Institute or other local institution. However, 
this name change is more recent than the source materials cited in this dissertation, including the text written by the 
member-named Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, so I shall retain the traditional name of the Study 
despite its terminological ambiguity. Historian Susan M. Reverby acknowledges a similar struggle in referring to the 
Study in her work and notes that, while “USPHS Study at Tuskegee” is more accurate, “the word ‘Tuskegee’ is what 
circulates and is known.” Examining Tuskegee: The Infamous Syphilis Study and Its Legacy (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 8-9. 
2 Jean Heller, “Syphilis Victims in U.S. Study Went Untreated for 40 Years,” New York Times, July 26, 
1972. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Allan M. Brandt, “Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” Hastings Center 
Report 8, no. 6 (December 1978): 21, 24; U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Final Report of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Advisory Panel (Washington, DC: GPO, 1973): 12. 
5 Ibid., 9-10. 
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After the Tuskegee Study’s details were brought to light, financial reparations were made 
to the survivors and families of survivors through an out-of-court settlement in 1974.6 Such 
settlements are usually taken as an admission of guilt,7 but in this case, they did not bring 
satisfactory closure for those involved in the Study and those affected by its legacy. Something 
was still missing – a formal apology. For decades, the absence of an explicit expression of regret 
and admission of wrongdoing by the U.S. federal government lingered like salt on a slow-healing 
wound. Then, nearly 25 years after the Study ended, an influential group of researchers and 
community leaders focused attention on this rhetorical imperfection and insisted that the 
president of the United States come clean about Tuskegee. They declared in a letter to President 
Clinton, “The Tuskegee Syphilis Study continues to cast its long shadow on the contemporary 
relationship between African Americans and the biomedical community.”8
On May 16, 1997, President Clinton spoke at the White House to a gathering of five 
survivors of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and family members representing the sixth remaining 
survivor and two deceased participants. President Clinton, a man who had not yet been born 
when the Tuskegee Study began, offered words of apology on behalf of the United States 
government and the American people for the tragedy and injustice inflicted on the men in that 
Study and their families. He then outlined five policy proposals for moving on from the tragedy 
                                                 
6 James H. Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, new and exp. ed. (New York: Free Press, 
1993), 217. 
7 Keith Michael Hearit and Jennifer Brown, “Merrill Lynch: Corporate Apologia and Business Fraud,” 
Public Relations Review 30 (2004), 465. 
8 Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” in Tuskegee’s Truths: 
Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, ed. Susan M. Reverby (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000), 559. 
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to a new era in bioethics and research in the hopes that such an offense should never happen 
again.9
Much has been written about the Tuskegee Study since the 1972 Times article and 
subsequent “fallout” events such as congressional hearings, a class-action lawsuit, and President 
Clinton’s speech. Historians, public health officials and scholars, sociologists, bioethicists, 
physicians, and rhetoricians have weighed in on the implications of the Tuskegee Study in terms 
of minority health, public health, government trustworthiness, human subjects research, and the 
dehumanizing features of medical reporting. However, according to historian and women’s 
studies professor Susan M. Reverby, the “facts” of the Tuskegee Study are hardly 
straightforward, even in hindsight:  
Especially after the 1997 presidential apology, media and cultural attention have 
refocused on Tuskegee and its racial assumptions and made the facts still more 
elusive. Concern over rising AIDS rates, the African American community’s lack 
of participation in clinical studies, and revelations of abuse of research and 
informed consent protocols in the nation’s leading medical schools and hospitals 
have also added to Tuskegee’s ascending metaphoric status.10
Why is the Tuskegee Study so infamous, when other bioethical violations have also been 
recorded in American history? Perhaps, as Reverby suggests, it is because an arm of the U.S. 
government—including the hierarchical, military model organization of the Public Health 
Service with periodic changes in command—carried out the Study or because the Study persisted 
                                                 
9 William J. Clinton, “Remarks in Apology to African-Americans on the Tuskegee Experiment,” Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents 33 (1997), 718-20. 
10 Susan M. Reverby, “More than Fact and Fiction: Cultural Memory and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” 
Hastings Center Report 31, no. 5 (2001), 25. 
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through an era of significant civil rights activity.11 Or perhaps it is because, unlike some other 
bioethical failures (such as the hepatitis experiments at Willowbrook School12), the Tuskegee 
Study involved the systematic deception of participants about the nature of their participation 
and their purported personal benefits, even when truth-telling (if not formal informed consent) 
was a norm of scientific research.13 Reverby continues: 
It is not surprising that a historical experience, containing the elements of a 
sexually transmitted disease, African Americans, coercion and lying by 
government officials, violation of trust between health-care providers and 
patients, and fear of experimentation, wrapped into a forty-year narrative with 
multiple media replays, would capture our analytic focus and reach into our 
cultural unconscious. Playing out with all the drama of a southern gothic tale, the 
story of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study holds our imaginations in thrall in ways that 
other medical research disasters do not. It almost would have to. As scholars 
Geneviève Fabre and Robert O’Meally have argued, by quoting author Richard 
Wright’s midcentury comment, “the Negro [sic] is America’s metaphor.”14
Historian and African American studies scholar Darlene Clark Hine agrees that the Tuskegee 
Study “has become the powerful symbol of black vulnerability in a white-dominated, capitalistic, 
patriarchal society. In its deepest sense, ‘Tuskegee Syphilis’ is a potent metaphor for the multiple 
                                                 
11 Reverby, “More than Fact and Fiction,” 26; Susan M. Reverby, “More than a Metaphor: An Overview of 
the Scholarship of the Study,” in Reverby, Tuskegee’s Truths, 2-3. 
12 See, for example: Joel D. Howell and Rodney A. Hayward, “Writing Willowbrook, Reading 
Willowbrook: The Recounting of a Medical Experiment,” in Useful Bodies: Humans in the Service of Medical 
Science in the Twentieth Century ed. Jordan Goodman, Anthony McElligott and Lara Marks (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003), 190-213. 
13 Reverby, “More than a Metaphor,” in Reverby, Tuskegee’s Truths, 2-3. 
14 Ibid., 3. 
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stratifications along the race, class, sex, and regional grids in twentieth-century America.”15 
Furthermore, the Tuskegee Study has often been cited as a prominent reason why many African 
Americans are distrustful of mainstream medical practice.16
Although there has been much scholarly interest in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 
Clinton’s speech, generally dubbed an “apology,” has garnered much less attention by 
comparison. This dissertation provides a focused analysis of Clinton’s speech, situating it 
historically and rhetorically within the “legacy” of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. The 38-year 
history since the Study’s termination includes the formal request for a presidential apology 
issued by the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, Clinton’s formal response to that 
request, and the empirical research conducted by epidemiologists to assess the efficacy of the 
President’s speech in changing public attitudes about participation in medical research. In this 
chapter, I lay out my plan to analyze the presidential speech within the context of the direct 
pressure for a presidential apology by the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee and the 
enduring “Tuskegee legacy” that functions as a recurrent rhetorical situation for physicians and 
researchers who would recruit African Americans and other minorities for participation in the 
mainstream medical (and research) establishment. 
                                                 
15 Darlene Clark Hine, “Reflections on Nurse Rivers,” in Reverby, Tuskegee’s Truths, 390. 
16 See, for example: Stephen B. Thomas and Sandra Crouse Quinn, “The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 1932-
1972: Implications for HIV Education and AIDS Risk Education Programs in the Black Community,” American 
Journal of Public Health 81, no. 11 (November 1991): 1498-1505. Associated Press writer Sonya Ross claimed, 
“Blacks use [the Tuskegee Study] as a reason to avoid clinical trials for diseases that disproportionately afflict them, 
such as high blood pressure, kidney disease and cancer.” Sonya Ross, “Clinton Offers Nation’s Apology for Syphilis 
Experiment.” New Pittsburgh Courier (June 7, 1997), Pg. 2. Additionally, Ralph V. Katz and colleagues note that 
the slate of speakers at University of Virginia’s 1994 bioethics conference, “The Tuskegee Legacy: Doing Bad in 
the Name of Good,” had collectively presumed “that African Americans were, in fact, more reluctant to participate 
in biomedical studies and that the USPHS-Tuskegee experiment was at the heart of this reluctance to become a 
research participant,” despite the speakers’ failure to provide any empirical evidence to support this claim. Ralph V. 
Katz and others, “The Tuskegee Legacy Project: History, Preliminary Scientific Findings, and Unanticipated 
Societal Benefits,” Dental Clinics of North America 47 (January 2003): 2-3. 
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1.1 SCHOLARSHIP ON THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY AND THE 
PRESIDENTIAL APOLOGY 
Historian James H. Jones’s Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment is widely considered 
the authoritative account on this subject. In addition to tracing the impetus for the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study and its 40-year trajectory, Jones considers the implications of the racial and 
medical themes of the Study for a contemporary audience living in the era of AIDS and distrust 
in mainstream medicine along racial lines. Jones has been involved in research of the Study since 
Heller’s article broke the news in 1972, including assisting attorney Fred Gray during the class-
action lawsuit filed against the United States government in 1973 and serving on the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study Legacy Committee formed in 1996. His thorough account of the Study is the 
result of unprecedented access to restricted archives in Macon County, Alabama; Atlanta, 
Georgia; and Washington, D.C. 
The Study has also has also been contextualized, chronicled, and criticized in Susan 
Reverby’s edited volume, Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.17 This 
collection includes contributions from key figures in the Study, including correspondence among 
the government researchers in charge of the Study and interviews with nurse Eunice Rivers and 
Study survivors, attorney Fred Gray and President Clinton, journalists, historians, public health 
researchers, bioethicists, poets, and others. These diverse voices and perspectives complicate the 
“tragic frame” that typically characterizes contemporary lay discourse surrounding the Study.18 
                                                 
17 Reverby, ed., Tuskegee’s Truths. 
18 The “tragic frame” is a poetic category described by Kenneth Burke as taking a resigned, forensic 
perspective toward causality. The victim is powerless in some way to overcome misfortune or offense and the 
perpetrator of the offense is subject to punishment and possible atonement. Attitudes Toward History, 3rd ed, 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 37-39. 
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In Tuskegee’s Truths, the only rhetorical analysis of the Study comes from rhetorical scholar 
Martha Solomon in her article, “The Rhetoric of Dehumanization: An Analysis of Medical 
Reports of the Tuskegee Syphilis Project.”19 Solomon identifies a new rhetorical genre of 
medical reports by examining the thirteen progress reports about the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (In 
the reports, the Study was described as one of “untreated syphilis in the Negro male.”) published 
in national medical journals. According to Solomon, these reports feature discursive styles that 
help to explain why the publication of these reports in medical journals over more than 30 years 
did not draw criticism of the Study by the readers of those journals. Solomon’s analysis speaks to 
norms of medical research and reporting that were persistent factors in the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study and demonstrates that Tuskegee was not “just” a racially problematic event. 
Reverby’s scholarship on the Tuskegee Study continues in her book, Examining 
Tuskegee: The Infamous Syphilis Study and Its Legacy, which is the product of more than 15 
years of research.20 Reverby delves into the history of the Study and its lingering repercussions 
through an exploration of the uncertainties, contingencies, and fictions that attach to accounts of 
the Study from personal, medical, and cultural perspectives. As a member of the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, Reverby also provides important insight into the development 
of the request for a federal apology and the subsequent advocacy necessary to bring about a 
public statement from President Clinton. 
In contrast to the number of published works that focus specifically on the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study (including newspaper accounts published nationwide and beyond), there is much 
less scholarship focused on the speech President Clinton offered in 1997. For example, Clinton’s 
                                                 
19 Martha Solomon, “The Rhetoric of Dehumanization: An Analysis of Medical Reports of the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Project,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 49, no. 4 (Fall 1985): 233-47. 
20 Reverby, Examining Tuskegee. 
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speech is used in psychiatrist Aaron Lazare’s book, On Apology, as an example of a public 
apology and a delayed apology with potential to promote social healing.21 Philosopher Nick 
Smith provides the text of Clinton’s speech as an example of collective apology but leaves the 
task of analysis to the reader.22 Clinton himself makes only passing reference to the Tuskegee 
speech in one sentence of his autobiography.23 Besides brief mentions such as these, there are 
only a handful of sustained treatments of the speech. Public health researcher Stephen Thomas 
wrote a commentary about the event in Emory University’s online journal, The Academic 
Exchange, in which he claims, “Clinton and the others present experienced forgiveness from 
men who suffered at the hands of PHS doctors.”24 Communication scholars Joy Koesten and 
Robert Rowland devote a portion of their article on “The Rhetoric of Atonement” to describe 
Clinton’s various apologies as examples of atonement (such as the Tuskegee speech) or not (such 
as the failed Lewinsky apologies).25 A book chapter, “Racial Apologies,” by rhetoric scholars 
Dexter Gordon and Carrie Crenshaw, uses Clinton’s speech and the 1997 congressional 
resolution that apologized for the Constitution’s sanctioning of slavery as examples of racial 
apologies.26 The authors argue that while these apologies can transcend racism “because of their 
resonance with traditional apologia,” they actually “perpetuate racism through their rhetorical 
silences about White privilege.”27 The authors identify features of these apologies that align with 
                                                 
21 Aaron Lazare, On Apology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 51, 198-9. 
22 Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
249-252. 
23 William J. Clinton, My Life (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 757. 
24 Stephen B. Thomas, “Anatomy of an Apology,” The Academic Exchange, Emory University, 
http://www.emory.edu/ACAD_EXCHANGE/1999/sept99/anatomy.html. 
25 Joy Koesten and Robert C. Rowland, “The Rhetoric of Atonement,” Communication Studies 55, no. 1 
(2004): 69. 
26 Dexter B. Gordon and Carrie Crenshaw, “Racial Apologies,” in New Approaches to Rhetoric, edited by 
Patricia A. Sullivan and Steven R. Goldzwig, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 245-66. 
27 Ibid., 247. 
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traditional apology (naming the Tuskegee Study as “shameful” and “wrong,” for example) while 
calling out the silences that serve to reinforce “otherness.”28
An article written by communication scholars Lynn M. Harter, Ronald J. Stephens, and 
Phyllis M. Japp focuses specifically on the President’s speech and “explore[s] how the discourse 
narratively reconstituted the events surrounding the Tuskegee experiment.”29 The authors reveal 
how Clinton adeptly made specific moves to deflect attention away from the Tuskegee Institute, 
a medical institution devoted to African American health and a partner in the Tuskegee Study, 
and placed the responsibility solely on the U.S. government and on the American people. 
Additionally, Harter and colleagues argue that Clinton’s address sought to reaffirm American 
confidence in the modernist institutions of medicine and technological advancement through his 
policy segment of the speech.30 The authors address the government’s position on the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study as presented through Clinton’s remarks and related press releases, gesturing to 
implications of such public “apologies” and their affect on public memory and race relations. 
Communication scholar Jason A. Edwards has used Clinton’s Tuskegee speech, along 
with speeches by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper, to build theory about a genre of “collective apologies.”31 Edwards discusses 
commonalities among the three speeches and asserts the purpose of collective apologies as 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 254-257. 
29 Lynn M. Harter, Ronald J. Stephens, and Phyllis M. Japp, “President Clinton’s Apology for the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Experiment: A Narrative of Remembrance, Redefinition, and Reconciliation,” The Howard Journal of 
Communications 11: (2000), 23. 
30 Ibid., 28. 
31 Jason A. Edwards, “Apologizing for the Past for a Better Future: Collective Apologies in the United 
States, Australia, and Canada,” Southern Communication Journal 75, no. 1 (January-March 2010): 57-75. In an 
earlier article by Edwards, he labels Clinton’s speech as “community-focused apology.” Jason A. Edwards, 
“Community-Focused Apologia in International Affairs: Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s Apology,” 
The Howard Journal of Communications 16 (2005): 320-1. 
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“repairing, healing, and rebuilding relationships harmed by historical injustice.”32 He also 
identifies three rhetorical strategies employed by Clinton, Rudd, and Harper: acknowledging 
their government’s wrongdoing, accepting responsibility for the wrongdoing while expressing 
remorse for the wrong, and taking corrective action to prevent future recurrence of the 
wrongdoing.33
My analyses add to the extant scholarship on Clinton’s Tuskegee speech by performing 
paired rhetorical criticism of this text with an earlier appeal that helped to draw President Clinton 
into the lingering rhetorical situation following the termination of the Tuskegee Study. By 
examining features of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee’s text that called for 
Clinton’s response, I am better positioned to analyze the rhetorical situation facing the president 
and the appropriateness of his speech in response. More details about the justification and 
methods of the paired analysis of the speech set are discussed in the following section. 
Additionally, in this project I integrate more focused analyses of the apology and apologia 
genres and specifically consider the commitments and implications of each, whereas extant 
literature tends to take for granted the labeling of Clinton’s speech as an apology. Finally, my 
work follows the rhetorical path of the “Tuskegee legacy” by analyzing a body of empirical 
research by public health scholars about the possible affects of lingering memories and attitudes 
about the Tuskegee Study on individuals’ willingness to participate as medical research subjects 
in the present day. 
                                                 
32 Edwards, “Apologizing for the Past,” 63. 
33 Ibid., 63-64. 
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1.2 METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES 
The discourse formation considered in this project can effectively be analyzed using a set of 
theoretical concepts and critical approaches drawn from the field of rhetoric, including the genres 
of kategoria and apologia, paired speech set analysis, the rhetorical situation, and ideographic 
analysis. Additionally, I incorporate a discussion of the fundamental features of apology, 
drawing from key texts in philosophy, psychology, and sociology, to provide a more focused 
consideration of Clinton’s speech as apology and apologia. In this section I provide an overview 
of each of these analytical methods and perspectives used throughout the dissertation. 
1.2.1 Genre Considerations 
The rhetorical analysis of the two primary texts, the Legacy Committee’s request and President 
Clinton’s speech, begins by considering the texts’ generic features. By reading the Legacy 
Committee’s request as a kategoria or accusation, the critic is poised to identify the key features 
and issues in the text to which a response is expected by the rhetors. Stasis theory, a classical 
approach to judicial rhetoric, provides a taxonomic guide to analyze accusations in order to 
design a strong defense. I also use Walter R. Fisher’s “motive view” of communication,34 Lloyd 
Bitzer’s “rhetorical situation,”35 and William L. Benoit and Bruce Dorries’s typology of 
“persuasive attack”36 to strengthen the generic criticism of the Legacy Committee’s kategoria.  
                                                 
34 Walter R. Fisher, “A Motive View of Communication,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 56 (1970): 131-139. 
35 Lloyd Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968): 1-14. 
36 William L. Benoit and Bruce Dorries, “Dateline NBC’s Persuasive Attack on Wal-Mart,” 
Communication Quarterly 44 (Fall 1996): 463-469. 
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The genre criticism continues with Clinton’s response. Communication scholars Lynn M. 
Harter, Ronald J. Stephens, and Phyllis M. Japp describe Clinton’s speech, in part, as “a 
historical narrative identifying heroes, villains, and causal relationships.”37 These functions are 
at home in the genres of apologia (defense) and apology and, as a response to a particular kind of 
accusation by the Legacy Committee, Clinton’s speech can be treated as both. I trace the 
development of apologia from Aristotle’s treatment of judicial rhetoric and stasis theory to 
contemporary elaborations of apologia’s rhetorical commitments. Although kategoria and 
apologia have been considered counterparts in judicial rhetoric since antiquity38, my analysis 
also includes the non-defensive genre of apology as a potential response to accusation. This two-
pronged approach allows the critic to connect the issues addressed in the response with those 
introduced in the accusation and assess the rhetorical appropriateness of the response. Harter and 
colleagues ask, “Can Clinton’s address truly be viewed as an apology, or should it be viewed as a 
sales pitch for the modern medical establishment?”39 Indeed, the proportion of the speech 
devoted to an explication of policies and executive orders to promote ethical research outweighs 
the time given to apologetic language. Perhaps, as a public figure and government leader, 
Clinton was too heavily influenced by the expectations of presidential rhetoric, which involve 
advancing policy and progress through presidential action. I argue, instead, that the second half 
of Clinton’s speech is an overt effort to “develop a different kind of present and future”40 for his 
audience by reinforcing long-standing values for modernist institutions. The relationship 
between apologia and apology is treated in Chapter 4, where I provide a definition of “genuine,” 
                                                 
37 Harter, Stephens, and Japp, “President Clinton’s Apology,” 24. 
38 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. George A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1358b. 
39 Harter, Stephens, and Japp, “President Clinton’s Apology,” 30. 
40 Koesten and Rowland, “Rhetoric of Atonement,” 73. 
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interpersonal apology and consider the complicated phenomenon of what is termed “institutional 
apology.” According to my analysis, Clinton’s speech may not be a genuine apology in the 
strictest sense, but as an institutional apology it has particular rhetorical functions that are similar 
to interpersonal apologies. The questions Harter and colleagues raise about the appropriate 
spokespersons and timings of public apologies are important to keep in mind so that addresses 
such as Clinton’s are not uncritically accepted as sufficient reconciliations of long-standing fear, 
manipulation, and abuses of power. 
 
1.2.2 Analog Criticism of the Kategoria/Apologia Speech Set 
The multifaceted and longitudinal features of the Legacy Committee request and Clinton’s 
response open up the possibility of many possible interpretations and require a robust analytical 
approach to plumb its depths. Clinton’s speech was not an isolated text, responding to one 
particular event. Rather, it drew upon a growing history of medical abuses, racism, and Clinton’s 
own political commitments and goals. While there are many frames through which to interpret 
these facets of Clinton’s speech, we need some standard for judgment by which we can make 
sense of it. Analog speech set criticism provides such a standard: the preceding kategoria serves 
as a standard by which the response, the apologia, is judged. 
Analog criticism, as theorized by L. W. Rosenfield, is a compare-and-contrast strategy 
that involves taking two generically similar speeches and “comparing the speeches in such ways 
 13
that each address serves as a reference standard for the other.”41 Rosenfield claims that the 
benefits of this type of criticism are a deeper exploration of the genre itself (as “exemplified by 
the messages”) and a comparison of the “relative artistic merit of each speech.”42 Argumentation 
scholar David Zarefsky employs this approach briefly in his analysis of Secretary of State Colin 
Powell’s February 2003 speech to the United Nations Security Council. Zarefsky compares 
Powell’s rhetorical context and composition in the lead-up to the second war in Iraq to that of 
UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson’s in 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis.43 Analog criticism 
was developed further by rhetorician Halford Ross Ryan, who applied analog criticism to a 
speech set of kategoria and apologia rather than two speeches of the same genre. Ryan justified 
this application by noting that a “critic cannot have a complete understanding of accusation or 
apology without treating them both.”44
The paired speech set approach described by Ryan is well-suited to criticize the 
longitudinal and historical artifacts featured in this dissertation because rhetoric deals 
specifically in situated persuasion. The kategoria issued and advocated by the Legacy 
Committee was created at a particular moment in time in an attempt to both increase and harness 
the rhetorical pull of situational factors such as the upcoming 25th anniversary of the Tuskegee 
Study’s termination and the persistent failure of the U.S. government to apologize. The 
Committee’s efforts indelibly altered the rhetorical situation facing the president and, as I discuss 
in Chapter 3, contributed substantially to Clinton’s rhetorical choices in his speech. By analyzing 
                                                 
41 L. W. Rosenfield, “A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Nixon-Truman Analog.” Speech Monographs 
35, no. 4 (November 1968): 435. 
42 Ibid. 
43 David Zarefsky, “Making the Case for War: Colin Powell at the United Nations,” Rhetoric and Public 
Affairs 10, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 280. 
44 Halford Ross Ryan, “Kategoria and Apologia: On Their Rhetorical Criticism as a Speech Set,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 68, no. 3 (1982): 254. 
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these texts as counterparts rather than in isolation, I am able to determine the influence of the 
preceding text on the response text and I have an established standard by which to weigh the 
merits of the responding text. As one example of the speech set analysis dynamic that is explored 
in this dissertation, I consider how President Clinton’s speech does and does not fulfill the 
specific features of a governmental apology requested by the Legacy Committee. Situational 
factors besides the Legacy Committee request influenced the President’s rhetorical choices, 
however, and additional analytical tools are necessary to fully explore these artifacts. 
1.2.3 The Rhetorical Situation 
As situated discourse, rhetoric is subject to judgments about its appropriateness, timeliness, and 
general ‘fit’ with its context. Rhetorician Lloyd Bitzer theorized the “rhetorical situation” to 
describe the contextual features that pull and sway rhetorical invention and his theory serves as 
an underlying guide to the analyses in this dissertation.45 There are three main components in the 
rhetorical situation: exigence, audience, and constraints. The rhetor is motivated by the exigences 
or defects that can be remedied (where the remedy requires discourse) in the context.46 The 
rhetor considers the appropriate and potentially efficacious audience that may be persuaded by 
her rhetorical intervention. Finally, the rhetor is limited by the constraints of the situation that 
hamper efforts to remedy the exigence. Constraints may include but are not limited to events, 
objects, and others’ beliefs, attitudes, and abilities. If the rhetor is able to address the appropriate 
audience and accommodate the situational constraints in her appeal to remedy a specific 
exigence, she is said to have crafted a “fitting response” to the demands of the rhetorical 
                                                 
45 Bitzer, “Rhetorical Situation,” 1-14. 
46 Ibid., 6-7. 
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situation.47 Both Clinton’s speech and the Legacy Committee’s request are analyzed (in Chapters 
3 and 2, respectively) according to the components of the rhetorical situation and in those 
analyses I consider another particularly relevant feature of the situation for this project: 
timeliness. Bitzer notes that “rhetorical situations come into existence, then either mature or 
decay or mature and persist – conceivably some persist indefinitely.”48 In Chapter 2, I discuss 
how the passage of time had mitigated but not fully decayed the perceived exigence of a missing 
presidential apology and how the Legacy Committee sought to revive the persisting rhetorical 
situation through its intervention. In Chapter 3, I also consider how timeliness served to constrain 
Clinton’s response. 
1.2.4 The Influence of Ideograph 
What remains to be seen in the situation surrounding Clinton’s apology is how an entire 
society perceives and reacts to a rhetorical situation. Americans’ knowledge of the Tuskegee 
Study draws upon a particular kind of memory about historical events filtered through media 
accounts, fictionalized theatrical dramas, word of mouth, and community lore. Myths intertwine 
with facts to form the powerful and influential connotations associated with ‘Tuskegee.’ 
Furthermore, the term ‘Tuskegee’ is often used as a one-word representative anecdote or 
paradigm example of 20th century bioethical failure in the United States and public health 
researchers have often credited the Tuskegee Study with causing or perpetuating feelings of 
distrust toward and fear of medical and government institutions. The legacy of the Study is said 
to be a significant deterrent that prevents African Americans from potentially participating as 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 10. 
48 Ibid., 12. 
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research subjects and from seeking mainstream medical care. For example, public health and 
minority health researchers Stephen B. Thomas and Sandra Crouse Quinn trace the Tuskegee 
legacy to AIDS risk reduction programs involving African Americans. They write, “almost 60 
years after the experiment began, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study’s legacy is a trail of distrust and 
suspicion that hampers HIV education efforts in Black communities. [...] Public health 
professionals must recognize that Blacks’ belief in AIDS as a form of genocide is a legitimate 
attitudinal barrier rooted in the history of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.”49 Social work scholar 
Carol A. Heintzelman cites the Tuskegee Study as a significant factor that perpetuated “African 
Americans’ continued distrust of the medical establishment, especially public health programs 
and a fear of vaccinations. It reinforced views about the medical establishment and the federal 
government, as well as disregard for African American lives.”50 Note that Heintzelman does not 
credit the Tuskegee Study with originating feelings of distrust among African Americans (as 
Thomas and Quinn seem to) but, rather, she perceives the Study as providing significant 
evidence to support the apprehension many minorities already felt toward government and 
medical institutions. Yet another understanding of the Tuskegee legacy comes from public health 
researchers Vickie Shavers, Charles Lynch, and Leon Burmeister. According to their study about 
factors affecting people’s willingness to participate in studies, “forty-nine percent of African 
Americans and 17% of whites that responded that their knowledge of the Tuskegee Study would 
affect their future participation indicated that they would not be willing to participate in a 
medical research study in the future.”51 However, the authors interpret these findings by 
                                                 
49 Thomas and Quinn, “Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” 1503. 
50 Carol A. Heintzelman, “The Tuskegee Syphilis Study and Its Implications for the 21st Century,” The 
New Social Worker 10, no. 4 (Fall 2003). http://www.socialworker.com/tuskegee.htm. 
51 Vickie L. Shavers, Charles F. Lynch, and Leon F. Burmeister, “Racial Differences in Factors That 
Influence the Willingness to Participate in Medical Research Studies,” Annals of Epidemiology 12 (2002): 252. 
 17
commenting, “having knowledge of the Tuskegee [Study] alone did not seem to impact the 
willingness to participate in medical research. The role of Tuskegee appears to lie with its 
contribution to the overall distrust of medical research among African Americans.”52 These 
published studies not only treat the Tuskegee legacy as a legitimate social factor, but they also 
contribute to the legacy by asserting and perpetuating cultural understandings of its significance. 
One way to understand these phenomena is to examine how ‘Tuskegee’ operates as an 
ideograph. Ideographs, as conceptualized by rhetorician Michael Calvin McGee, are terms that 
have particular rhetorical thrust within a culture. They carry particular connotative commitments 
and motivate behavior and attitudes among members of the culture. McGee describes: 
An ideograph is an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is a 
high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but 
equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses 
behavior and belief that might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, 
and guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as 
acceptable and laudable. [...] Ideographs are culture-bound, though some terms 
are used in different signification across cultures.53
Moreover, McGee writes, ideographs perform “a task of socialization, an exercise in epideictic 
rhetoric” that teaches us “to make, or comprehend, judgments of public motives and […] civic 
duty.”54 This conceptualization will be instrumental in examining the Tuskegee legacy that is 
cited by research in knowing tones but which is largely overlooked in empirical studies. The 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 254. 
53 Michael Calvin McGee, “The ‘Ideograph’: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology,” Quarterly Journal 
of Speech 66, no. 1 (February 1980): 15. 
54 Ibid., 11. 
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recent studies led by Ralph V. Katz to examine the influence of the legacy and Clinton’s speech 
on attitudes about medical research are a notable exception and are the focus of Chapter 5.55  
 The ideograph is a powerful tool of rhetorical criticism that, in this case, highlights how 
popular conceptions of the Tuskegee legacy are tinged by a patina of contingency, and how such 
conceptions thereby have potential to be colored and shifted by rhetorical events, especially 
high-profile interventions such as presidential addresses. By attending to the cultural resources 
that adhere to references to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, I shed similar light on how lay 
audiences, public health scholars, and others make use of <Tuskegee>56 as an ideograph and 
how understandings of <Tuskegee> may be resistant to particular rhetorics. 
1.3 CHAPTER ORGANIZATION AND PREVIEW 
In this section, I introduce the specific thesis questions that guide each stage of the inquiry and 
briefly preview the rhetorical artifacts to be examined. 
Chapter 2 features kategoria, the first component of the two-part speech set of kategoria 
and apologia as conceptualized by Ryan. Criticism of this genre incorporates several theoretical 
resources dating from antiquity through the contemporary era, including the frame of Bitzer’s 
rhetorical situation and the subsequent correctives to this perspective as asserted by Vatz and 
Consigny. The key text under consideration as a kategoria is the 1996 Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
                                                 
55 See, for example: Katz and others, “Tuskegee Legacy Project.” Additional published findings from the 
Tuskegee Legacy Project are cited and discussed in Chapter 5. 
56 I use the angle brackets to indicate reference to an <ideograph>, following the lead of Lucaites and 
Condit in their ideographic rhetorical criticism article. See John Louis Lucaites and Celeste Michelle Condit, 
“Reconstructing <Equality>: Culturetypal and Counter-Cultural Rhetorics in the Martyred Black Vision,” 
Communication Monographs 57, no. 1 (1990): 5-24. 
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Legacy Committee’s request for a presidential apology, which established expectations for the 
long-awaited apology. The history of the Legacy Committee sheds light on the motivations and 
rhetorical situation that contributed to the composition of its appeal to the president, as well as 
the exigences facing Clinton leading up to his response. 
This broader understanding of the rhetorical situation will allow for a more thorough 
understanding of the exigences that emerged “objectively” due to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study’s 
termination (Bitzer’s formulation) as well as the exigences and constraints created through 
creative human effort in the Legacy Committee’s request (Vatz’s formulation).57 I argue that the 
exigences that emerged at the close of the Study lacked sufficient urgency to compel a fitting 
response at the time. This insufficient condition was rectified through the production of a 
rhetorical artifact by members of the Legacy Committee that infused urgency into the exigence 
and set the stage for increased publicity as the 25th anniversary of the Study’s end drew near. 
According to Ryan, “The accuser is the affirmer or the rhetorical prime-mover in the 
speech set. The accuser perceives an evil or an exigence, he is motivated to expose it, and the 
rhetorical response to that motivation is a kategoria.”58 This chapter, then, analyzes kategoria as 
a bookend of an interactive speech set, by pursuing the following questions: 
• What are the generic features of kategoria? 
• How did the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee seek to intensify the 
exigences in the post-Tuskegee rhetorical situation with their demand for an 
                                                 
57 In response to criticism such as Vatz’s, Bitzer amended his stance on exigence in a later work: “Public 
knowledge will change as new conceptions, values, and principles are added and old ones discarded, and as some of 
these recede into the background while others become dominant… […C]ertain salient elements will be known to 
most—if those elements are placed regularly before the public view.” Lloyd F. Bitzer, “Rhetoric and Public 
Knowledge,” in Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature: An Exploration, ed. Don M. Burks (West Lafayette: Purdue 
University Press, 1978): 69.  
58 Ryan, “Kategoria and Apologia,” 256. 
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apology? 
• How was the appeal crafted? What are its prominent features?  
• How does the request fit with the generic features of kategoria? 
• How did the appeal contribute to further advocacy for a presidential apology? 
 
In Chapter 3, I analyze the so-called apology for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study offered by 
Clinton, completing my initial analysis of the kategoria/apologia speech set. There are several 
features of this speech context that require a multi-faceted generic analysis. First, Clinton is a 
representative of a culpable institution, yet he does not stand personally accused of wrongdoing. 
How is he able to respond to the kategoria in light of his innocence? Since he does not 
necessarily need to speak from a position of defensiveness, does that preclude his remarks from 
categorization as apologia? In order to make the most of these analytical tools, I use Ryan’s 
perspective of the speech set to draw productive parallels between the paired analysis of 
kategoria and apologia and the paired rhetorical artifacts of the Legacy Committee’s request and 
Clinton’s responsive address. 
Although Clinton answered the Legacy Committee’s request, his speech did not close the 
books on the “Tuskegee legacy” or lay to rest the specific concerns raised by the Legacy 
Committee. By examining the speech in light of the particular features of the preceding request, I 
am able to parse the ways in which Clinton’s remarks fulfilled the explicit expectations of the 
kategoria as well as identify additions to and omissions from the recommendations of the request 
that may belie the President’s other commitments. Additionally, I discuss how Clinton’s 
ideological maneuvers in his speech shifted the tone from apology/apologia to a policy-driven 
epideictic oration. My analysis takes its direction from both Bitzer and Vatz: I consider how 
Clinton’s rhetoric is a response to the rhetorical situation created by the absence of apology 
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following the Study and enhanced by the efforts of specific rhetors, and I consider how Clinton’s 
speech is an important attempt to shape the (re)current rhetorical situation faced by medical 
researchers seeking to recruit African American subjects. To this end, I engage the following 
questions: 
• What are the generic features of apologia? 
• How did Clinton’s remarks fit with the preceding kategoria? What conclusions 
can be drawn from the degree of fit? 
• What is the significance of Clinton’s deviations from the Legacy Committee’s 
recommendations (both omissions and additions) for a presidential apology?  
• How did the request serve to shape the subsequent address? What were the 
aspects of the exigence that drove Clinton’s speech?  
• How did Clinton’s address work as an apologia? 
• How did the speech reframe an historical understanding of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study? 
In Chapter 4 I interrogate the common description of Clinton’s speech as an apology. The 
Legacy Committee requested an apology from President Clinton and the president’s response is 
termed an apology in subsequent media reports and academic literature, but critical attention to 
this characterization is rare in the extant literature. Chapter 4 continues the analysis of Clinton’s 
speech through the additional frame of genuine apology. I draw on foundational works to 
develop a basic definition of apology and then discuss Clinton’s address in light of that standard 
as well as the genre of apologia introduced in Chapter 3. The following questions guide the 
analyses in Chapter 4: 
• What are the constitutive elements and other features of a genuine apology? 
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• How does Clinton’s address fit with the definition of genuine apology? What 
conclusions can be drawn from the degree of fit? 
• How did Clinton deal with the fact that he was apologizing for an institution that 
he was not part of at the time of the Study? 
• How does the concept of institutional apology help make sense of the “gray area” 
of Clinton’s speech? 
• How does Clinton’s speech work as apology and apologia? Can either be a 
potentially “fitting response” to kategoria? 
Chapter 5 looks more broadly at the cultural context of the “Tuskegee Legacy” and considers the 
theoretical traction gained by treating the term ‘Tuskegee’ as an ideograph. The Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study Legacy Committee described the lingering effects of Tuskegee as “cast[ing] a 
long shadow on the contemporary relationship between African Americans and the biomedical 
community”59 and the Committee called for a presidential apology that was long overdue. Now 
that an apology (of sorts) has been made, has the status of the Tuskegee legacy changed in any 
fundamental way? Is public acknowledgement of the offense an effective remedy for the 
historical trauma of Tuskegee? If Clinton’s speech did indeed create a shift in the Tuskegee 
legacy, is the shifting of such a “legacy” appropriate? In Chapter 5, the analysis moves out from 
the two primary texts in the speech set into a social analysis of the significance of public memory 
about the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. By treating the Legacy as an ideograph, I develop a 
framework for a more sophisticated understanding of the uses of ‘Tuskegee’ in the lay public. To 
do so, I draw on an array of sources, including rhetorical theory, a historian’s analysis of African 
Americans’ knowledge about the Tuskegee Study, public health researchers’ analyses of 
                                                 
59 Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” 559. 
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Americans’ attitudes about participating in medical research, and examples of journalism that 
reflect on the significance of Clinton’s speech from the perspective of the lay public. 
Public health research led by Ralph V. Katz and colleagues has explored the doxa of 
medical researchers who assume that the Tuskegee legacy is a significant deterrent for potential 
minority participants in medical research. As widespread as this particular “understanding” of 
the Tuskegee legacy seems to be (as evidenced by its reference in scholarly and journalism 
articles60), the authors shed doubt on this particular influence of the Tuskegee legacy by 
conducting the first long-term, multi-city empirical study to assess minorities’ anxiety about 
participating in medical research as well as their likelihood to participate. These researchers are 
also the first to consider the potential influence of Clinton’s 1997 address over attitudes about the 
Tuskegee Study and its legacy. The frequent citing of the legacy by other researchers, as well as 
the capacity for Katz and colleagues to design an instrument called the Tuskegee Legacy 
Questionnaire, indicate that the legacy may circulate ideographically. 
By treating the Legacy as an ideograph, I examine how <Tuskegee> is juxtaposed with 
Clinton’s speech and how that relationship may complicate or shift the mental connotations that 
accompany references to <Tuskegee>. The assumption underlying this approach is that public 
memory perpetuates and evolves contemporary understandings of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. 
The often-used term “legacy” is central to this analysis: it is used by those describing long-
standing apprehensions of medical and government institutions in the shadow of ethics violations 
like Tuskegee, but it also describes a recurring rhetorical situation surrounding the 
ideographically charged <Tuskegee>. In order to parse the ideographic tendencies of the 
Tuskegee Legacy, this chapter is guided by the following questions: 
                                                 
60 See footnote 16 in this chapter. 
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• How does ‘Tuskegee’ circulate as an ideograph? 
• What do the findings of the Tuskegee Legacy Project reveal about the influence 
of <Tuskegee> and Clinton’s remarks over Americans’ attitudes and behaviors 
about participating in medical research? 
• How do the rhetorical choices of the Tuskegee Legacy Project Questionnaire 
designers potentially affect responses from respondents? 
• In what ways do Clinton’s remarks fall short of “curing” the Tuskegee legacy?  
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarizing my findings and reflecting on “big-
picture” implications of the central theses driving the Study. In this vein, I explore how Clinton’s 
adherences and deviations from the Legacy Committee’s request transformed an apology into a 
celebration of modern medicine and therefore disregarded the medical establishment and the 
modernist priorities on <science> as being key culprits in the Study. For example, when the 
Legacy Committee asked for bioethics research support by the government, Clinton obliged but 
also exhorted his African American audience to participate in research as subjects, which was 
not explicitly requested by Committee. How does this reframing of the apology event complicate 
the Legacy? To put it another way, was the Committee’s optimism about the “opportunity to 
challenge this legacy and create a more beneficial one” satisfied?61 I also revisit claims made in 
the opening chapter regarding the significance of my research: the benefits of paired rhetorical 
criticism over strict genre criticism, the opportunities and limits of institutional apologies for 
government-level wrongdoing, the role of “Tuskegee” as a metaphor, and the capacity and 
limitations of rhetoric to work within the constraints of historical context while simultaneously 
shift the framing of the same context. Aaron Lazare speaks to the equalizing effects of apologies 
                                                 
61 Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” 563. 
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as “hurting” the offender to make up for the hurt suffered by the victim.62 Since Clinton was an 
apologizer but not the offender, who benefits from his display of humility?  
Chapter 6 takes stock of how the specific findings and overarching themes of the 
dissertation address the research questions guiding the project, as well as how they suggest future 
paths of inquiry. 
1.4 CONCLUSION 
This study of Clinton’s address within the broader context of the Tuskegee legacy is beneficial 
for several reasons. First, there is little scholarship focused on Clinton’s speech, and even less 
attention given to the rhetorical artifact that provoked it: the Legacy Committee request. Second, 
the project provides a clearer understanding of public reception and uses of apology and 
apologia within their ideological frames of reference. Third, failing to understand how the 
Tuskegee legacy continues to circulate decades after the Study’s end has significant implications 
for public health policies, health outcomes for minorities, and the public discourse of science and 
medicine.
                                                 
62 Lazare, On Apology, 52. 
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2.0  KATEGORIA: THE REQUEST FOR APOLOGY 
I cannot understand why some hold that the elaboration of speech originated in 
the fact that those who were in peril owing to some accusation being made against 
them, set themselves to speak with studied care for the purpose of their own 
defence. This, however, though a more honourable origin, cannot possibly be the 
earlier, for accusation necessarily precedes defence. You might as well assert that 
the sword was invented for the purpose of self-defence and not for aggression.1  
~ Quintilian 
 
In January 1996, a group of fourteen scholars, historians, public health officials, and others 
interested in the long-term consequences and implications of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
gathered at Tuskegee University in Tuskegee, Alabama, to form the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
Legacy Committee.2 At that time, they also began composing a document, the Legacy 
Committee Request, to secure an official apology for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study from 
President Clinton and to “develop a strategy to redress the damages caused by the Study and to 
                                                 
1 Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria, trans H. E. Butler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 3.2.2. 
2 Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” in Tuskegee’s Truths: 
Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, ed. Susan M. Reverby (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000), 565 n. 1. 
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transform its damaging legacy.”3 The Legacy Committee and its formal request are credited with 
bringing about the long-awaited apology delivered by President Clinton in the East Room of the 
White House on May 16, 1997—25 years after the termination of the Study. 
The significance of the Legacy Committee request extends beyond simply compelling a 
response from the one of the most powerful political leaders in the world. As the antecedent in a 
pair of rhetorical artifacts, the request performs the function of kategoria, or accusation, to which 
the predicate artifact (Clinton’s speech) must respond. The request implicitly and explicitly lays 
out expectations and constraints for the response intended by the request’s authors. Therefore, it 
is critical to examine the request and its entailments before considering the nature of the 
response. In the terminology of rhetorician Halford Ross Ryan, the kategoria is appropriately 
paired with its corresponding apologia, or defense, as a speech set. He asserts that paired 
rhetorical criticism of the speech set enables the critic to understand better the rhetorical choices 
of each speaker or author and recognize the degree to which the apologia fits with or departs 
from the expectations revealed by the kategoria.4 According to this analytical model, the generic 
constraints on an artifact of apologia may be variable and dependent on the kategoria that 
precedes it. 
This chapter analyzes the Legacy Committee Request by first exploring kategoria as a 
rhetorical genre and considering its relationship to its counterpart, apologia. Next, I discuss the 
history and membership of the Legacy Committee to provide context for the development of the 
request letter and its presentation to President Clinton. This groundwork lays a foundation for 
description and rhetorical analysis of the Legacy Committee Request using the critical tools 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 560. 
4 Halford Ross Ryan, “Kategoria and Apologia: On Their Rhetorical Criticism as a Speech Set,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 68, no. 3 (1982): 254. 
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afforded by a consideration of this document as kategoria, including its implications for 
subsequent rhetorical action by key actors in this drama. 
2.1 GENERIC FEATURES OF KATEGORIA 
While the genre of kategoria is as old as apologia,5 it receives much less theoretical 
attention in the contemporary era than its counterpart. Clearly, as a piece of persuasive discourse, 
a kategoria may be designed by its creator to include any number of rhetorical tactics to castigate 
her target effectively. Rhetorical critique of these moves can be informed by several important 
developments in kategoria theory that have been offered in recent decades. Most notably, 
Halford Ross Ryan reinvigorated theoretical attention to kategoria. Ryan approaches criticism of 
kategoria and apologia using a toolset comprised of three analytic perspectives: Walter Fisher’s 
four motives of communication, Hermagoras’ four classical stases, and Lloyd Bitzer’s rhetorical 
situation.6 Further, Ryan argues that in rhetorical criticism of kategoria and apologia, critics 
ought to treat artifacts of accusation and defense as a speech set rather than in isolation, in order 
to better measure the features of each text against the exigences created by its counterpart.7 But, 
he claims, “The accuser is the affirmer or the rhetorical prime-mover in the speech set. The 
accuser perceives an evil or an exigence, he is motivated to expose it, and the rhetorical response 
                                                 
5 The classical history of each of these genres will be spelled out in sections 2.1.1 and 3.1.1, respectively. 
6 Ryan, “Kategoria and Apologia,” 255. 
7 Ibid., 254. 
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to that motivation is a kategoria.”8 Therefore, the critic must be attentive to the arguments 
advanced in accusation before assessing the corresponding apologia.9
Before looking at contemporary uses and developments of this genre, we must first look 
to the origins of kategoria as a feature of judicial rhetoric in ancient Greece and the further 
development of stasis theory in judicial contexts. From there, Ryan’s contemporary rhetorical 
criticism of kategoria leads to a more diverse set of analytical frames with which to consider 
kategoria beyond the courtroom. These frames include Bitzer’s rhetorical situation, 
communication scholar Walter R. Fisher’s “motive view” of communication, and 
communication scholars William L. Benoit and Bruce Dorries’s theory of persuasive attack. 
Several additional considerations of this genre will be addressed in preparation for the analysis of 
the Legacy Committee’s request for a presidential apology. 
2.1.1 Classical Treatments of Kategoria 
Even as rhetorical genres were first considered in classical Greece, thinkers 
acknowledged the rhetorical opportunities in prosecution and defense. Looking back to classical 
Greek texts, we can find several brief references to kategoria. For example, the character of 
Socrates in Plato’s Phaedrus acknowledges the rhetorical handbooks’ topical treatment of 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 256. 
9 The accusation(s) and defense(s) need not be a single events or texts, but may arise generally through 
mediated commentary and/or come from multiple rhetors over a variable period of time [On this point, see Halford 
Ross Ryan, introduction to Oratorical Encounters: Selected Studies and Sources of Twentieth-Century Political 
Accusations and Apologies, ed. Halford Ross Ryan (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), xxiii; William L. Benoit, 
Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration Strategies (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1995), 85]. Due to the prominence and influence of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee’s 
request for a presidential apology, I focus exclusively on that text as the kategoria. 
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prosecution and defense.10 Isocrates, in his oration on Helen, asserts, “a plea in defence is 
appropriate only when the defendant is charged with a crime” (though he does not use the term 
‘kategoria’ in this passage).11 Isocrates’ Panegyricus emphasizes the importance of rhetoric with 
regard to behavior change: 
 It is not, however, possible to turn men from their errors, or to inspire in them the 
desire for a different course of action without first roundly condemning their 
present conduct; and a distinction must be made between accusation, when one 
denounces with intent to injure, and admonition, when one uses like words with 
intent to benefit; for the same words are not to be interpreted in the same way 
unless they are spoken in the same spirit.12
In each of the above examples, the authors provide no further exposition of kategoria as a genre 
beyond indicating that a defense necessarily follows an accusation. Nevertheless, Isocrates' 
distinction between accusation and admonition, as we shall see, sheds light on some important 
features of the Legacy Committee’s request for an apology in the Tuskegee case. 
Aristotle treats kategoria more thoroughly in the course of describing judicial rhetoric as 
that of accusation or defense.13 His conceptualization of wrongdoing serves as a heuristic frame 
for preparing or criticizing an accusation or defense; he suggests that arguments offered for 
either side should account for the motives for the wrongdoing and the natures of a perpetrator 
and a victim.14 With regard to the purposes that drive wrongdoing, Aristotle writes, “it is clear 
                                                 
10 Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 267A. 
11 Isocrates, Helen, trans. LaRue Van Hook. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1961), section 15. 
12 Isocrates, Panegyricus, trans. George Norlin. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), section 130. 
13 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. George A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1368b. 
14 Ibid. 
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that the prosecutor should consider, as they apply to the opponent, the number and nature of the 
things that all desire when they do wrong to their neighbors, and the defendant should consider 
what and how many of these do not apply.”15 Aristotle’s profiling of offender and victim provide 
tools for individual accusation and defense but are less applicable to the Legacy Committee’s 
request for at least two reasons. First, both the Legacy Committee and President Clinton 
acknowledged that Clinton was a representative of the blameworthy institution but neither a 
central figure in the wrongdoing of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study nor a personal apologist. 
Second, the artifacts under consideration here do not fit squarely with forensic rhetoric but, 
rather, have more in common with the other two species of rhetoric as conceptualized by 
Aristotle: deliberative and epideictic rhetoric. The generic considerations of the two central 
artifacts in this thesis are important and will continue to be discussed in this and following 
chapters. 
2.1.2 Stasis Theory Approach to Kategoria 
Following Ryan’s lead, we might consider how other classical analytic schemes can contribute to 
our understanding of kategoria and its function as persuasive rhetoric. In particular, Ryan 
suggests that stasis theory is valuable when examining an artifact of kategoria. The rhetorical 
critic of kategoria and apologia uses the stases to define the contours of the argument and to 
determine whether the response of the accused party adequately addresses the specific issues of 
the accusation lodged against her. The four classical stases (fact, definition, quality, jurisdiction 
or legality), while developed over centuries by several philosophers and rhetorical theorists, were 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
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set in their basic form by Hermagoras during the second century B.C.16 Stasis theory is an 
approach to disputes that helps the critic or disputants to identify the key lines of controversy at 
issue in the dispute. Each of the four stasis lines may be addressed within a kategoria and an 
apologia, though in a given controversy or speech set one stasis may be more central than the 
others. As rhetorician Dale Hample asserts, “all the stases must be addressed, all the time. Only 
one may turn out to be pivotal in a given matter, but only because the others have obvious and 
consensual resolutions.”17 The stases are traditionally listed in descending importance from the 
perspective of the accused; the hierarchy of the stases reflects the prioritization of the arguments 
one may offer in defense of oneself.18 First is the stasis of fact: Did the accused commit the act? 
This issue is fundamental to an accusation: one alleges that some action was or was not done by 
the accused. Likewise, this issue is the first one that a defendant will try to deny if possible. If 
one cannot offer a compelling argument that she did not do the alleged act, she will turn to the 
second stasis: definition. This issue concerns the description of the act. Was the killing a 
murder? Did the act constitute sacrilege? Was it unjust?19 The accuser may offer definitions of 
the act as part of the kategoria, and the accused may take issue with those proffered definitions. 
Additionally, the accused may concede the issue of fact but then anchor a defense on the issue of 
how the act ought to be defined: not as unjust but as just, or not as murder but as an accident. 
The third stasis is the issue of quality and concerns the possibility of mitigating or guilt-lessening 
circumstances.20 If the defendant has conceded that she committed an illegal act, her next line of 
                                                 
16 Hanns Hohmann, “Stasis,” in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 741. 
17 Dale Hample, Arguing: Exchanging Reasons Face to Face (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2005), 71. 
18 Hohmann, “Stasis,” 741. 
19 Charles Marsh, “The Syllogism of Apologia: Rhetorical Stasis Theory and Crisis Communication,” 
Public Relations Review 32 (2006): 42. 
20 Ibid.  
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defense is that her act was excusable or justified based on some principle. For example, her theft 
may be justified by her need to feed her starving family or her violence may have been 
committed in self-defense. The fourth stasis, jurisdiction, is used as a last resort by the defense to 
argue that the accusation has been brought before an inappropriate forum and that the venue in 
question does not have the right to judge the case.21 This stasis is rarely addressed directly in an 
accusation because, implicitly, the accuser directs her charges to the audience or venue she 
believes to be appropriate and relevant.22
While the stases have their foundation in judicial rhetoric, writers have applied them to 
assessments of deliberative and, rarely, epideictic rhetoric.23 Speeches of praise and blame 
(epideictic), like accusations and defenses, employ claims and evidence to support the speaker’s 
assertion that the subject of her speech is, indeed, praiseworthy or blameworthy and these claims 
may follow the traditional form of the stases. In cases of deliberative rhetoric, the policy under 
consideration is addressed from four stases called stock issues: significant harm of the current 
system, the inherency of the problem to the current system, the plan to address the harm, and any 
disadvantages of the proposed policy.24 As with legal arguments, policy arguments may pivot on 
only one of these stases or stock issues if both sides address the other issues in a mutually 
satisfactory way. Analysis of the kategoria/apologia speech set specifically benefits from the 
mobilization of stasis theory, which helps the critic identify the stases in the kategoria and lays 
the groundwork for the critique of the apologia as a response to those stases. By setting up a 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ryan, “Kategoria and Apologia,” 256 n. 20. 
23 See, for example: Hample, Arguing, 71, 76. 
24 Hample, Arguing, 75. 
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thorough understanding of the kategoria, stasis theory enables a richer and more productive 
rhetorical criticism of the subsequent apologia. 
2.1.3 The Rhetorical Situation of Kategoria 
Ryan suggests another analytic frame for kategoria and apologia that moves beyond judicial 
contexts by treating the two as a rhetorical situation, consistent with Lloyd Bitzer’s traditional 
model.25 In this formulation, an accuser identifies an “exigence which he would seek to modify 
through accusatory discourse,” recognizes constraints to his rhetoric, and addresses an audience 
that he perceives to be capable of mediating change to resolve the exigence.26 For 
kategoria/apologia speech set criticism, the rhetorical situation approach equips the critic to 
attend to contextual factors influencing the inventional capacities of both rhetors. Specifically, 
understanding kategoria and apologia as existing within and constituting a particular rhetorical 
situation acknowledges the function of the kategoria as affecting the exigences and constraints 
facing the one who would offer an apologia. This form is sufficient for a preliminary analysis 
though I will provide a more thorough and sophisticated description in this and the next chapter 
as part of the analyses of the Legacy Committee’s request and President Clinton’s response.  
                                                 
25 Lloyd Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968): 6-8. 
26 Ryan, “Kategoria and Apologia,” 255. 
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2.1.4 Motive View of Kategoria 
The theory of motive, conceptualized by Walter R. Fisher, is another approach employed by 
Ryan to analyze the kategoria/apologia speech set.27 The four primary motives, according to 
Fisher, are affirmation (creating a new image or seeking buy-in to a new concept), reaffirmation 
(revitalizing the audience’s pre-existing belief or value), purification (refining an image or 
ideology), and subversion (weakening or destroying an image or ideology).28 These motives 
influence rhetorical invention as the rhetor considers each salient element of the rhetorical 
situation she faces.29 Clearly, motives are important for consideration of both the accuser’s 
rhetoric as well as the defender’s rhetoric. For the critic, this theory “directs attention not to 
communicator intent so much as to how and in what ways rhetorical discourse functions, the 
nature of its use in adapting ideas to audiences and audiences to ideas.”30 The particular speech 
set artifacts analyzed in this project have significant entailments and consequences for multiple 
audiences, so an analysis of the rhetorical functions and motives of the kategoria and apologia 
may help to illuminate these consequences. 
2.1.5 Kategoria as “Persuasive Attack” 
The three analytical frames cited by Ryan and discussed above are not the only tools with which 
to understand kategoria. Citing the disproportionate attention given to apologia over kategoria in 
                                                 
27 See Walter R. Fisher, “A Motive View of Communication,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 56 (1970): 131-
139. 
28 Ibid., 132-137. 
29 Ibid., 139. 
30 Ibid. 
 36
the extant rhetoric literature, William L. Benoit and Bruce Dorries developed a preliminary 
typology of “persuasive attack.”31 Inspired by Anita Pomerantz’s description of a persuasive 
attack having essentially two elements (the accuser must believe that salient audiences will 
perceive the alleged act negatively, and the accused person must be perceived to be responsible 
for the act), Benoit and Dorries elaborate on how a rhetor might increase the accused person’s 
perceived responsibility for the act and increase the perceived offensiveness of the act. The 
rhetor must also, of course, consider the audience’s preexisting attitudes about the act and the 
accused and the likely response the accused will make to the accusation.32 Benoit and Dorries 
propose that an accuser can emphasize the agent’s responsibility by showing that the accused has 
committed the act before, planned the act, knew the likely consequences of the act, and/or 
benefitted from the act.33 The relative offensiveness of the act may be emphasized by noting the 
extent of the damage, the persistence of negative effects, the effects on the audience, 
inconsistency or hypocrisy by the accused, the innocence or vulnerability of the victims, or the 
particular obligation of the accused to protect the victims (as in the case of parents for their 
children or doctors for their patients).34 These ten topoi for persuasive attacks are consistent with 
the rhetorical strategies offered by Aristotle’s On Rhetoric.35
Although classical rhetorical theory does not provide much depth in terms of the 
development of kategoria as a genre, the several analytical frames discussed thus far serve to 
expand the opportunities for and usefulness of rhetorical criticism of the genre. By considering 
                                                 
31 William L. Benoit and Bruce Dorries, “Dateline NBC’s Persuasive Attack on Wal-Mart,” 
Communication Quarterly 44 (Fall 1996): 463. 
32 Ibid., 464-465. 
33 Ibid., 466. 
34 Ibid., 469. 
35 Aristotle discusses the topoi of justice and injustice as well as degrees of magnitude in chapters 13-14 of 
Book I of On Rhetoric. 
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critical tools applicable to judicial rhetoric (e.g., stasis theory and persuasive attack) as well as 
those that have broader application (e.g., the rhetorical situation and motive view), we can see 
how multiple frames may help generate richer analysis of deceptively simple accusations. Still, 
there are additional considerations that must be addressed before concluding this discussion on 
the genre of kategoria. 
2.1.6 Further Considerations of Kategoria 
The tools discussed above for analyzing kategoria do not fully satisfy a few questions that 
remain about treating kategoria as a genre. First, it is important to recognize that kategoria is 
different from general accusation in respect to its functions. Whereas an accusation may be made 
for the psychological and sociological benefit of the accuser and witnesses, kategoria is 
specifically designed to elicit a particular response in the form of apologia. In the terminology of 
speech act theory, the kategoria is an illocutionary act that carries enough force to “invite by 
convention a response or sequel” and apologia functions as the corresponding “perlocutionary 
sequel,” a response that necessarily follows.36 The response need not be verbal—in many cases a 
physical action or deed can serve as a perlocutionary sequel. 
Another function of kategoria that distinguishes it from general accusation is that 
kategoria seeks to shape the generic constraints that confront the apologia. It is this function that 
justifies the pairing of kategoria and apologia for analysis as a speech set and requires particular 
focus on the kategoria as the instigation of the speech set. All kategoriae face the challenge of 
working within received audience expectations regarding the generic constraints of apologia. A 
                                                 
36 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 
117-118. 
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kategoria may try to foreground, background, alter, add, or subtract from the set of those 
constraints. The success of a kategoria is not predetermined because it depends in part on 
rhetoric to shape the rhetorical situation. The success of any apologia, then, depends on the 
rhetor not only dealing artfully with the received generic constraints (what audiences generally 
expect from an apologia), but also on the extent to which the rhetor responds to the situation as 
shaped by a particular kategoria (what audiences expect from this apologia, specifically). 
The context for kategoria also factors in to its consideration as a genre. Traditionally, 
kategoria has been associated with judicial/forensic rhetoric of accusation to which the accused 
responds in defense (apologia) by addressing the salient stasis points with denial, excuse, or 
justification and perhaps by using the strategies the rhetoricians B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel 
made famous (bolstering, denial, transcendence, and differentiation).37 However, kategoria has a 
place within deliberative and epideictic rhetoric as well. In the case of the Legacy Committee 
Request, as we shall see, accusations about past events—including the failure of the United 
States government to apologize for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study—are leveled in order to pursue 
a specific ceremonial action (apology) as well as the enactment of policies as suggested by the 
Legacy Committee.  
Furthermore, the kategoria/apologia speech set has not traditionally allowed for non-
defensive responses (i.e., apologies) to the accusation. In the next two chapters, I will 
specifically address the relationship between the genres of apology and apologia, but the generic 
divisions should not prohibit my consideration of kategoria and apology as possible variation of 
the speech set that benefits from paired criticism. 
                                                 
37 B. L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, “They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of 
Apologia,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 59 (1973): 273-283. 
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This section has introduced the genre of kategoria and several specific analytic resources 
for its criticism, including stasis theory, motive theory, the rhetorical situation, and persuasive 
attack. The genre discussion has laid part of the foundation for analysis of the focal rhetorical 
artifact of this chapter, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee’s request for a 
presidential apology. I have traced the classical roots of kategoria and stasis theory, as well as 
examined the notable contemporary developments of kategoria’s generic qualities and topoi. I 
have also raised three additional concerns for the treatment of kategoria on its own as well as its 
inclusion in speech sets. I turn now to the history of the group that authored and authorized the 
request for an apology for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study before engaging an analysis of the 
document they issued. 
2.2 HISTORY OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY LEGACY COMMITTEE 
The development of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee’s request for an apology 
began with the creation of the Committee itself, the impetus for which dates back more than two 
years before the delivery of the apology request to the White House in 1996. On February 23, 
1994, the University of Virginia hosted a one-day symposium titled, “Doing Bad in the Name of 
Good? The Tuskegee Syphilis Study and its Legacy.” Coordinated by Joan Echtenkamp Klein, 
then the Assistant Director for Historical Collection and Services at the Claude Moore Health 
Sciences Library at the University of Virginia, the symposium’s purpose was to “apply historical 
perspective on the Tuskegee Study to the current problems of cultural difference in perceptions 
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of health care workers and the appropriate nexus of scientific research and human rights.”38 The 
symposium included a viewing of the film, “Bad Blood,” and presentations by scholars across a 
variety of disciplines: 
James H. Jones Author of Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment 
Historian at University of Houston 
Vanessa N. Gamble Physician and medical historian at University of Wisconsin 
School of Medicine  
Susan M. Reverby Historian and women’s studies professor at Wellesley College 
Patricia A. Sullivan Biologist and Assistant Director for the Study of Civil Rights at 
the University of Virginia’s Carter G. Woodson Institute 
Paul A. Lombardo Law professor and Director of the Mental Health Law Training 
and Research Center of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry, and 
Public Policy at the University of Virginia 
John C. Fletcher Bioethicist and Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at 
the University of Virginia Health Sciences Center 
Gertrude Fraser Anthropologist at the University of Virginia39
According to Paul Lombardo, it was John Fletcher’s remarks and actions at the 
symposium that precipitated direct action on the part of the scholars present to bring about a 
government apology. In an emotional moment during his talk, “Fletcher set aside his prepared 
remarks and declared the legal settlement that followed the Tuskegee revelations to be morally 
inadequate; more was required, he said. ‘This institution [the Public Health Service] should have 
come to its knees and apologized. It is not too late to say we did something wrong?’”40 Later that 
evening, Fletcher “paced the room” at the symposium dinner to solicit the involvement of other 
                                                 
38 University of Virginia Health System, “Tuskegee Syphilis Study Symposium,” 
http://www.hsl.virginia.edu/historical/medical_history/bad_blood/symposium.cfm; Joan Echtenkamp Klein, “Doing 
Bad in the Name of Good,” Symposium announcement, email to MedLib-L mailing list, http://list.uvm.edu/cgi-bin/ 
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39 University of Virginia Health System, “Tuskegee Syphilis Study Symposium,” http://www.hsl.virginia 
.edu/historical/medical_history/bad_blood/symposium.cfm. 
40 Paul A. Lombardo, “In Memoriam: John C. Fletcher (1931-2004),” Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics 
32 (October 2004): 539. 
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attendees in his fledgling plan to secure an apology from the government.41 The seeds of the 
Legacy Committee had been sown. 
On January 18-19, 1996, Tuskegee University hosted a workshop on “Enhancing 
Minority Participation in Research and Other Programs Sponsored by the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services” sponsored by the Minority Health Professions 
Foundation and funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the 
Department of Health and Human Services.42 The workshop, organized by the Northeastern 
Minority Oral Health Research Center, attracted scholars and practitioners interested in racial 
health disparities and disproportionate participation by minorities in health research and the 
mainstream medical establishment. Dr. Ralph Katz guided the organization of the workshop 
along with Dr. James Ferguson (Dean of Tuskegee University College of Veterinary Medicine 
and president of the Minority Professions Foundation) and Dr. Rueben Warren (Associate 
Director for Minority Health at the CDC.43 Two goals were established for the two-day 
workshop: to “develop a strategy for an apology from the United States President” and to have 
the 22-person expert panel assess the preliminary Tuskegee Legacy Project Questionnaire 
developed by Katz and his colleagues before its revision and pilot the following summer.44
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ralph V. Katz and others, “The Tuskegee Legacy Project: History, Preliminary Scientific Findings, and 
Unanticipated Societal Benefits,” Dental Clinics of North America 47 (January 2003): 10. 
43 Katz and others, “The Tuskegee Legacy Project,” 10. 
44 Ibid., 10-11. The Tuskegee Legacy Project, of which Katz is the principal investigator, is an empirical 
study that aims to “document, directly address, and hopefully mollify the specific concerns harbored by African 
Americans as they were invited to participate in future studies focused on minority health issues” (3). The Tuskegee 
Legacy Project will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 5. 
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Fourteen of the participants at the Tuskegee University workshop established the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee at that meeting.45 As Katz describes, the 
Committee’s goal was “to ensure that, subsequent to the workshop, the proposed apology 
document would be presented to the highest levels of government and to key community 
leaders.”46 The final report of the Committee, the request for a presidential apology, was dated 
May 20, 1996.47  
Vanessa Northington Gamble chaired the Legacy Committee. As a medical historian and 
professor at the University of Wisconsin, she was a founder and director of the Center for the 
Study of Race and Ethnicity at the University of Wisconsin Medical School.48
John Fletcher served as co-chair for the Legacy Committee he instigated.49 Previously, 
Fletcher had been a Founding Fellow of the Hastings Center (a bioethics research institution 
founded in 1969), the first Chief of the Bioethics Program at the Clinical Center of the National 
Institutes of Health and the Founding Director of the Center for Bioethics at the University of 
Virginia in Charlottesville.50 He was a professor of biomedical ethics there until he retired in 
1999.51
                                                 
45 Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” 564, 565 n. 1; Katz and others, “The Tuskegee 
Legacy Project,” 11. The names and affiliations of all fourteen members of the Legacy Committee are included in 
the Committee’s final report (reprinted in Appendix A) and, unless otherwise specified, information about these 
members came from that report. 
46 Katz and others, “The Tuskegee Legacy Project,” 11. 
47 University of Virginia Health System, “Final Report of the Tuskegee syphilis Study Legacy 
Committee—May 20, 1996,” http://www.hsl.virginia.edu/historical/medical_history/bad_blood/report.cfm.  
48 National Library of Medicine, “Biography [Dr. Vanessa Northington Gamble],” Changing the Face of 
Medicine exhibit, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/changingthefaceofmedicine/physicians/biography_122.html 
49 Lombardo, “In Memoriam,” 539; Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” 564. 
50 Mary Faith Marshall, “What Really Happened: A Tribute to John C. Fletcher,” The American Journal of 
Bioethics 4 (Fall 2004): W3. 
51 Ibid. 
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In addition to Fletcher and Gamble, two other speakers at the 1994 Symposium joined the 
Legacy Committee: James Jones and Susan Reverby. Jones, a historian from the University of 
Houston, wrote what is widely held as the definitive history of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Bad 
Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment was initially published in 1981 and a second edition, 
expanded to include “the Tuskegee Experiment’s legacy in the age of AIDS” was published in 
1993.52 Jones first learned of the Tuskegee Study while researching a different project in the 
National Archives but thought that the Study had already been discontinued.53 The 1972 Heller 
article shocked him and he began research for the manuscript of Bad Blood the same year.54 
Susan Reverby, a women’s studies scholar, has written about the role of nurse Eunice Rivers in 
the Tuskegee Study and, since the Legacy Committee’s formation, has written and edited several 
articles and two books about the Tuskegee Study. 
Tuskegee workshop organizers Ralph Katz, Rueben Warren, and James Ferguson were 
members of the Legacy Committee, as was one of Katz’s co-investigators in the Tuskegee 
Legacy Project, Dr. B. Lee Green. Dr. Green was an Assistant Professor at the University of 
Alabama and had been invited to join the committee due to his previous interest and work in the 
area of minority participation in research.55 Joan Echtenkamp Klien, the University of Virginia 
symposium coordinator, also joined the Committee. 
The remaining five members of the Legacy Committee were professionals in public 
health organizations. Myrtle Adams was the Chairman and Patricia Clay was an administrator of 
the Macon County Health Care Authority. Barbara Harrell was the Director of the Division of 
                                                 
52 James H. Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, New ed. (New York: The Free Press, 
1993). 
53 Ibid., xi. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Moffitt Diversity, “Team Members—B. Lee Green,” http://www.moffitt.org/Site.aspx?spid= 
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Minority Health at the Alabama Department of Public Health. Dr. Bill Jenkins was an 
epidemiologist at the CDC. Anthony Winn, a Program Analyst from the Minority Health 
Professions Foundation, rounded out the Committee. 
Understanding the make up of this motivated group sheds light on the group’s orientation 
toward rhetorical production and their explicit mission to craft an effective call for apology. The 
participation of the Committee members in local and national organizations, as well as some 
members’ academic prestige, lent particular credibility to the Legacy Committee and strength to 
its collective voice in the formal request. Armed with background information about the authors 
of the Legacy Committee Request, I now turn to a description of the document followed by 
rhetorical analysis of the request according to the analytic frame detailed in the previous section. 
2.3 THE LEGACY COMMITTEE REQUEST 
The final report of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee was submitted to the CDC as 
well as to the White House and was publicly supported by the Congressional Black Caucus, civil 
rights attorney Fred Gray (who, joined by five Study survivors, held a press conference on the 
matter in April 1997), and other groups.56 According to one colleague, Legacy Committee co-
chair John Fletcher “worked through colleagues and contacts in government to bring the apology 
petition to the President's desk.”57
                                                 
56 Susan M. Reverby, “History of an Apology: From Tuskegee to the White House,” Research Nurse 3, no. 
4 (July/August 1997): 7. 
57 Lombardo, “In Memoriam,” 539. 
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In its report,58 the Legacy Committee acknowledged that it sought “two inseparable 
goals: 1) to persuade President Clinton to publicly apologize for past government wrongdoing to 
the Study’s living survivors, their families, and to the Tuskegee community, and 2) to develop a 
strategy to redress the damages caused by the Study and to transform its damaging legacy.”59 
The stated purpose was not to demonize or damage the Clinton administration for acts that took 
place long before its election, but to urge the sitting president to perform particular rhetorical and 
political acts designed to address the exigences identified by the Committee. Needless to say, this 
approach did not fully absolve the Clinton administration for its handling of the issue, as the 
subsequent analysis elucidates. 
The Legacy Committee’s request set forth arguments for why an apology was necessary 
(perception of an “evil or exigence,” in Ryan’s terms), why it ought to be given soon, and why 
President Clinton was a fitting agent to deliver the apology. In the following subsections, I 
identify and describe these arguments as they occur within four prominent themes in the request. 
Specifically, the Legacy Committee emphasized the wrongs and harms of the Study; made 
recommendations regarding the audience, timing, and context for its desired presidential 
apology; identified the agent to perform the apology; and laid out additional goals for the 
apology event and presidential action related to the event. Each of these themes contributes to the 
kategoria as an accusation and as a document designed to elicit a particular set of perlocutionary 
sequels performed by President Clinton. The analysis in Section 2.4 also deploys the specific 
tools for rhetorical criticism of kategoria that were introduced earlier in this chapter. 
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2.3.1 Emphasizing the Wrongs and Harms of the Study 
As an accusation, the request for an apology must explain the acts or failures to act that warrant 
censure and for which an apology is requested. In the Legacy Committee’s request, the 
Committee described the “moral and physical harms to the community of Macon County,” 
specifically the men in the Study and their families.60 The report cited several components to the 
government’s wrongdoing, including “deliberately deceiving them and withholding from them 
state of the art treatment.”61 The introduction to the report pointed to how the government 
doctors “went to extreme lengths to ensure that [the men] would not receive any therapy from 
other sources.”62 Additionally, the “lax study protocol” may have admitted men whose syphilis 
was still communicable, thereby allowing the untreated men to spread the disease to their sexual 
partners and their children in utero.63 In this way, the physical harms of untreated syphilis 
extended beyond the men in the Study to others in the community. The Committee reported that 
even the reputation of Tuskegee Institute (now, Tuskegee University) was harmed because the 
name of the Study itself is misleading and “clouds the funding and responsibility for the 
Study”—the United States government, rather than Tuskegee Institute, directed the Study and 
designed its parameters.64
Another aspect of the Study’s lingering harm described in the request regards the absence 
of apology for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study: “No public official has ever stated clearly to the 
nation that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study was morally wrong from its inception, and no public 
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official has ever apologized to the survivors and their families.”65 A class-action lawsuit, settled 
out of court in 1974, provided financial compensation to victims and their family members but 
did not include an apology.66 The Legacy Committee contended that “an apology is sorely 
needed” and that “an apology from the President could facilitate the healing of the victims and 
the nation.”67 There is no further explanation of apology’s healing potential beyond the 
rhetorical power of publicly declaring the values and moral standards by which the nation will be 
guided. Still, the Legacy Committee’s request implies that a public acknowledgement of the 
government’s wrongdoing and its consequent harms may have tremendous value to those who 
have felt disregarded and forgotten by their nation. 
Beyond the immediate harms of the Study, the request for an apology cited the “harmful 
legacy of the Study.”68 The authors acknowledged, “African Americans’ distrust of the medical 
profession predates the revelation of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and involves a myriad of other 
social and political factors. Nevertheless, the Study has become a powerful symbol for the fear of 
exploitation in research and the deprivation of adequate medical care that is widespread in the 
African-American community.”69 The Committee cited several examples of how the memory of 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study is invoked as the reason why so many African Americans are 
suspicious of the medical profession and the government. This distrust manifests in many ways 
including avoiding medical treatment, participating in medical research in disproportionately low 
numbers, choosing not to donate organs, and believing rumors of various government genocide 
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programs involving, for example, the AIDS virus and needle exchange programs.70 According to 
the Committee, this lingering distrust has continued implications for the health disparities 
observed between African Americans and white Americans. The Committee summarized the 
nature of the Tuskegee Legacy: “In the almost twenty-five years since its disclosure, the Study 
has moved from a singular historical event to a powerful metaphor. It has come to symbolize 
racism in medicine, ethical misconduct in human research, paternalism by physicians, and 
government abuse of vulnerable people.”71 The power of this metaphor, then, is another 
argument for a public presidential apology. In Chapters 5 and 6, I will return to this theme of the 
Tuskegee Study as a metaphor to explore the implications of this claim for medical research 
recruitment and for the rhetorical situations facing those who would speak about historical 
wrongdoing.  
2.3.2 Attending to Audience, Timeliness, and Context 
The Legacy Committee’s kategoria extended beyond mere accusation to include 
recommendations for the response the Committee sought. Still, the explicit call for apology is 
clear: “The Committee urges President Clinton to apologize on behalf of the American 
government for the harms inflicted at Tuskegee.”72 The Committee then specified its preferred 
parameters for such an event. First, it requested that the apology be offered to both the specific 
and the more general victims of the Tuskegee Study: “The apology should be directed to those 
most directly harmed: to the elderly survivors of the Study, to their families, and to the wider 
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community of Tuskegee and its University. Also included in the apology should be all people of 
color whose lives reverberate with the consequences of the Study.73 Attention to the broader 
audience would take into account the legacy of the Study and not just the men directly involved 
in the government program itself.  
The call for an apology listed a few more details for the context of the apology event: it 
“should be offered swiftly,” as fewer than a dozen participants were still living at the time of the 
report and those survivors were advanced in years; it should be offered from Tuskegee 
University; it might correspond with a meeting of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
at the same location since “the Tuskegee Study is a starting point for all modern moral reflection 
on research ethics.”74 Some of these parameters seem to be offered in the spirit of ideal wishes 
rather than mandatory features—the correspondence between these requests and the actual 
circumstances of President Clinton’s apology will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
2.3.3 Specifying the Agent of Apology 
As for the agent of the apology, the Committee argued that Clinton, as the “highest elected 
official of the United States,” ought to apologize since a branch of the government conducted the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Furthermore, President Clinton had already demonstrated his 
willingness to apologize for governmental wrongdoing of past administrations when he 
apologized for human radiation experiments conducted during the Cold War, an event cited by 
the Committee as an example of the significance of a presidential apology and a means to 
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“regain confidence of the American people.”75 A third reason offered for Clinton to serve as the 
agent of apology was his own professed commitment to “bridg[ing] the racial divide”—the 
Committee argued that offering an apology for the Tuskegee Study “provides the opportunity to 
begin to heal the racial wounds that persist in this country.”76 Again, the report provided no 
specific explanation of how an apology would affect the legacy of the Study, nor how it could 
resolve broader racial conflicts in the United States, but an apology was still hailed by the 
Committee as the first big step toward repairing the damage caused by the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study. 
2.3.4 Identifying Additional Goals 
In addition to establishing an argument for a presidential apology and providing some guidance 
about the context for such an apology, the Legacy Committee also included in the report a 
discussion of how an apology could serve as a catalyst for a transformation of the Tuskegee 
legacy. The Committee deemed a presidential apology to be a necessary but insufficient action to 
“heal the wounds of Tuskegee,” and requested that a center be established at Tuskegee 
University, funded by governmental and private contributions, that would be “focused on 
preserving the national memory of the Study and transforming its legacy.77 The Committee did 
not express a wish to end the legacy but, rather, convert it into a positive association that 
demonstrates “the importance of acknowledging past wrongs, rebuilding trust, and practicing 
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
 51
ethical research.”78 A staffed center at Tuskegee University would, according to the Committee, 
serve as a Tuskegee Syphilis Study museum and archive as well as a bioethics research facility 
with a focus on determining and disseminating ethical and practical solutions to mitigate the 
negative effects of the Tuskegee legacy. The Committee proposed both governmental and private 
funding for such a center but suggested that other initiatives related to minority health and 
research ethics could be valuable, as well. The request closed with optimism about an apology’s 
effect on the Tuskegee legacy: “It is undeniable that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study has adversely 
affected the attitudes that many African Americans hold toward the biomedical community and 
the United States government. But despite the long shadow that it casts, we now have an 
opportunity to challenge this legacy and create a more beneficial one.”79 Such optimism about 
the efficacy of an apology might appear to be nearsighted, particularly in light of the deep-seated 
racial divisions in the United States that extend farther back than our nationhood itself. Still, the 
Legacy Committee recognized that its explicit request for an apology could serve to fan the 
fading flames of the exigence for an official governmental response to the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study. 
The Legacy Committee’s report shows clear intent to influence its audience, but the 
rhetorical tactics employed in the request must still be explicated. In the next section, I provide 
an analysis of the text using the critical toolkit for kategoria discussed earlier in this chapter with 
the goal of identifying the rhetorical maneuvers that contributed to the report’s influence over 
President Clinton’s actions and policies. 
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2.4 ANALYSIS OF THE REQUEST 
2.4.1 Identifying the Genre and Speech Set 
The report issued by the Legacy Committee performs several rhetorical functions, but its degree 
of fit with the genre of kategoria must be addressed before proceeding with its analysis 
according to the theory discussed earlier in the chapter. It is important to recognize that this 
report was not issued within a legal context or for the purpose of bringing criminal or civil 
charges against any individual or group. The class-action lawsuit brought by attorney Fred Gray 
and settled in 1974 was the opportunity for formal investigations, accusations, defenses, and 
statements. By contrast, the Legacy Committee’s 1996 report serves purposes more closely 
associated with deliberative and epideictic rhetoric than forensic rhetoric. Here, the kategoria 
enumerates the particular harms and shortcomings of the present situation and establishes the 
rationale for President Clinton addressing those ills at this particular, opportune time (kairos). 
The key topics are not merely past events (as they tend to be in forensic rhetoric), but also the 
present harms suffered as a result of those past events and the proposals for future policies to 
remediate the harms. The Legacy Committee’s kategoria performs epideictic functions as it lays 
out a blaming scheme that places responsibility for the harms of the Tuskegee Study squarely on 
the shoulders of the U.S. government and locates responsibility for an apology with the executive 
head of that government. Additionally, the request for apology serves as a commemorative 
artifact issued in preparation for the 25th anniversary of the Study’s end that recalls the history of 
the Study and its legacy and calls for a formal ceremony in response. 
The Legacy Committee’s two stated goals, “to persuade President Clinton to publicly 
apologize [and] to develop a strategy to redress the damages caused by the Study and to 
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transform its damaging legacy,”80 indicate that its document seems to be presented in the spirit 
of admonition (using “words with intent to benefit”) rather than accusation (“denounc[ing] with 
intent to injure”), according to Isocrates’ distinction.81 The committee's rhetorical invention 
aimed at bringing about a presidential apology employs a tone of cooperation and exhortation 
rather than antagonism. Yet, in Isocrates' conceptualization, the difference between admonition 
and accusation is one of intent rather than form or substance. It is useful to treat them as 
variations of kategoria rather than separate genres; both admonition and accusation require the 
rhetor to advance claims about the stases and both call for a response in the form of apologia or 
apology. Further analysis of the speech set will reveal whether the Legacy Committee’s stated 
benevolent goals were interpreted as such but, at this juncture, further difference between 
admonition and accusation need not worry us. 
The appropriate response to this kategoria, as requested by the Legacy Committee, is an 
apology rather than a defense typical of the kategoria/apologia speech set. However, the non-
forensic contextual features of this kategoria allow for a response that need not be a defense in 
the traditional sense of apologia—such a defensive response may be entirely inappropriate in 
some cases—but an apology that addresses the faults identified in the kategoria and the 
enactment of policies that the proposers and respondent deem to be expedient to meet the needs 
described in the kategoria. In our case, the speech set is much less adversarial than a traditional 
accusation/defense pair. 
The Legacy Committee’s elaboration of a request for a presidential apology fits the 
pattern of kategoria in important ways and serves, therefore, to heighten the exigence faced by 
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President Clinton as the 25th anniversary of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study’s termination 
approached. While the Committee’s call for an apology is not an accusation against Clinton 
specifically and Clinton’s response is not a personal defense, the two rhetorical events still 
constitute a speech set and the genres of kategoria and apologia are relevant and helpful in the 
analytical process. 
2.4.2 A Challenge of Clinton’s Ethos 
As an accusation, the Legacy Committee report does not link President Clinton directly to the 
wrongdoing of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study or the government’s failure to apologize in the past 
but, rather, echoes the President’s own stated political goals of racial reconciliation and 
governmental transparency in and accountability for matters of wrongdoing. In this way, the 
President’s character was not the subject of the accusation but was invoked in the service of a 
persuasive strategy that offered him the opportunity to uphold his stated values and work toward 
his political goals. For example, the Committee asserted, “In the context of President Clinton’s 
stated desire to bridge the racial divide, this apology provides the opportunity to begin to heal the 
racial wounds that persist in this country.”82 As the leader of the government (though not the 
particular administration) responsible for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, any sitting president at 
that time would have been subject to the Committee’s criticism and request, but President 
Clinton’s explicit desire for racial reconciliation made him a particularly attractive recipient. Had 
President Clinton not responded to the call for an apology, he almost certainly would have 
become the subject of direct accusation for his failure to do so. After all, the Committee’s belief 
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was that, “as the highest elected official of the United States, the President should offer the 
apology for the Study which was conducted under the auspices of the United States 
government.”83
In Walter Fisher’s “A Motive View of Communication,” he asks the reader to keep in 
mind that the “motive view” is designed to help us see how rhetoric works rather than primarily 
to identify a specific rhetor’s intent.84 Using that approach, we can understand how the Legacy 
Committee’s report may have reaffirmed some readers’ views of the U.S. government (and, 
perhaps, the medical establishment) as corrupt, dangerous, unethical, racist, and untrustworthy 
while simultaneously subverting others’ perceptions of the government as benevolent, 
progressive, just, transparent, and responsive. For those who had lived under the specter of the 
Tuskegee legacy, the history provided by the Legacy Committee’s report was not news. 
However, for those who were not as familiar with the details of the Study, the report may have 
germinated new perceptions and feelings about the U.S. government and medical research 
establishments.85 As for the effects on the specific intended audience, President Clinton, it is 
unclear whether his previously held views on the government’s role in the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study were reaffirmed or subverted by the Legacy Committee’s report. What is more important 
rhetorically, however, is how President Clinton responded to the Legacy Committee’s appeals, 
the subject of the next chapter’s inquiry. 
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2.4.3 Building a Case Using Stases 
Despite the necessary qualifications accompanying my classification of the Legacy Committee 
request as a kategoria, we can plainly see how the authors built a case against the United States 
government for the harms caused as a result of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study by providing 
evidence to address each of the four stases. The issue of fact is perhaps the simplest in this case: 
The Committee reminded the President that the Unites States Public Health Service, a 
government agency, conducted a study in rural Alabama for 40 years.86 Additionally, the 
Committee cited the legal settlement of 1974 and the absence of any official apology to the men 
and families affected by the Study as additional facts that are pertinent to their argument for an 
apology.87 The question of how to define the actions of the Public Health Service doctors who 
designed and conduced the Study is critical. The Legacy Committee argued that the Tuskegee 
Study was harmful, unethical, scientifically and morally problematic, and unnecessary.88 It 
categorized the harms as those suffered by the men and families of Macon County, by the 
community by extension, by the reputation of Tuskegee Institute and others involved with the 
Study (though not necessarily complicit with it) because of the name by which the Study is 
remembered, and by the fear and distrust that it alleges are consequences of the enduring legacy 
of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.89 This structure of the request serves not only to organize the 
Committee’s arguments but also to emphasize clearly how the harms of the Study are varied, 
widespread, and enduring. Each of these accusations targets policies and practices of the 
government and its agents. 
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The charge against the government for the lack of a public apology was further defined in 
the Committee’s request as a failure to provide a necessary and ethically valuable offering to the 
victims of the government’s wrongdoing.90 The stasis of jurisdiction is not typically addressed in 
an accusation, but the Legacy Committee provided an explicit argument for why President 
Clinton was an appropriate audience for its appeal and the appropriate apologizer for the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study. It asserted that, as the “highest elected official of the United States,” 
Clinton had the authority and responsibility to speak on behalf of the deeds committed by a 
government agency.91 The Committee even provided evidence of Clinton’s willingness to 
apologize for past administrations’ sins against U.S. citizens by citing his 1995 apology for Cold 
War-era human radiation experiments,92 thereby attempting to preemptively shut down an 
excuse for Clinton not to apologize, one based on the stasis of quality. 
Attention to each of the stases, whether the Committee intended to or not, shows a strong 
argumentative approach to the accusation and call for apology. The Committee is unambiguous 
in its criticism of the government’s wrongdoing and its proposal for partial remediation through a 
presidential apology. By presenting a clear and straightforward statement, the Committee was 
successful in beginning to reshape the rhetorical situation facing President Clinton. 
2.4.4 The Kategoria’s Rhetorical Situation  
As Ryan suggests, the elements of Bitzer’s rhetorical situation can helpfully serve to illuminate 
and organize criticism of kategoriae and apologiae. In Bitzer’s model, a rhetor senses an 
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imperfection, or exigence, and seeks to ameliorate it by addressing a rhetorical audience (one 
that is able and potentially willing to respond favorably) while working within the constraints 
posed by the situation.93 In the case of the Legacy Committee request, the two central issues 
argued by the Committee—the government conducted a harmful project and has not yet 
apologized—also serve as the exigences driving the request. In particular, the lack of an apology 
presented a clear imperfection to the Committee that it explicitly desired to correct through its 
rhetorical action. The urgency that marks this exigence is also made explicit in the request: 
“Given the ages of the [eleven] living participants and the period of time since the Study was 
disclosed, we believe that the apology should be offered swiftly.”94 The Legacy Committee 
delivered its request twenty-four years following the end of the Study, in time for a presidential 
response during the 25-year anniversary of the Study’s end. Such a direct appeal for an apology 
can create the exigence for a presidential response. However, the Legacy Committee argued that 
the exigence had existed for at least twenty-four years and that the government has been guilty of 
affording inadequate attention to repairing the damage caused by the Study.95 Thus, this 
accusation serves to heighten the exigence facing Clinton rather than to manufacture a new 
rhetorical situation or allow an old situation to decay.96 By working with governmental groups 
such as the CDC and the Congressional Black Caucus to promote its request (and by including 
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fourteen signatories from both local and national organizations), the Legacy Committee assured 
that its efforts could not be ignored by President Clinton without notice by others. The witnesses 
to the Legacy Committee’s request form a peripheral audience for the rhetoric, though President 
Clinton is clearly the primary target.97 The Legacy Committee, then, experienced the usual 
constraints of observing appropriate decorum in its correspondence with the President. The 
Committee needed to be clear and firm about its goals without becoming demanding or 
presumptuous in its requests and the request reflects appropriate care given to this balance. 
More attention to the features of the rhetorical situation facing President Clinton 
following his receipt of the Legacy Committee’s request for an apology will be provided in 
Chapter 3. For now, however, it is important and sufficient to recognize the Legacy Committee’s 
overt attempt to reinvigorate the exigence (a missing apology) that had become feebler due to the 
passage of time. The Committee argued that its intended audience, President Clinton, had the 
power and authority to remediate many of the lingering harms of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
that cast a “long shadow” over the United States and crafted its appeal to accommodate the 
rhetorical and practical constraints of addressing the highest elected official of the government 
with its request.98
2.4.5 Topoi of Persuasive Attack 
Finally, I turn to the argumentative topoi of persuasive attack developed by Benoit and Dorries to 
consider how the Legacy Committee employed rhetorical tactics to present its case to President 
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Clinton. Benoit and Dorries focus on two primary concerns of the attacker: increasing the agent’s 
perceived responsibility for the alleged act and increasing the perceived offensiveness of the 
alleged act.99 Three of the topoi emphasizing the agent’s responsibility are used within the 
Legacy Committee request, though not always for the same agent of responsibility. One tactic is 
to show that the accused has committed the act before. In this case, the Legacy Committee uses 
this strategy with a twist—not to castigate Clinton for particular wrongdoing, but to call to mind 
the precedent for official apologies for governmental wrongdoing that he had already established 
by apologizing for the human radiation experiments during the Cold War.100 Since he had 
apologized in the past for other administrations’ wrongdoing he should apologize now, the 
argument goes.  
Another tactic is to demonstrate that the accused agent planned the act. The Committee’s 
request clearly recounts the U.S. Public Health Service’s role in designing and initiating the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study in 1932 and persisting in preventing the men in the Study from 
receiving effective treatment by penicillin when it became available several years later.101 The 
Legacy Committee’s accusation also emphasizes that the government scientists engaged in 
“deliberately deceiving” the men they recruited into the Study.102 This topos specifically points 
to the Study characteristics that were purposefully and unethically established by the Public 
Health Service.  
Additionally, the request alleges implicitly that the government knew the likely 
consequences of their actions, another of the attack topoi for agent responsibility. The 
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Committee acknowledged that “state of the art” treatments for syphilis were hardly effective in 
1932, but criticized the Study investigators for withholding penicillin after it was found to be 
effective as the standard treatment for syphilis.103 Implicitly, the Legacy Committee alleged that, 
in withholding treatment from the men for four decades, the government scientists knew they 
were harming the health of the men in the Study even if that was not necessarily the case at the 
Study’s inception. While the Study was intended to be an investigation of “untreated syphilis in 
the male Negro,”104 there was enough scientific knowledge in 1932 to indicate that withholding 
treatment—even less effective treatments—would be detrimental to the men’s health.  
Benoit and Dorries recommend that the persuasive accuser indicate how the accused has 
benefited from the alleged act. In the case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, the investigators must 
have thought they were gathering important data to expand medical and public health 
knowledge, but the Legacy Committee cited “lax study protocol” that invalidated the results by 
enrolling participants who did not meet the study criteria (e.g., some men may have had active 
rather than latent syphilis).105 In any case, the Legacy Committee did not use this topic of the 
perpetrator’s gain in its criticism of the U.S. government but relied, instead, on descriptions of 
the harm done to the victims. 
After increasing the agent’s perceived responsibility for wrongdoing according to the 
tactics outlined above, Benoit and Dorries indicate that an accuser may try to increase the 
perceived offensiveness of the alleged act. While there are six suggested lines, all of which are 
eligible for use in an accusation of the government’s role in the Tuskegee Study, the Legacy 
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Committee focused on four in particular. First, the Committee recounted the extent of the 
damage of the Study, explicitly listing the moral harms (deception, being prevented from 
obtaining standard medical care, “exploitation in research”106), physical harms (fatalities from 
syphilis are estimated between 28-100 men, spread of active syphilis to family members107), 
psychological harms (increased distrust and suspicion of the medical profession, fear of 
exploitation, avoidance of medical treatment108), and harm to the reputation of Tuskegee 
Institute—now Tuskegee University—because of the name by which the Public Health Service 
study is remembered.109 This strategy was combined in the request with another strategy: 
showing the persistence of the negative effects. For the Legacy Committee, the harm of the 
Tuskegee Study was not simply in the health consequences for the men in the Study, but in the 
enduring physical and, particularly, psychological and sociological harms to the broader African 
American community, many of whom believe that “the fact that the Tuskegee Study occurred at 
all proves that black life is not valued” in the United States.110 The Committee wrote, “The 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study continues to cast its long shadow on the contemporary relationship 
between African Americans and the biomedical community,”111 and repeatedly cited this 
“harmful legacy of the Study”112 as a persistent need for official words and actions to “begin the 
process of regaining the trust of people of color.”113 The harms of the Tuskegee legacy are cited 
by the Legacy Committee as salient in the present—the Committee used the present tense to 
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describe the consequences of African Americans’ distrust in government and the medical 
establishment as well as how “the notoriety of the Study obscures the achievements of the 
Tuskegee Institute in improving the health care of African Americans.”114 The Committee’s 
recommendation for a presidential apology and development of grants and programs to enhance 
bioethics and minority health training were explicitly made in the hopes that such moves would 
help the country “move beyond Tuskegee and to address the effects of its legacy.”115 The 
Committee also hoped that a dedicated research and memorial center at Tuskegee “could help 
transform the legacy of Tuskegee into a positive symbol for all Americans by demonstrating the 
importance of acknowledging past wrongs, rebuilding trust, and practicing ethical research.”116
The Legacy Committee also attempted to increase the perceived offensiveness of the 
Tuskegee Study by showing the victims to be innocent and helpless. The Committee described 
the men in the Tuskegee Study as “poor black sharecroppers from Macon County”117 and 
“socially and economically vulnerable African-American men.”118 Later, some of the men were 
called “elderly survivors”119 and the Study was described as “government abuse of vulnerable 
people.”120 The report also cited the men’s families, children, unborn children, and “all people of 
color whose lives reverberate with the consequences of the Study” as victims of the Study, 
victims who cannot be seen as blameworthy for their hardship, grief, or fear. The Legacy 
Committee did not explicitly identify the government researchers and doctors as “white,” but the 
frequent reference to African American victims, “racial wounds,” and the “racial divide” signal 
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117 Ibid., 559. 
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119 Ibid., 562. 
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that the Tuskegee Study was, among other things, a race issue where the powerful majority 
abused and exploited the less powerful minority. 
The remaining strategies available to the Legacy Committee to emphasize the 
offensiveness of the Tuskegee Study would be recognized by the reader though they were not 
explicitly argued in the report. The inconsistency or hypocrisy of the agents are obvious enough 
not to need spelling out in the request: the Public Health Service ought to be serving the health 
needs of the citizens rather than purposely putting them in danger, the U.S. government ought 
not allow—much less promote—the needless abuse of its citizens, and doctors ought to treat 
their patients rather than keep them from appropriate care. This attack strategy fits well with 
another: arguing the special obligation of the agents to protect the victims. The doctor/patient, 
researcher/participant, and perhaps even government/citizen relationships all obligate the party 
with more power and control to exercise due care in their treatment of their counterparts. These 
obligations rise above a mere social contract or professional obligation to the level of an ethical 
obligation.121  
The final strategy for increasing the perceived offensiveness of an act, according to 
Benoit and Dorries, is to show how the act affects the audience. In this case, this strategy is 
implicitly modified as showing the effects of the Tuskegee Study on those within the jurisdiction 
of the audience(s)—American citizens and those the CDC aims to reach in their attempts to 
eliminate racial health disparities. By emphasizing how the legacy of the Tuskegee Study is said 
                                                 
121 An example from the medical field may help to illustrate the connection among professional, legal, and 
ethical obligations and failures: “If a physician breaches her duty to care and fails to meet the standard of care, we 
can say that she has acted wrongfully and find her blameworthy according to ethical and professional standards. If 
that failure of her duty also results in compensable harm to the patient, she would also be liable—by legal 
standards—for negligence and, thus, malpractice. Ethical culpability and legal culpability do not adhere to all the 
same criteria, but the standard of care in the medical arena clearly carries implications for both.” Autumn R. Boyer, 
“In a ‘Sorry’ State: The Ethics of Institutional Apologies in Response to Medical Errors” (master’s thesis, University 
of Pittsburgh, 2009), 17-18. 
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to affect the health care participation of African Americans and breed general distrust of the 
government, the Legacy Committee appealed to President Clinton’s stated political interests and 
invoked the mission of another government agency, the CDC, to add additional pressure to 
President Clinton’s reception of the message. Again, this strategy was not explicitly employed, 
but the critic would be foolish not to see how the Legacy Committee uses the power of rhetoric 
to invite its target audience to enact policies consistent with his previously cited priorities. 
2.4.6 Summary of Analysis 
In the above analysis, I have examined the Legacy Committee’s final report and request for a 
presidential apology according to the frame of Ryan’s suggested approach (motive view, stases, 
and the rhetorical situation) and Benoit and Dorries’s topoi for persuasive attack. Additionally, I 
have considered the request’s degree of fit with the genre of kategoria and the implications of 
that categorization. 
As a criticism of specific government policies from the beginning of the Tuskegee Study 
until the present, the Legacy Committee Request performs the function of kategoria in the midst 
of a stale rhetorical situation.122 To the Committee, the lack of an official apology for the 
Tuskegee Study was a self-evident exigence but one that did not have sufficient power to compel 
                                                 
122 Bitzer writes that rhetorical situations can “mature or decay or mature and persist—conceivably some 
persist indefinitely” until they are met with a fitting response (“Rhetorical Situation,” 12). In the legacy of the 
Tuskegee Study, it may have seemed that the appropriate time for a governmental apology had long since passed by 
1996—perhaps the situation had matured in the mid-1970s but then “decayed” as public and private attention was 
diverted to myriad other concerns in the world. However, the rhetorical pressures of a dedicated group of people 
revived the situation and reinvigorated the pull of the persistent imperfection that no U.S. government official had 
ever apologized for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Rather than “decayed” beyond usefulness or persisting with 
energy, this rhetorical situation was merely “stale” and, with the help of purposefully crafted rhetoric, still had the 
power to compel a response from key figures in the still-unfolding drama. Without the push from the Legacy 
Committee, it is reasonable to assume that a formal presidential apology would not have been issued in 1997. 
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a response from the United States government during the decades following the Study. As a 
request for an apology and government funding for bioethics and minority health programs, the 
Committee’s report had to be clear about the wrongdoing and harm that necessitated an apology 
but also proceed in a manner that invited governmental cooperation. Rather than demand 
compensation or redress through public health initiatives and additional resources at Tuskegee 
University, the Committee’s proposal was offered as an opportunity for the government to 
specifically benefit Macon County and Tuskegee University communities as well as underserved 
populations, generally. Failure to attend to these constraints may have resulted in a less favorable 
response from President Clinton. Additionally, the Committee likely sought to take advantage of 
the approaching 25th anniversary of the Study’s end, which would provide a timely opportunity 
for public ceremonies of remembrance and apology. The Committee’s request was successful in 
compelling a public response from President Clinton, but further analysis is needed to ascertain 
how the President’s remarks addressed the stases argued in the request and how the rhetorical 
situation may have changed as a result of the Legacy Committee’s report. 
2.5 FROM THE REQUEST TO THE RESPONSE 
As historian and Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee member Susan M. Reverby notes, 
a letter to the President from motivated individuals would not necessarily have compelled action 
from the President had the Legacy Committee and other concerned citizens not continued to 
work to bring about the response they desired.123 The above analysis shows that the Legacy 
                                                 
123 Susan M. Reverby, Examining Tuskegee: The Infamous Syphilis Study and its Legacy (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009): 223. 
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Committee request is hardly a simple letter but, rather, a conscientiously crafted persuasive 
appeal. Still, a series of exhortations and negotiations transpired in the year between the 
finalization of the Legacy Committee’s request in May 1996 and the White House event on May 
17, 1997 that was necessary to bring the request for apology to fruition. At the time the request 
was written, the Legacy Committee agreed that the apology event should not take place before 
that fall’s presidential election because such a speech by Clinton could cynically be perceived as 
an attempt to manipulate voters, so the Committee waited until after the election to push in 
earnest for the apology.124 In the meantime, Legacy Committee member Ruben Warren, the 
CDC’s Associate Director for Minority Health, and Dixie Snider, the CDC’s Chief of Science, 
kept in touch with Legacy Committee chair Vanessa Gamble, Tuskegee University’s president 
Benjamin Payton, and Representative Louis Stokes (Ohio) about the proposal for Clinton’s 
apology.125 The proposal survived “umpteen iterations,” according to Snider, and became 
particularly focused on “the importance of the past and its contemporary legacy,” although some 
within the CDC had reservations about how drawing public attention to such a significant ethical 
failure might negatively affect their work.126
For months, advocates of the apology partnered with the Congressional Black Caucus 
and other influential political figures (including AIDS activist A. Cornelius Baker and civil rights 
attorney Fred Gray) to negotiate for an apology from President Clinton, and the Caucus even 
issued a formal letter to Clinton.127 Once the President agreed to issue a formal apology, the 
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logistics were ironed out in February and March.128 Even though the Committee had specifically 
requested that Clinton speak from Tuskegee, ultimately the White House was chosen for the 
event due to constraints of the President’s schedule and “the fact that the press corps was more 
likely to cover a major racial story in Washington.”129
It is evident that the efforts and cooperation of many people in various professional fields 
and political organizations contributed to the efficacy of the Legacy Committee’s request to 
garner a presidential response. We cannot overlook, however, the importance of a carefully 
crafted rhetorical artifact to serve as both the site and the impetus for such cooperation. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
As a kategoria, the Committee’s request for an apology performed several functions: it 
emphasized the Study’s unethical and harmful consequences, laid out recommendations for the 
context and audience of the apology, identified who should offer the apology, and enumerated 
practical policies and programs that could help to achieve the Committee’s goals of improving 
ethical medical research and developing a more positive legacy for the Study.  
Yet, beyond functioning as an accusation that aims to compel a response from the 
accused, the kategoria of the Legacy Committee also advocates a particular understanding of the 
events of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. In particular, the Committee emphasized, while “facilities 
and staff of the Tuskegee Institute were involved, primary direction came from the government 
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under the auspices of the USPHS.”130 Additionally, as addressed earlier, the Committee focused 
narrowly on the racial dimension of the Study, repeatedly citing the fear aroused by the Study for 
persons of color, specifically. These claims are not untrue or particularly exaggerated. However, 
the Committee could have taken an approach that had more general, trans-racial appeal and 
acknowledged the potential consequences of the Tuskegee Study for Americans of other races, as 
well. Such an approach may have affected how President Clinton received and responded to the 
request, as well as the political implications of such a request-and-response pairing. As it was 
written, the request narrowed the scope of the accusation to specifically include wrongdoing 
against African Americans (in particular and in general) perpetrated by an arm of the U.S. 
government. This framing and the rhetorical choices discussed in this chapter undoubtedly 
provided particular constraints for the response crafted by President Clinton—just how much 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
                                                 
130 Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” 561. 
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3.0  APOLOGIA: PRESIDENT CLINTON’S REMARKS 
The genre [of apologia] is a high-stakes rhetorical battle in the political arena that 
apologists cannot afford to lose. Success in this arena requires a “take action, 
welcome debate, and be rational and methodical” approach. The genre is a public 
purging of sins and a reaffirmation of the ethical norms of society “dressed up” in 
theatrical proportions to bring pleasure to spectators; it is the most intimate form 
of secular discourse.1
  ~ Susan Schultz Huxman 
 
The previous chapter discussed the role of kategoria leading up to the 25th anniversary of the 
Tuskegee Study’s termination. The lack of apologetic response to the Tuskegee Study from the 
United States government left a lingering insufficiency for the victims of the Study, the victims’ 
families, and other concerned groups. To help satisfy this insufficiency, the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study Legacy Committee penned a letter addressed to President Clinton that laid out the 
Committee’s expectations and desires for a presidential apology. As argued in the previous 
chapter, the request for an apology functioned as a kategoria that heightened the exigency facing 
the President as the anniversary of the Study’s termination approached.  
                                                 
1 Susan Schultz Huxman, “Exigencies, Explanations, and Executions: Toward a Dynamic Theory of the 
Crisis Communication Genre,” in Responding to Crisis: A Rhetorical Approach to Crisis Communication, ed. Dan 
P. Millar and Robert L. Heath (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004), 297. 
 71
In this chapter, I turn to the official response from President Clinton to complete the 
paired analysis of the speech set containing both kategoria and apologia. By conducting the 
analysis of the two artifacts as a paired set, the critic is better situated to identify and compare the 
expectations of the kategoria with the corresponding elements in the apologia. Any omissions or 
deviations in the apologia from the groundwork laid by the kategoria are also identifiable when 
the analysis of the two artifacts is conducted together. This chapter serves as the corresponding 
bookend to the analysis performed in Chapter 2. 
President Clinton’s official response to the Legacy Committee’s request came on the 
afternoon of May 16, 1997 in a ceremony held in the East Room of the White House. Both the 
content and context of this speech are important to the analysis because both were specifically 
addressed by the Legacy Committee’s formal request and considered by the Committee to be 
significant to the event. Before analyzing the speech, however, it is necessary to explore the 
generic features of apologia and trace the series of events that took place between the issuance of 
a request for apology and President Clinton’s official response. 
This chapter, then, provides explication of the generic developments of apologia in both 
ancient and contemporary scholarship, description of Clinton’s speech and analysis based on 
generic considerations, comparison of the speech to the Legacy Committee’s request for an 
apology, and discussion of how Clinton’s rhetorical choices reframed contemporary 
understandings of the historical events of the Tuskegee Study. 
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3.1 GENERIC FEATURES OF APOLOGIA 
As introduced in the first chapter, the genre of apologia has been recognized and theorized since 
antiquity. One of the oldest recognized genres in rhetorical theory, apologia is characterized by 
speeches of self-defense. The Oxford English Dictionary traces the noun ‘apology’ to 1533, 
meaning at that time, “The pleading off from a charge or imputation, whether expressed, implied, 
or only conceived as possible; defence of a person, or vindication of an institution, etc., from 
accusation or aspersion.”2 It was not until the late 16th century that the verb ‘to apologize’ was 
used, but still the definition for that era’s use of the term links it more closely with offering 
justification for one’s actions rather than expressing guilt and remorse: “To speak in, or serve as, 
justification, explanation, or palliation of a fault, failure, or anything that may cause 
dissatisfaction; to offer defensive arguments; to make excuses.”3 The application of the term 
‘apology’ to a defense is still used, primarily in scholarly and religious contexts, but the common 
understandings and uses of the genre have evolved since its early instantiations. In this section, I 
trace the theoretical developments of the genre of apologia in rhetorical scholarship, which 
remained largely unchanged until the 20th century when political scandals inspired a more 
nuanced theorization of defensive strategies. By considering Clinton’s speech in light of the 
traditional rhetorical understandings of apologia as well as the contemporary modifications of 
the genre, we can begin to explore the exigences and constraints affecting Clinton’s inventional 
resources as an institutional representative. 
                                                 
2 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “Apology.” 
3 Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1991), 16; Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “Apologize.” 
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3.1.1 Classical Foundations of the Genre 
Rhetorician Noreen Wales Kruse notes that initial attention to apologia was poetic rather than 
theoretical, citing Solon’s iambic triameters on the topic.4 Plato considered rhetoric as divisible 
into the two genres of accusation and apology, whereas Isocrates thought two additional genres 
of encomium and admonition rounded out the species of rhetoric.5 Aristotle defines apologia 
simply as defense for past actions, specifically as the counterpart to accusation (kategoria) in 
legal proceedings.6 The most famous example from antiquity is arguably the Apology of 
Socrates, where the condemned philosopher spoke on his own behalf to the Athenian jurors in 
response to the accusations that he had corrupted the youth of Athens and had shown disrespect 
to the gods.7 Socrates’ speech was closer to expressing defiance rather than contrition; in this 
context, the “apology” differs from what we commonly recognize as an apology today (The 
Greek word apologos, or ‘story’, serves as the root of both apologia and apology.8).  
In Chapter 2, I introduced Aristotle’s recommendation that litigants on both sides of a 
case account for the motives for the alleged wrongdoing and the natures of a perpetrator and 
victim.9 The same issues raised by the accuser should be considered by the defendant: “[I]t is 
clear that the prosecutor should consider, as they apply to the opponent, the number and nature of 
the things that all desire when they do wrong to their neighbors, and the defendant should 
                                                 
4 Noreen Wales Kruse, “The Scope of Apologetic Discourse: Establishing Generic Parameters,” Southern 
Speech Communication Journal 46 (Spring 1981): 279. 
5 George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963): 86. 
6 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 1358b. 
7 Plato, “Socrates’ Defense (Apology)” in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961): 3-26. 
8 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa,15.  
9 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 1368b. 
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consider what and how many of these do not apply.”10 Aristotle enumerates other factors useful 
to both the prosecution and the defense, including seven causes for human action, considerations 
of the degree of magnitude of the wrongdoing, and forms of evidence that may be presented or 
contested.11 This legal and rhetorical advice ties the speech set of kategoria and apologia 
together tightly, as both speeches ought to account for the same issues, though likely from quite 
different perspectives. 
Similarly, the development of stasis theory by Hermagoras and others has as much—if 
not more—relevance to apologia as kategoria.12 As discussed in Chapter 2, an accuser can 
attempt to implicate the accused along the lines of the first three stases (fact, definition, and 
quality), but it is more significantly the defendant’s onus to prepare the strongest defense 
possible, for which stasis theory is particularly applicable. The defendant should try to deny the 
fact of a crime; failing that the defendant can contest the definition of the act as criminal; failing 
that, the defendant can assert mitigating factors affecting the quality of the act; failing that, the 
defendant may challenge the procedure and jurisdiction of the court.13 The stases can be used in 
rhetorical criticism to identify the degree to which an apologia addresses the charges leveled in 
the kategoria.14 In other words, a satisfactory apologia ought to have an answer for the 
accusations made against the defendant. 
In classical rhetoric, then, guidance for crafting apologia was focused on legal contexts 
of accusation and defense. Although other philosophers and theorists continued to develop the 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 1368b-1377b. 
12 George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994), 98. In Hermagoras’ terminology, the charge of the prosecution is a kataphasis and the defendant’s denial is 
an apophasis. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Halford Ross Ryan, “Kategoria and Apologia: On Their Rhetorical Criticism as a Speech Set,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 68 (1982): 254. 
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broader category of judicial rhetoric throughout ancient times, this has been done without 
substantial shifts to the genre of apologia itself.15
3.1.2 Contemporary Developments of the Genre 
Although apologia is a genre recognized from the beginning of rhetorical theory in ancient 
Greece, interest in and development of apologia has blossomed in the latter part of the 20th 
century. Additionally, contemporary theory about apologia has considered its use in contexts 
beyond formal courtrooms. Rhetoricians B.L. Ware and Wil Linkugel wrote an influential piece 
in 1973 on the genre of apologia where they retain the classical understanding of the genre as 
being constituted by speeches of self-defense but note that “[t]he questioning of a man’s moral 
nature, motives, or reputation is qualitatively different from the challenging of his policies” and 
demands a personal response .16 Within those defenses, four factors (two pairs of obverses) are 
prevalent: denial and bolstering, and differentiation and transcendence.17 Ware and Linkugel also 
discuss four common postures assumed by those who speak in self-defense, each based on which 
of the four factors are most strongly emphasized: absolution (seeking acquittal), vindication 
(preservation of reputation and great personal worth), explanation (assumption that an 
understanding audience could not condemn the speaker), or justification (seeking approval in 
addition to understanding).18 This descriptive framework is not proffered by the authors for 
evaluative purposes, but to help focus the rhetorical critic’s attention as they determine whether 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Kennedy’s survey of rhetoric in classical Greece and Rome. Kennedy, Classical 
Rhetoric. 
16 B.L. Ware and Wil A. Linkugel, “They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of 
Apologia,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 59 (1973), 273-4. 
17 Ibid., 275-80. 
18 Ibid., 282-3. 
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the apologia is offered from a “culturally acceptable stance.”19  
Other scholars in the 1970s built upon Ware and Linkugel’s framework and many 
focused on political apologia, as American presidents and other notable figures provided 
substantial material in the genre for analysis. For example, rhetoricians Jackson Harrell, Ware, 
and Linkugel theorize that Nixon’s Watergate apologia failed because the President did not 
adequately “maintain his public image along personal, ideological, and structural lines of 
legitimacy.”20 Ellen Reid Gold continues the scholarship on personal integrity in political 
apologia by describing strategies deployed by candidates during the 1976 presidential campaign 
to distance themselves from the Watergate scandal.21 She employs Ware and Linkugel’s 
typology of defensive strategies (particularly denial, bolstering, and differentiation) to examine 
how candidates used apologia to protect themselves from perceived threats to their ethos.22 Gold 
postulates that “a candidate’s ability to free himself rhetorically from political nettles is often 
seen as analogous to his ability to lead the country out of the dark forests of domestic and foreign 
crises,” particularly in an age when the media pounce upon opportunities to reveal apparent 
misdeeds and stoke controversy.23  
The connection between ethos and apologia is explicitly recognized by another 
rhetorician writing in the 1970’s, Noreen W. Kruse, who defines apologia as “public discourse 
produced whenever a prominent person attempts to repair his character if it has been directly or 
indirectly damaged by overt charges, or rumors and allegations, which negatively value his 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 283. 
20 Jackson Harrell, B.L. Ware, and Wil A. Linkugel, “Failure of Apology in American Politics: Nixon on 
Watergate,” Speech Monographs, 42, no. 4 (1975): 260.  
21 Ellen Reid Gold, “Political Apologia: The Ritual of Self-Defense,” Communication Monographs, 45 
(1978): 306-16.  
22 Ibid., 307-308. 
23 Ibid., 315. 
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behavior and/or his judgment.”24 She divides apologiae into two categories: those that deny the 
charges (denial apologia) and those that admit fault but offer justifications (non-denial 
apologia).25 Utilizing A. H. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, Kruse asserts that non-denial apologia 
may be first motivated by the rhetor’s need for survival (protecting one’s safety and security), 
then her social health (restoring one’s image in others’ eyes), and finally her self-actualization 
(maintaining one’s self-image and personal morality).26 A critic can examine an apologia to 
determine which of these needs is of greatest concern to the rhetor, signaling which aspect the 
rhetor perceives as particularly threatened.27 Whether denial or non-denial, Kruse understands 
apologia as “grounded in circumstances” due to its responsiveness to “recurring situations”28 
and, like other types of speech, as inherently behavioral—motivated by the rhetor’s emotional, 
physical, social, and situational needs.29 In an article published four years later, Kruse defines 
and defends the generic parameters of apologia as being situated and responsive to criticism or 
anticipated criticism, exclusively defensive, and self-oriented (may not defend another with 
apologia).30
The responsiveness of apologia to prior accusations is addressed more specifically by 
rhetorician Halford Ryan,31 as discussed in Chapter 2. His consideration of kategoria and 
apologia as counterparts in analog criticism follows the lead of Lawrence W. Rosenfield, who 
describes analog criticism as “comparing [two] speeches in such ways that each address serves as 
                                                 
24 Noreen W. Kruse, “Motivational Factors in Non-Denial Apologia,” Central States Speech Journal 28 
(Spring 1977): 13. 
25 Ibid., 14. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 15. 
28 Ibid., 13. 
29 Ibid., 23. 
30 Kruse, “Scope of Apologetic Discourse,” 280-286. 
31 Ryan, “Kategoria and Apologia,” 254-261. 
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a reference standard for the other,” for the purposes of identifying generic characteristics as well 
as evaluating the “relative artistic merit of each speech, compared to the other.”32 Whereas 
Rosenfield was comparing two instances of mass mediated political apologia to ascertain their 
similarities and differences, Ryan’s interpretation of Rosenfield’s method obtains for analyzing 
kategoria and apologia as a speech set, as well.33 Following Ryan’s model for examining 
kategoria and apologia as a speech set allows the present criticism to identify and discuss more 
fully the relevance and implications of Clinton’s specific rhetorical choices, by focusing analysis 
on the interplay between call and response. 
Rhetorical theorist Sharon Downey expands the genre of apologia in her 1993 article, 
which considers five subgenres of apologia, each arising from the varying situational 
contingencies that evolved through history and led to specific stylistic choices with functional 
goals.34 Through five historical periods, Downey traces the emergence of slight shifts in the 
forms and functions of apologia, yet she retains the classical stance of apologia as self-defense 
against specific accusations. Her more nuanced discussion of apologia through the ages helps to 
tie Ware and Linkugel’s traditional notion of apologia to Clinton’s specific address in 1997. For 
example, apologia in the contemporary period (the 20th century) is characterized by political 
discourses (rather than the traditional judicial appeals) and mass media’s amplification of events 
and resulting alienation of citizens from participating directly in those events.35 Additionally, the 
                                                 
32 Lawrence W. Rosenfield, “A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Nixon-Truman Analog,” Speech 
Monographs, 35, no. 4 (1968): 435. 
33 On this point, Susan Schultz Huxman reminds readers that “crisis is both an act (an empirical event) and 
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34 Sharon D. Downey, “The Evolution of the Rhetorical Genre of Apologia,” Western Journal of 
Communication 57 (1993): 43.  
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charges leveled against the apologists, particularly before 1960, tended to “[stem] primarily from 
betrayal of trust, indiscretion, corrupt practice, or mishandling of an issue,” so “rhetors were 
motivated to repair threats to their reputations.”36 In response to charges of this nature, a rhetor 
seeks closure and protection of their “political pasts and futures” through apologia from a 
homogenous mass public, but the closure is based in public opinion and the rhetor’s image 
protection rather than more tangible judgments in earlier eras of apologia.37 Since 1960, 
continued “suspicions about leadership in America […] and a media-inundated audience 
increasingly ‘inured to tales of scandal and tragedy’” have estranged audiences of apologia.38 
Apologia in this era tends to respond to “administrative corruption, media intervention, and 
public disillusionment.”39
Downey’s conceptualizations of apologia in the contemporary era make way for a 
subgenre of institutional or organizational apologia, as well as more focused concern on image 
restoration in response to criticism. Both of these related concerns are addressed in 
communication scholar William Benoit’s Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies: A Theory of Image 
Restoration Strategies. He invokes examples such as Exxon’s response to the Valdez oil spill and 
President Nixon’s “Cambodia” address and argues that to analyze such rhetorical artifacts we 
must integrate various theories pertaining to apologia that have traditionally been used 
independent of each other.40 To that end, Benoit makes use of the theoretical contributions of 
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dozens of other scholars to develop his typology of discourse-oriented image restoration 
strategies according to five categories: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing the 
offensiveness of an event, corrective action, and mortification.41 This typology and Benoit’s 
theory of image restoration, generally, are founded on the paired assumptions that 
“communication is a goal-directed activity” and that “maintaining a positive reputation is one of 
the central goals of communication.”42 Furthermore, Benoit asserts that one’s reputation can 
only be threatened if a “relevant audience” perceives that the accused is responsible for the 
occurrence of an undesirable act (whether or not the accused is actually responsible).43
Maintaining reputations is not a concern solely for individuals; organizations and 
institutions clearly have stakes in fostering a positive image from the public’s perspective. The 
strategies Benoit describes may be employed by spokespeople and other representatives of 
corporations or organizations that have experienced a public image setback. Likewise, Susan 
Schultz Huxman coalesces the strategies theorized by Ware and Linkugel, Benoit, Ryan, and 
others by identifying three general types of executions of apologia that may be employed by 
individuals or corporations, each type corresponding with the three major species of rhetoric. For 
each of these executions, rhetors employ a constellation of tactics in the service of their goals: 
Deliberative responses are more political in nature and use the strategies of transcendence, 
corrective action, extenuating circumstances, and/or minimization; epideictic responses are 
expressive and use the strategies of confession, bolstering, counter-attack, and/or scapegoating; 
                                                 
41 Benoit, Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies, 79. These strategies, along with Ware and Linkugel’s set of 
postures for apologia (denial, bolstering, differentiation, transcendence) are evidence of apologia’s affiliation with 
all three of Aristotle’s species of rhetoric: forensic rhetoric makes use of denial and evading responsibility, 
epideictic rhetoric employs bolstering and mortification, and deliberative rhetoric is an appropriate setting for 
transcendence and corrective action strategies. Huxman, “Exigencies, Explanations, and Executions,” 283.  
42 Benoit, Accounts, Excuses, and Apologies, 63. 
43 Ibid., 71-72. 
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forensic responses have a legal focus and use arguments of denial, stonewalling, dispute of 
jurisdictional authority, and/or equivocation.44 Huxman argues that the “clustering approach […] 
allows the crisis analyst to move beyond description (what responses are used?) to analysis (why 
are these responses used together?).”45 In a later section I will expand on the specific image 
restoration and apologetic strategies Clinton used in his speech and discuss how those rhetorical 
choices were also designed to rehabilitate the reputations of the federal government and the 
institutions of medical research and practice. 
Another development in apologia theory is the consideration that apologia may be used 
preemptively to “forestall or mitigate criticism” rather than solely in response to an accusation.46 
Rhetorician Alfred G. Mueller adopts Kruse’s perspective that “apologia exists whenever a 
response is issued relative to a person’s character somehow being attacked and when that 
response constitutes some kind of ethical defense.” 47 While Kruse’s generic parameters of 
apologia require a provocation in the form of an accusation, she concedes in a footnote that 
“[t]hose who realize that their behaviors are immoral or unethical and, thus, are likely to be 
condemned, may anticipate public response and produce apologetic discourse before they are 
actually criticized.”48 Likewise, Mueller argues that this broader application of apologia as 
potentially preemptive does not violate the earlier parameters of the genre.49  
In sum, apologia should be understood as a defensive mode of rhetoric used to respond to 
accusations and to protect the rhetor from further criticism. As we shall see in this chapter, 
                                                 
44 Huxman, “Exigencies, Explanations, and Executions,” 292-93. 
45 Ibid., 292. 
46 Alfred G. Mueller II, “Affirming Denial through Preemptive Apologia: The Case of The Armenian 
Genocide Resolution,” Western Journal of Communication 68 (Winter 2004): 40.  
47 Ibid., 30. 
48 Kruse, “Scope of Apologetic Discourse,” 281 n. 10. 
49 Mueller, “Preemptive Apologia,” 30. 
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Clinton’s speech is designed to protect his political future by responding in particular ways to the 
request brought to him by the Legacy Committee and their political allies. Section 3.2 provides a 
description of Clinton’s speech, which is followed by close analysis according to the generic 
features of apologia already discussed. First, though it is important to briefly address how the 
defensive behaviors of justification and excuse are treated outside the field of rhetoric in order to 
recognize the differences between these strategies as they apply to instances of apologia.  
3.1.3 Justification and Excuse as Apologia 
When discussing issues of blame and defense, we must also consider what constitutes 
justification and excuse, both of which are offered in an attempt to establish one’s blamelessness 
for particular actions.50 In Kruse’s terminology, discussed above, both justification and excuse 
can be considered forms of non-denial apologia. However, there are significant distinctions 
between the two. When one offers a justification for one’s actions, one accepts responsibility for 
the actions (or failure to act) but claims that those actions (or omissions) “were defensible or 
permissible on the basis of some countervailing demand or obligation.”51 Moreover, from a legal 
perspective—or, by analogy, an ethical perspective—a justified act is one where “what is done is 
regarded as something which the law [or ethics] does not condemn, or even welcomes.”52
                                                 
50 Portions of this section are drawn from my prior research on the ethics of apologies. Autumn R. Boyer, 
“In a ‘Sorry’ State: The Ethics of Institutional Apologies in Response to Medical Errors” (master’s thesis, University 
of Pittsburgh, 2009), 21-23. 
51 Virginia A. Sharpe, “Taking Responsibility for Medical Mistakes,” in Margin of Error: The Ethics of 
Mistakes in the Practice of Medicine, ed. Susan B. Rubin and Laurie Zoloth (Hagerstown, MD: University 
Publishing Group, 2000), 184. 
52 H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1968), 13. 
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By contrast, those who seek to excuse their actions or omissions admit that the behavior 
was wrong but seek to shift or deny culpability for their action or inaction. In other words, to 
offer an excuse is to admit that the action “wasn’t a good thing to have done, but to argue that it 
is not quite fair or correct to say baldly ‘X did A.’”53 The nature of the actor’s behavior may then 
be explained with some excusing condition. Legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart asserts that the 
psychological state of the accused is the locus of excusing conditions, typically including “those 
forms of lack of knowledge which make action unintentional: lack of muscular control which 
makes it involuntary, subjection to gross forms of coercion by threats, and types of mental 
abnormality, which are believed to render the agent incapable of choice or of carrying out what 
he has chosen to do.”54 The accused may also point to particular features of the action or 
circumstances surrounding it that serve as mitigating factors that should both excuse the act and 
absolve the agent of responsibility in this situation.55 In the terminology of stasis theory, excuses 
may argue against the definition and the quality of the offense for which one is accused.  
Clearly, offering an excuse or justification is a rhetorical act in the service of self-defense 
from an accusation and both are, therefore, potential strategies of apologia. As discussed above, 
contemporary developments in the genre of apologia have produced a more nuanced 
consideration of defense and image restoration strategies that incorporate justification, excuse, 
and other defensive rhetorical moves, but it is important to have introduced these particular 
considerations at this point due to their utilization since antiquity. 
                                                 
53 J. L. Austin, “A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 
(1956-1957): 2. 
54 Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, 14. 
55 Sharpe, “Taking Responsibility,” 184. 
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3.2 PRESIDENT CLINTON’S RESPONSE 
President Clinton’s official response to the Legacy Committee’s request came in the form of a 
ceremony held in the East Room of the White House and transmitted via satellite to viewers in 
Tuskegee, Alabama. His speech may be divided into four sections: welcome and introductions, 
apology statements, policy announcements, and closing.56 President Clinton opened by 
identifying and welcoming the five Tuskegee survivors present at the ceremony, as well as the 
family representatives of the sixth remaining survivor and two deceased Study subjects.57 He 
welcomed the other honored guests at the ceremony, including several politicians and civil rights 
attorney Fred Gray, as well as members of the Tuskegee community watching the ceremony by 
satellite feed.  
Next, President Clinton offered a statement of “apology” to the Study survivors, the 
extended families of those who participated in the Study, and beyond, saying: 
We can stop turning our heads away. We can look at you in the eye and finally 
say on behalf of the American people, what the United States Government did 
was shameful, and I am sorry. 
The American people are sorry—for the loss, for the years of hurt. You 
did nothing wrong, but you were grievously wronged. I apologize and I am sorry 
that this apology has been so long in coming. 
                                                 
56 The text of the speech has been reprinted in Appendix B. 
57 Clinton identified each of the five present survivors (Carter Howard, Frederick Moss, Charlie Pollard, 
Herman Shaw, Fred Simmons) as well as one survivor (Ernest Hendon) who was represented by a family member. 
William J. Clinton, “Remarks in Apology to African-Americans on the Tuskegee Experiment,” Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents 33 (1997): 718. Historian Susan M. Reverby, a Legacy Committee member who attended 
the White House event, reported that five of the six living survivors were in attendance. Susan M. Reverby, 
Examining Tuskegee: The Infamous Syphilis Study and Its Legacy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2009): 224. 
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To Macon County, to Tuskegee, to the doctors who have been wrongly 
associated with the events there, you have our apology, as well. To our African 
American citizens, I am sorry that your Federal Government orchestrated a study 
so clearly racist.58
The President’s statement included the “hundreds of men betrayed, along with their wives and 
children, along with the community in Macon County, Alabama, the City of Tuskegee, the fine 
university there, and the larger African American community.”59 Throughout the speech, Clinton 
identified that the victims of the Study “were betrayed,” “were denied help, and they were lied 
to,” had their rights “trampled upon,” and experienced “years of internal torment and anguish” as 
well as “years of hurt.”60 He characterized the government’s actions as “shameful,” “fail[ing] to 
live up to its ideals,” “[breaking] the trust” with its people, “deeply, profoundly, morally, 
wrong,” an “outrage,” and “racist.”61
Following the apologetic portion of the speech, Clinton announced federal initiatives to 
help mitigate the damage of “the legacy of the study at Tuskegee [that] has reached far and deep, 
in ways that hurt our progress and divide our Nation.”62 These developments included: 1) a 
pledge to help build a memorial at Tuskegee and a grant from the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to plan a bioethics research center there; 2) a report to be issued by 
Donna Shalala, Secretary of HHS, within 180 days regarding strategies to increase minority 
communities’ involvement in research and health care; 3) additional bioethics training materials, 
to be prepared by Shalala and others, for health care researchers; 4) HHS fellowships, beginning 
                                                 
58 Clinton, “Remarks in Apology,” 719. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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in Fall 1998, to support postgraduate bioethics students, particularly students of color; and 5) 
extension of the charter of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission through October 1999.  
Finally, Clinton closed his speech with a caution about the consequences of allowing 
scientific and technological progress to take precedence over ethics and “our conscience,” and by 
thanking the Study survivors for their forgiveness and grace:63
Today, all we can do is apologize. But you have the power, for only you, Mr. 
Shaw, the others who are here, the family members who are with us in 
Tuskegee—only you have the power to forgive. Your presence here shows us that 
you have chosen a better path than your Government did so long ago. You have 
not withheld the power to forgive. I hope today and tomorrow every American 
will remember your lesson and live by it. 
 Thank you, and God bless you.64
3.3  ANALYSIS OF CLINTON’S RESPONSE 
Based on the theoretical framework discussed earlier in this chapter, an analysis of this rhetorical 
artifact may now proceed with an understanding that there exists a significant difference between 
what is commonly understood as apology and the genre of apologia. Given this distinction, it 
may seem discordant to discuss Clinton’s speech in the context of apologia or defense when it 
has almost uniformly been referred to by scholars, journalists, and laypersons alike as an apology 
(in the common, non-defensive sense of the term). Indeed, as a specific response to the Legacy 
                                                 
63 Ibid., 720. 
64 Ibid. 
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Committee’s accusation and call for apology, Clinton’s speech resembles both apology and 
apologia. Specific attention to the apology aspect will be addressed in Chapter 4, as additional 
analysis is warranted to determine whether characterizing Clinton’s speech as an apology is 
appropriate. Presently, however, we must identify the features of this speech that are associated 
with apologia and determine how its degree of fit with the preceding kategoria affects our 
understanding and interpretation of this speech. 
In this section, then, I discuss the generic categorization of Clinton’s speech as apologia, 
explore the historical and rhetorical context which offered opportunities and constraints to his 
rhetorical invention, analyze some particular facets of Clinton’s defense, and consider how his 
rhetorical “sleight-of-hand” attempted to reframe retrospective understanding of the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study. 
3.3.1 Identifying the Genre 
In order to identify whether Clinton’s speech may be characterized as apologia following the 
general definition of apologia as a speech of defense,65 it is essential first to identify particular 
accusations against which Clinton may be defending himself. In this regard, it is useful to bear in 
mind the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee's point that President Clinton had neither 
direct nor indirect involvement with the creation, preservation, or dissolution of the Study. 
Therefore, he is not in position to defend any particular actions of his own with regards to the 
harms and wrongdoing associated with the Study itself. However, the Legacy Committee’s 
specific criticism against President Clinton (as a representative of the U. S. government) was that 
                                                 
65 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 1358b. 
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no president had yet offered an apology for the Tuskegee Study and “an apology is sorely 
needed.”66 The Committee’s request also cited Clinton’s statement in apology for the U.S. 
government’s human radiation experiments during the Cold War in which he claimed that the 
government has a responsibility to tell the truth, admit fault for wrongdoing, and “do the right 
thing.”67 In this way, the Legacy Committee put specific pressure on President Clinton to act in 
accordance with his previous statement and be the one to right the wrong of a missing 
governmental apology for the Tuskegee Study. This pressure serves both as an accusation (“no 
public apology has ever been offered”68) and as a challenge to act consistently in response to 
historical, governmental wrongdoing—Clinton had little choice but to respond to these charges.  
Additionally, as an apologia, Clinton’s speech is explicitly and implicitly a forward-
looking defense of government policies and practices. His direction of funds and other resources 
to increase bioethics research and training, safe and ethical medical research, and respect and 
protection for minorities serves not only as corrective action but also as a preemptive defense 
against continued allegations of governmental wrongdoing. Clinton’s humble tone and specific 
agreement with the Legacy Committee’s characterization of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study are not 
consistent with personal defensiveness per se but serve another goal of apologia concerning the 
restoration and protection of images and reputations—both Clinton’s and the government’s. In 
this light, Clinton’s response fits with Downey’s description of contemporary apologia: 
corruption by the administration, revealed through mass media intervention compounding public 
disillusionment, was addressed by a politician who had a reputation and political future at stake. 
                                                 
66 Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” in Tuskegee’s Truths: 
Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, ed. Susan M. Reverby (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2000), 561.  
67 Ibid., 560. 
68 Ibid., 561. 
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Other theorists’ approaches to apologia discussed earlier are also salient to analysis of Clinton’s 
speech: the accusations are of a moral nature and threaten Clinton’s reputation (Ware and 
Linkugel), the speech is responsive to a particular rhetorical situation (Kruse, Ryan), image 
restoration strategies may be necessary (Benoit), and Clinton shifts among all three rhetorical 
species within his speech (Huxman). In the following sections I will elaborate on how these 
analytic frames help to parse out the rhetorical maneuvers Clinton employed in his speech. 
3.3.2 The Apologia’s Rhetorical Situation 
As Ware and Linkugel note, “The recurrent theme of accusation followed by apology is so 
prevalent in our record of public address as to be, in the words of literary theorist Kenneth 
Burke, one of those ‘situations typical and recurrent enough for men to feel the need of having a 
name for them.’”69 To address this feature, I use an analytical frame based on rhetorical theorist 
Lloyd Bitzer’s landmark essay, “The Rhetorical Situation.”70 The rhetorical situation, as 
described by Bitzer, is characterized by an exigence (“an imperfection marked by urgency”), 
constraints upon the rhetor and audience, and an audience who is in a position to be persuaded 
and/or act upon the “fitting response” called for by the rhetorical situation.71 Bitzer’s article 
stirred criticism and further development by other rhetorical scholars. A notable criticism was 
leveled by rhetorician Richard Vatz in which he contests Bitzer’s assertion that situations can be 
objectively rhetorical and compel responses. Vatz argues, instead, that “meaning is not 
discovered in situation, but created by rhetors” who interpret situations and invent rhetorical 
                                                 
69 Ware and Linkugel, “Generic Criticism of Apologia,” 273-4. 
70 Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968): 1-14. 
71 Ibid., 6. 
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situations through their use of rhetoric (Bitzer later modified his view to in response to this 
criticism72). In a continuation of the debate, rhetorician Scott Consigny offers a third perspective: 
rhetoric is an art in which the rhetor must meet the conditions of integrity and receptivity to 
“become effectively engaged in particular situations.”73 Consigny reaffirms Bitzer’s claim that 
situations have particularities but disagrees that those particularities determine the rhetorical 
response. He also sides with Vatz on the view that rhetors have the power of creativity and 
invention but warns that Vatz does not account for the constraints that rhetors face within 
rhetorical situations. Consigny proposes that being mindful of topoi will help the rhetor navigate 
and manage indeterminate situations.74 This broader understanding of the rhetorical situation 
allows for a more thorough understanding of the exigences that emerged “objectively” due to the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study’s termination (Bitzer’s original formulation) as well as the exigences 
and constraints created through creative human effort in the Legacy Committee’s request (Vatz’s 
formulation). Vatz’s theory is useful because it shows that contingency is built into the rhetorical 
situation: rhetoricians can influence the intensity of the exigence. 
The rhetorical audience, as conceptualized by Bitzer, is one that is potentially motivated 
and able to act in response to a rhetorical appeal. The Legacy Committee explicitly identified 
President Clinton as one who had the authority and ability to speak on behalf of the U.S. 
government regarding the wrongdoing of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Moreover, the 
Committee’s request spoke to the issue of motivation by calling attention to Clinton’s previous 
                                                 
72 Richard E. Vatz, “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 6, no. 3 (1973): 157; 
Lloyd F. Bitzer, “Rhetoric and Public Knowledge,” in Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature: An Exploration, ed. 
Don M. Burks (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1978): 69.  
73 Scott Consigny, “Rhetoric and its Situations,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 7, no. 3 (1974): 176. 
74 Ibid., 182. 
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apology for the human radiation experiments and his commitment to racial healing and equality 
in the United States. 
The exigence for a presidential apology is a bit more complicated, however. Although the 
situation created by the termination of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study called for some sort of 
governmental response (an imperfection, since no president offered an apology for the Study 
widely understood to be unethical), there was no particular urgency until one was created 
through the request written by the Legacy Committee. As Consigny contends, both Bitzer and 
Vatz have partial understanding of the nature of rhetorical situations: both “objective” events and 
rhetorical creativity were in play leading up to Clinton’s response. The lack of apology was, 
alone, an insufficient exigence until the Legacy Committee’s request created particular 
opportunities and constraints for Clinton’s response. While the request did not explicitly call 
Clinton’s own character into question, it did echo the President’s own stated political goals of 
racial reconciliation and governmental transparency in and accountability for matters of 
wrongdoing. In this way, the President’s character was not the subject of the accusation but was 
invoked in the service of a persuasive strategy that offered him the opportunity to uphold his 
stated values and work toward his political goals. Such an “invitation” is difficult to disregard, 
politically, and may be personally compelling as well—it serves as an identification of an 
exigence to be ameliorated as well as a constraint on what the Committee would deem a “fitting 
response” from the President.  
The Committee offered another test of the President’s character and political 
commitments when their request described specific programs that they wished to see 
implemented and funded with the help of the federal government. Again, the bioethics research 
and Tuskegee memorial proposals offered the President the opportunity (and constraint) to enact 
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policies consistent with his stated commitment to racial reconciliation and government 
accountability. As requested, the President did announce five specific plans to promote ethical 
research and health care and to preserve the memory of the Tuskegee Study. Furthermore, 
Clinton’s apology did not challenge the Legacy Committee’s claims about the harms of the 
Tuskegee Study, the nature of the wrongdoing, or the relative innocence of Tuskegee Institute 
(now, University). He conceded each argument of fact, definition, quality, and jurisdiction, and 
even responded within the timeframe recommended by the request and the subsequent advocacy 
on its behalf. The President’s responsiveness to the policy proposals and arguments in the 
request suggest that the kategoria was sufficiently persuasive or coercive or that the President 
already believed strongly in the mission of the Legacy Committee. Additionally, such 
responsiveness shows attention to the constraints established explicitly and implicitly by the 
Committee’s request. 
Some constraints existed apart from the Legacy Committee’s request, however. As an 
official presidential speech, Clinton’s discourse was expected to have a certain degree of 
formality. Likewise, he could not speak exclusively of the U.S. government’s faults—American 
audiences expect that the President will show patriotism and optimism for the future. Clinton 
used his speech, in part, to bolster the values of trust, freedom, and equality that are considered 
traditional American values and indicated how the Tuskegee Study betrayed those values when it 
betrayed and deceived the men who unknowingly participated in that Study.75 His rhetoric also 
invoked Ware and Linkugel’s transcendence strategy by hailing the medical and scientific 
progress that can be gained through continued research and improvement of research ethics.76 
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Ironically, as communication scholars Lynn M. Harter, Ronald J. Stephens, and Phyllis M. Japp 
point out, Clinton “framed science and technology in such a way as to reinforce the ideology of a 
technological society—the same values that originally served as catalysts to the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Experiment.”77 Still, as the President, Clinton could not appropriately have adopted a 
position that was critical of or antagonistic toward medical, scientific, and technological 
industries, whether from fear of losing political support or from the perception that being fearful 
of the future and “progress” is un-American. 
Whether or not Clinton’s address constituted a fitting response requires additional 
analysis and must take into consideration the speech’s degree of fit with the Legacy Committee’s 
request as well as audiences’ expectations of the speech. These and other issues salient to the 
speech’s reception by Study survivors and the public will be taken up later in this chapter as well 
as in Chapters 5 and 6. 
3.3.3 Defense of Personal and Professional Ethos 
The preceding analysis showed how Clinton’s speech meets the self-defensive criterion of 
apologia even though he had no role in the Tuskegee Study. The nature of his defense, then, 
warrants closer attention.  
Race was a prominent theme in Clinton’s presidential campaign, and once elected, the 
new President voiced his commitment to racial reconciliation and equality.78 Such statements 
                                                 
77 Lynn M. Harter, Ronald J. Stephens, and Phyllis M. Japp, “President Clinton’s Apology for the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Experiment: A Narrative of Remembrance, Redefinition, and Reconciliation,” Howard Journal of 
Communications 11 (2000): 28. 
78 Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” 562. Additionally, just a couple of years before the 
Legacy Committee drafted and submitted their request, the political ramifications of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
had featured significantly in the hearings for President Clinton’s nomination for Surgeon General. In 1994, Clinton 
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provided a natural opening for the Legacy Committee to call for a Tuskegee apology, suggesting, 
“In the context of President Clinton’s stated desire to bridge the racial divide, this apology 
provides the opportunity to begin to heal the racial wounds that persist in this country.”79 To 
further drive home the point that the Clinton administration was uniquely positioned to apologize 
for Tuskegee, the Committee cited the President's stated commitment to acknowledge past 
wrongdoing by the government, here referencing Clinton’s 1995 apology for the human radiation 
experiments conducted by the U.S. government during the Cold War in an effort to “[heal] the 
wounds inflicted” and “regain the trust of the country.”80 According to the Committee's logic, if 
such high-level effort were appropriate in the case of human radiation experiments, similar 
redress on Tuskegee would be warranted as well.  
Against this background, Clinton faced the constraint of appearing consistent with his 
prior comments and actions, specifically those declaring remorse for the U.S. government’s past 
wrongdoing. By speaking plainly and directly about the harms caused by the U.S. Public Health 
Service’s Tuskegee Syphilis Study, Clinton had the opportunity to protect his image (and, 
therefore, speak in preemptive self-defense) in two ways. He protected his professional image as 
the leader of the culpable institution (though not the blameworthy institution) by acknowledging 
the wrongdoing and harms unequivocally rather than attempting to mitigate the Study’s damage 
or obscure the government’s role in the Study. His forthrightness prevented the issue of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
nominated Henry W. Foster, Jr., an African American, for Surgeon General and the subsequent confirmation 
proceedings devolved into accusations and defenses regarding the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, even though Foster had 
no involvement with the Study himself and had simply been vice president of the Macon County Medical Society in 
during the final years of the Study. According to historian Susan Reverby’s analysis, Foster “took the blame and 
became the villain” for the Study he claims he first learned about with the rest of the public in 1972. Ultimately, 
Foster’s nomination was tabled and he was never appointed following the spectacle of the too-late witch-hunt for 
those actually responsible for the Tuskegee Study. Reverby, Examining Tuskegee, 217-220. 
79 Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” 562. 
80 Ibid., 560. 
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missing apology from developing into a full-fledged contemporary controversy that might have 
had the power to taint his professional image. Clinton also performed image work on a personal 
level as he appeared to genuinely sympathize with the Study’s victims and speak from a personal 
commitment to racial reconciliation rather than as a mere professional courtesy. President 
Clinton’s true intentions and feelings about the speech are a matter of speculation;81 his 
performance, however, was understood by witnesses at the event to be a sincerely heart-felt 
offering.82
To say that Clinton spoke in defense of his personal and professional ethos is not to claim 
that he bore direct responsibility for the Study’s harms. Rather, his defense is largely proactive 
and asserts his commitment to present and future protections for vulnerable populations involved 
in medical research in addition to his commitment to ensuring the full measure of respect and 
ethical treatment for minorities that had been missing in the Tuskegee episode. Clinton’s remarks 
and policy enactments were crafted as expressions of his personal character83 and political 
                                                 
81 President Clinton’s only mention in his autobiography of this speech is within the context of his proposal 
to Congress to ban human cloning. He wrote a single sentence about it: “Just a month earlier I had apologized for 
the unconscionable and racist syphilis experiments performed on hundreds of black men decades earlier by the 
federal government in Tuskegee, Alabama.” William J. Clinton, My Life (New York: Vintage Books, 2005), 757. 
82 Herman Shaw, a Study participant and survivor, spoke at the White House ceremony immediately prior 
to President Clinton and said, “Mr. President, words cannot express my gratitude to you for bringing us here today—
for doing your best to right this tragic wrong, and resolving that America should never again allow such an event to 
occur. Because of your leadership I am confident that we never will.” (“Herman Shaw’s Remarks,” in Reverby, 
Tuskegee’s Truths, 573). Public health researcher Stephen B. Thomas, though not a participant at the ceremony, 
wrote that “Clinton and the others present experienced forgiveness from men who suffered at the hands of [Public 
Health Service] doctors” and characterized Clinton’s statement as “emotional.” (“Anatomy of an Apology: 
Reflections on the 1997 Presidential Apology for the Syphilis Study at Tuskegee,” The Academic Exchange, Emory 
University, http://www.emory.edu/ACAD_EXCHANGE/1999/sept99/anatomy.html).  
83 For example, Clinton developed some immediacy in his speech by his use of the personal pronoun “I” (“I 
apologize and I am sorry,” “I would like to announce several steps to help us achieve these goals,” “I hope today and 
tomorrow every American will remember your lesson and live by it”) as well as the inclusive pronoun “we” (“We 
remember,” “We can stop turning our heads,” “we can look at you in the eye,” “we need to do more,” “we face a 
challenge in our time.”).  
 96
goodwill and served to bolster his credibility as a racial reconciler.84 Several of his remarks 
spoke directly about racial tension and Clinton’s hope for resolution and healing.85 By 
responding to the Legacy Committee’s request for an official apology with his statement and 
policies, Clinton was able to obviate the possibility of specific accusations against his character 
for neglecting the request and for perpetuating the perceived harm caused by such a delayed 
apology. 
Ware and Linkugel’s defensive strategies factors of bolstering, differentiation, and 
transcendence are all featured in Clinton’s speech (denial was not employed as a strategy in this 
case). Clinton used bolstering rhetoric, which “reinforces the existence of a fact, sentiment, 
object, or relationship […] viewed favorably by the audience,”86 when he spoke about 
acknowledging historical wrongdoing and reasons for mistrusting the government while also 
adopting the postures of sympathy and reconciliation. For example, Clinton said, “[W]ithout 
remembering [our past], we cannot make amends and we cannot go forward,”87 and “We cannot 
be one America when a whole segment of our nation has no trust in America. An apology is the 
first step, and we take it with a commitment to rebuild that broken trust.”88 Additionally, he 
bolstered the ideals of equality and fairness when he referred to the Study as “an outrage to our 
                                                 
84 The rhetorical agency of the speaker in official apologies is complicated, involving both institutional and 
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commitment to integrity and equality for all our citizens.”89 Even Clinton’s policy 
pronouncements were sometimes framed as his personal efforts to promote bioethics and reduce 
racial health disparities, as when he said, “I’m directing the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, Donna Shalala, to issue a report” and “I am also today extending the charter of the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission.”90
Clinton’s use of differentiation rhetoric was largely for the sake of others rather than 
himself. The President’s presentation of himself as an ethical leader concerned about the well 
being of citizens of all races serves as an implicit differentiation between himself and past 
administrations that did not actively protect Americans from governmental abuse. However, he 
explicitly engaged in differentiation strategies as he sought to preserve or improve the reputation 
of Tuskegee Institute and the region of Macon County according to the Legacy Committee’s 
request. Ware and Linkugel describe differentiation strategies as those that provide a different, 
transformative perspective on a charge or issue that has been typically viewed negatively by the 
audience.91 Here, it is Clinton’s broader audience, the general public, that is being “set right” 
with a new understanding of the Tuskegee Study rather than the immediate audience of the Study 
survivors. He performed this differentiation by framing his apology to these communities rather 
than indict them as complicit with the U.S. Public Health Service program. This, too, was a 
stance encouraged in the Legacy Committee’s request.92 While not a specific strategy of 
differentiation, Clinton also avoided providing complicating details about those from the Macon 
County community (especially those who were African American) who worked alongside the 
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government doctors in carrying out the procedures of the Tuskegee Study. This passive omission 
helped further to establish perceptual separation between the local victims and the Study’s 
perpetrators.  
Clinton’s transcendence rhetoric helped “psychologically move the audience away from 
the particulars of the charge at hand in a direction toward some more abstract, general view,”93 
in this case a view of science and medical progress as beacons of hope rather than as the 
underlying motives for unethical research such as the Tuskegee Study. He said, “Science and 
technology are rapidly changing our lives with the promise of making us much healthier, much 
more productive and more prosperous. But with these changes we must work harder to see that 
as we advance we don’t leave behind our conscience. No ground is gained and, indeed, much is 
lost if we lose our moral bearings in the name of progress.”94  
In addition to the strategies described by Ware and Linkugel, Benoit’s image restoration 
strategies of corrective action and mortification appear in Clinton’s speech. The five policy 
initiatives introduced in the latter half of the speech each serve as forms of corrective action by 
expanding the resources available for bioethics research and training, minority health research, 
ethical involvement of community members in public health initiatives, and preserving the 
memory of the Tuskegee Study. Mortification was particularly prevalent, though with a twist due 
to Clinton’s non-involvement in the Study’s wrongdoing. Benoit uses Kenneth Burke’s 
conceptualization of mortification as occurring when “the accused may admit responsibility for 
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the wrongful act and ask for forgiveness.”95 Clinton readily admitted the government’s 
(exclusive) responsibility for the Study (“The United States Government did something that was 
wrong, deeply, profoundly, morally wrong.”96) and offered a personal apology as well as an 
apology on behalf of “the American people.”97 Similarly, Clinton closed his speech by further 
castigating those who directed the Tuskegee Study and addressing his audience of Study 
survivors as those who “have the power to forgive” and who “have not withheld the power to 
forgive.”98
Rather than solely protecting his own reputation, as required by Kruse’s generic 
parameters and Downey’s contemporary apologia, Clinton’s rhetorical maneuvers also worked 
to protect and restore the images of Tuskegee University and its surrounding communities.99 
Identifying particular defensive strategies, such as those conceptualized by Benoit and Ware and 
Linkugel, helps the critic recognize the issues of particular concern to the rhetor. In the case of 
Clinton’s response to the Legacy Committee’s request, it is apparent that the President’s 
blamelessness for the Tuskegee Study did not keep him from performing a speech of apologia 
and the above analysis reveals particular opportunities taken by Clinton to protect his reputation 
amidst a broader controversy. 
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3.3.4 Responding to the Stases 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Legacy Committee’s request for an official apology served as a 
kategoria in part by laying out the blameworthy elements of the Study. The stases served to 
guide the analysis of the Committee’s accusations, and we return to those stases now to consider 
how President Clinton addressed these accusations in his official response. 
The issues of fact identified by the Committee were confirmed by the President: “[Forty] 
years, hundreds of men betrayed, along with their wives and children, along with the community 
in Macon County, Alabama, the City of Tuskegee, the fine university there, and the larger 
African-American community.”100 He acknowledged that “hundreds of men [were] used in 
research without their knowledge and consent” in a study “orchestrated” by the federal 
government and carried out through the U.S. Public Health service.101 The fact that an official 
apology had not yet been offered was noted directly when Clinton said, “[W]e can end the 
silence. We can stop turning our heads away.[…] I am sorry that this apology has been so long in 
coming.”102 In each of these statements, Clinton assented to the facts presented by the Legacy 
Committee. 
Likewise, Clinton accepted the stases of definition supplied in the Legacy Committee 
request. He referred to the Study unambiguously as “shameful;” “deeply, profoundly, morally 
wrong;” “an outrage;” “clearly racist;” and “against everything our country stands for.”103 He 
specified those harmed, as the Legacy Committee did, as extending beyond the men in the Study 
to include the broader community and African Americans, generally, while acknowledging that 
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the damage caused included betrayal by the government, “lives lost, the pain suffered, the years 
of internal torment and anguish,” and having their rights “trampled upon.”104 The Legacy 
Committee further identified the harm caused to the reputations of Tuskegee Institute (now, 
Tuskegee University) because the Study has come to be remembered as the “Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study” even though it was a project of the U.S. Public Health Service that took place in that 
region.105 In his response, Clinton included Macon County, Tuskegee, and the “doctors who 
have been wrongly associated with the events there” as recipients of his apology, implicitly 
acknowledging the Committee’s definitions.106 A final aspect of the stasis of definition to which 
Clinton responded affirmatively was that a government apology for the Study was ethically 
valuable and necessary. On that topic he asserted, “We cannot be one America when a whole 
segment of our Nation has no trust in America. An apology is the first step, and we take it with a 
commitment to rebuilt that broken trust.”107
While the Legacy Committee directly addressed the stasis of jurisdiction in their 
argument that Clinton, as the “highest elected official of the United States,”108 was the 
appropriate person to offer an official apology for the Tuskegee Study, Clinton only 
acknowledged this implicitly by agreeing to the Committee’s request. Moreover, President 
Clinton invoked his role as the nation’s chief representative by claiming to speak and apologize 
on behalf of the American people.109
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These stases (and the stasis of quality, which is not salient to Clinton’s response) 
function in traditional apologia as topoi or “commonplaces” upon which a defendant could 
mount his case by targeting opportunities to contend and contradict the accuser’s accounts. 
However, in this case, President Clinton assented to each of the stasis presented in the Legacy 
Committee’s request. This analysis reaffirms my earlier claim that his defense was not of the 
Study or its responsible agents but of his reputation as a concerned and ethical leader. By 
agreeing with and reaffirming the Legacy Committee’s assessment of the Study and its legacy, 
President Clinton acted to placate the Committee and the American citizens concerned with 
issues of government wrongdoing and racial discrimination rather than to perpetuate or escalate 
the existing controversy about the Study and its legacy. 
The value of this congruence between kategoria and apologia, with regard to stases, is 
more evident to the critic than the general reader or hearer of Clinton’s speech because the 
Legacy Committee’s request was not widely disseminated or publicized. Those who heard 
Clinton speak, read his transcript, or read newspaper accounts of the White House event were 
more likely to assess his speech according to their own expectations of an appropriate address on 
the topic rather than in comparison to the specific accusations that compelled the President’s 
response, so general public reaction to the speech is unlikely to be structured or primed by the 
stases in the Legacy Committee’s request. The rhetorical critic, however, can note that the 
degree of congruence between the kategoria and apologia helps to satisfy the exigence identified 
and amplified by the kategoria (and, further, does not exacerbate the exigence of a missing or 
delayed acknowledgement by the U.S. government). For both general audiences and rhetorical 
critics, an incongruity between Clinton’s rhetoric and the audience’s expectations or between his 
rhetoric and the prescriptions of the Legacy Committee request would draw more attention to 
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key points than the congruity evident in this episode. In forensic rhetoric, a defendant would 
implicitly assent to stasis points by his silence but would need to develop an explicit argument to 
contest the stasis points with which he disagrees or finds room to mount a defense. Likewise, we 
notice clashes more than agreements because rhetors draw attention to them and dwell on the 
contrasting arguments. When there is agreement, there is much less need to draw the audience’s 
attention to particular stases. In this way, Clinton’s address is largely unremarkable. However, 
some of his agreements with the Legacy Committee have other implications and will be 
discussed in a later section. 
3.3.5 Fitness of the Response to the Kategoria 
Following Rosenfield’s model of analog criticism110 and Ryan’s speech set approach to 
kategoria and apologia,111 a key move for the rhetorical critic is to examine the succeeding 
artifact in light of that which preceded it. In this case, Clinton’s official response ought to be 
considered in comparison to the Legacy Committee request that compelled it in order to identify 
the elements of congruency as well as those that deviate or contradict the claims and conditions 
set forth in the Committee’s request. 
In the previous section, I pinpointed the various ways in which Clinton accepted and 
promoted the Legacy Committee’s descriptions and interpretations of the events in the Tuskegee 
Study. By agreeing to the three stasis points (and implicitly agreeing to the fourth, quality, by 
accepting the responsibility to speak), Clinton’s response showed a high degree of fit with the 
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preceding kategoria. He offered no significant challenge to the narrative laid out by the 
Committee, nor did he offer a competing narrative to replace theirs.112
Clinton also acted in accordance with the Legacy Committee’s request by introducing 
several initiatives to promote bioethics and minority health research. The Committee specifically 
requested a staffed, federally and privately funded memorial center at Tuskegee “focused on 
preserving the national memory of the Study and transforming its legacy.”113 Such a center 
would facilitate scholarly research and investigate the concerns and solutions associated with 
attitudes of distrust that prevent many, particularly African Americans, from participating in 
mainstream medical practice.114 The Committee also suggested that other federally assisted 
programs could help meet their goal to “redress the damages of Tuskegee.” These include a 
Minority Health Initiative, a program to train health care providers in the socio-cultural issues 
salient to serving minority populations, and a research “clearinghouse” to promote ethical 
research scholarship and practice.115 In response to these specific requests, President Clinton 
announced five initiatives as part of his speech: 1) a grant from the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) to fund the memorial center at Tuskegee to serve as a museum and site 
for bioethics research; 2) a commissioned report to be conducted by the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to examine how the government “can best involve communities, especially 
minority communities, in research and health care”; 3) bioethics training materials for medical 
researchers to be prepared in part by the Secretary of Health and Human Services; 4) 
postgraduate bioethics fellowships provided by the DHHS beginning in September 1998; and 5) 
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an extension of the NBEAC charter to October 1999.116 Taken together, these five programs 
were intended to meet the stated desires of the Legacy Committee to promote bioethics and 
improve minority health research and outreach. 
There were, however, two notable differences between the Legacy Committee’s 
kategoria and Clinton’s apologia. These vary in their material significance. First, the ceremony 
was not held in conjunction with a National Bioethics Advisory Commission meeting as 
requested (although Clinton did extend the Commission’s charter). The Legacy Committee had 
suggested that the apology could “perhaps” be held in concert with a meeting of the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBEAC) because, as the Committee asserted, “the Tuskegee 
Study is a starting point for all modern moral reflection on research ethics [and] a meeting of the 
NBEAC at Tuskegee in conjunction with a presidential apology would be an ideal new 
beginning.”117 While the apology event was not paired with a NBEAC meeting, this deviation 
from the request has not earned the President any specific criticism. 
Clinton’s choice to speak from the White House rather than from Tuskegee University, as 
the Legacy Committee specifically recommended, was more controversial. As noted in Chapter 
2, the choice of location was determined by “Clinton’s schedule and the fact that the press corps 
was more likely to cover a major racial story in Washington.”118 Furthermore, as Clinton spoke, 
he was physically surrounded by his institutional context rather than the site of the wrongdoing. 
This choice implicitly affiliates Clinton with the presidency rather than the Tuskegee Study 
directly. One could argue that the five Study survivors, family representatives of three 
participants, and other attendees of the ceremony were more highly honored as guests of the 
                                                 
116 Clinton, “Remarks in Apology,” 720. 
117 Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” 562. 
118 Reverby, Examining Tuskegee, 224. 
 106
White House than they may have been if the ceremony had been held in Alabama. Still, the 
chosen site for the ceremony excluded the physical attendance of interested community members 
in Macon County, including the sixth Study survivor, who watched the speech via satellite 
downlink to a conference center at Tuskegee University.119 Reverby regarded the venue choice 
of the East Room of the White House as “a fitting setting for a formal apology.”120 However, 
John C. Fletcher, co-chair of the Legacy Committee and one of the primary authors of the 
request document, strongly opposed Clinton’s decision not to speak in Tuskegee. Reverby 
reported, “Sticking to his principles, John Fletcher refused to attend because the event was not in 
Tuskegee.”121 Mark I. Evans, in his obituary for John Fletcher in 2005, elaborated:  
He always stood up for principle regardless of its personal costs. He was 
instrumental in getting President Clinton to acknowledge the horrors of the 
Tuskegee experiment, yet, when President Clinton insisted that the ceremony be 
held at the White House, as opposed to going to Alabama to personally try and 
undo the damage, John refused to be involved, stating that it was only a half-
hearted effort.122
3.3.6 Reframing Historical Understandings of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
As introduced in earlier sections, Clinton’s speech performs a variety of functions within and 
apart from the genre of apologia. One of these functions, related to defending others, presents a 
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particular interpretation of the events of the Tuskegee Study. Following the Legacy Committee’s 
lead, Clinton’s description of the Tuskegee Study emphasized its racial dimension over other 
probable and coexisting factors. According to Harter and colleagues, Clinton’s reframing of the 
Study “forced the experiment to be interpreted strictly as a racial issue rather than an issue of 
medical ethics and abuse of power.”123 This flattening of the issue away from problematic 
medical institution norms tends to reduce the legacy of the Tuskegee Study to a race issue and 
neglects other widespread issues that made the Tuskegee Study possible, such as scientific 
norms, the economically depressed region of Macon County, the pressure on the Tuskegee 
Institute to cooperate with government programs for their own institutional gains, and others. 
The historical reconstruction, in other words, minimizes the scope of the Tuskegee Study in other 
cultural and social realms. However, the Legacy Committee helped pave the way for this 
interpretation of the Study through their particular suggestions for the presidential apology, 
which favored the simpler approach of understanding the Study as a problem of racism.124
Another significant interpretive shift Clinton made in the text of his speech was his 
inclusion of “the American people” as co-apologists for the Tuskegee Study. He said, “We can 
look at you in the eye and finally say on behalf of the American people, what the United States 
Government did was shameful, and I am sorry. The American people are sorry—for the loss, for 
the years of hurt. You did nothing wrong, but you were grievously wronged.”125 While the 
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“American people” were being called forth as fellow apologists with Clinton, it is unclear 
whether he was speaking inclusively or signaling only white American people, particularly when 
he apologized to “our African-American citizens” that the “Federal Government orchestrated a 
study so clearly racist.”126 Additionally, Clinton censured the United States government “on 
behalf of the American people.” One may argue that the whole of the U.S. government was not 
responsible for the Tuskegee Study (it was a Public Health Service program), but Clinton 
rebuked the government’s sins. Again, the unethical treatment he apologized for was described 
as being committed by “the American people” and “the United States Government.”127
In addition to providing a particular historical frame with which to interpret the Tuskegee 
Study, Clinton also proffered a forward-looking perspective for his audience by trying to 
constitute potential research subjects according to bioethical norms and conventions. Rhetorician 
Maurice Charland writes, “constitutive rhetorics, as they identify, have power because they are 
oriented towards action.”128 The actions that Clinton proposed for his audience include increased 
participation by African Americans in medical research. He lamented that the progress of 
medical science was slowed as a result of the Tuskegee Study, and the benefits of research and 
developments could not flow well to African Americans if they distrusted the physicians who 
were well-intentioned: “Still, 25 years later, many medical studies have little African-American 
participation and African-American organ donors are few. This impedes efforts to conduct 
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promising research and to provide the best health care to all our people, including African-
Americans.”129 This link between the Tuskegee Study and African Americans’ distrust of 
medical institutions, particularly government medical institutions, is commonly referenced in 
public health and bioethics literature, but the Legacy Committee asserts that the origins of the 
distrust stretch far earlier in American history.130 As examples of other historical medical abuses 
of African Americans, Reverby cites doctors’ (mis)treatment of Black women slaves in order to 
develop vaginal surgical procedures, slaveholders’ propagation of myths about “night riders” 
who abducted Blacks for experimentation, and grave robbers’ predilection for Black bodies to 
sell to medical schools as cadavers.131 Clinton used his speech as an opportunity to improve the 
image of mainstream medical and research institutions that have for so long been distrusted 
among many African Americans and other minorities. He offered an implied invitation for 
African Americans in his broader audience to take on a new identity, that of potential research 
subjects and trusting patients who are willing to engage the mainstream medical system for better 
health. He attempted to “[provide] the subject with new perspectives and motives”132 through 
promises of ethical conduct, commitment to bioethical principles, and unequivocal condemnation 
of past government abuses. Clinton said, “Since the study was halted, abuses have been checked 
by making informed consent and local review mandatory in federally funded and mandated 
research” and implored, “You must—every American group must be involved in medical 
research in ways that are positive. We have put the curse behind us; now we must bring the 
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benefits to all Americans.”133 This exhortation, however, may have the unintended effect of 
placing an undue burden on particular racial groups to “pick up the slack” in research 
participation for the benefit of others, if not themselves, an effect that will remind the savvy 
observer of the original purposes of the Tuskegee Study. 
In sum, Clinton’s apologia employed rhetoric to help his broader audiences interpret 
history and the present in ways that particularly benefited key stakeholders: the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, medical and science industries, and even himself as a 
political figure with a reputation and professional future to protect. These rhetorical moves are 
not always included in apologia but certainly do contribute to broader motives of self-defense 
and image restoration. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
By using analog criticism, pairing the Legacy Committee’s request for a presidential apology 
with President Clinton’s response, I have been able to fulfill Halford Ross Ryan’s promise that 
“the critic is better able to distinguish the vital issues from the spurious ones, to evaluate the 
relative merits of both speaker’s [sic] arguments, and to make an assessment of the relative 
failure or success of both speakers in terms of the final outcome of the speech set.”134 I have 
argued that the specific rhetorical choices included in Clinton’s apology demonstrate a clear 
responsiveness to the kategoria issued by the Legacy Committee. He conceded the Committee’s 
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claim that Tuskegee University’s reputation has been sullied by its eponymous affiliation with 
the Tuskegee Study, acknowledged the lingering damage the Study had caused for minorities and 
vulnerable populations, and fulfilled the Committee’s requests for specific federal support 
through new and renewed programs and funding. Clinton’s notable deviations from the Legacy 
Request were the change of setting for the apology and his broader notion of who had standing to 
apologize, including “the American people” among those who were sorry for the Tuskegee 
Study. From this degree of fit between the kategoria and apologia, we can determine that the 
Legacy Committee’s request highlighted its perceived exigences and accommodated its 
situational constraints in such a way that its audience, the President, was able to identify and 
provide a fitting response. 
However, I have noted that the exigences that emerged at the close of the Study lacked 
sufficient urgency to compel a fitting response at the time. This insufficient condition was 
rectified through the production of a rhetorical artifact by members of the Legacy Committee to 
renew the unsatisfied exigences with the infusion of urgency from increased publicity about the 
request as well as the looming 25th anniversary of the Study’s end. Clinton responded to the 
heightened exigence and worked within the constraints created by the kategoria to address his 
multiple audiences and balance his political commitments and responsibilities. My analysis takes 
its direction from both Bitzer and Vatz: Clinton’s rhetoric is a response to the rhetorical situation 
created by the absence of apology following the Study and enhanced by the efforts of specific 
rhetors. His speech is also, significantly, an attempt to shape the (re)current rhetorical situation 
faced by medical researchers seeking to recruit African American subjects. The ideological and 
rhetorical maneuvers in Clinton’s speech shifted the tone from apology/apologia to a policy-
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laden epideictic oration, an approach that allows the rhetor to shift from a position defense and 
humility to one of benevolent power.  
Although Clinton answered the Legacy Committee’s request, his address did not close 
the books on the “Tuskegee Legacy” nor the specific concerns raised by the Legacy Committee. 
Health disparities between white Americans and minorities continue to concern public health 
workers and distrust of government persists among many Americans, particularly those who feel 
most vulnerable to abuse or neglect. More work is needed to remedy these scars caused by our 
nation’s history of racial tensions, misuse of government power, and delayed attention to ethical 
issues in research and health care. Still, by cooperating with the community leaders, scholars, 
administrators, and clinicians in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, President 
Clinton took important steps in the continuing long-term challenge of diffusing the harmful 
power of the Tuskegee legacy. 
 
 113
4.0  APOLOGIA AND APOLOGY RECONSIDERED 
A consummate apology, no matter how personal or private an act, is rarely the 
sole concern of the principals. It is not easily contained because it inevitably 
touches upon the lives and convictions of interested others while raising both 
practical and moral questions that transcend the particular situation that prompted 
it. In this sense, it is quintessentially social, that is, a relational symbolic gesture 
occurring in a complex interpersonal field, with enormous reverberatory potential 
that encapsulates, recapitulates, and pays homage to a moral order rendered 
problematic by the very act that calls it forth.1
~ Nicholas Tavuchis 
 
Thus far, the analysis of Clinton’s speech about the Tuskegee Syphilis Study has proceeded 
based on the classification of that speech as apologia, a speech of defense. In Chapter 3, I laid 
out the key theoretical developments of that genre and discussed the degree to which the speech 
fit with that classification. However, this critical stance may seem at odds with the fact that 
Clinton’s speech is generally considered an apology (in the common definition of the term) 
rather than a defense. What are we to make of the daylight between these classifications? From 
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one vantage point, the divergent terms used to classify the President's address speak to how this 
charged text is prone to diverse uptake by various audiences. On another level, the 
terminological cleavage highlights how apology and apologia carry distinct entailments, 
especially for critics striving to make sense of Clinton's rhetoric. The following discussion 
considers both of these issues, using the Clinton case study to drive extended theoretical 
reflection on the apology/apologia relationship, and in turn, drawing upon the resulting insight to 
inform a more granular appraisal of the Tuskegee speech set. 
Chapter 3 revealed that apologia and apology (as a statement of remorse) share an 
etymological root but have little else in common. Conceptualizations of apology in contemporary 
literature reveal a lack of consensus among scholars hailing from the disciplines of philosophy, 
sociology, and psychology, among others, who disagree about the appropriate meanings, 
limitations, and even the essential elements of apology. In this chapter, I first lay out a working 
definition of apology, drawn from foundational works, and then consider the possibility and 
implications of a subgenre of institutional or collective apology. Throughout the discussion of 
these genres, I tie the theoretical developments to our specific artifact, Clinton’s speech, to 
demonstrate how this artifact eludes simple categorization. Finally, I return to the 
apology/apologia division to further explicate the entailments each places on Clinton as a rhetor. 
This approach focuses critical attention on two quintessentially rhetorical aspects of the study: 1) 
How Clinton’s speech has been accepted and understood by his various audiences, whether as a 
defense or as an apology; and 2) The critical stakes in play for the question, “What do we call 
Clinton’s speech act?” 
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4.1 DEFINING APOLOGY 
Since President Clinton’s remarks about the Tuskegee Study have been termed an ‘apology,’ 
both formally and informally,2 we must specifically define apology to see if this designation is 
appropriate in Clinton’s case. This task is relevant to criticism of the kategoria/apologia speech 
set of the past two chapters because the Legacy Committee specifically requested an apology—
rather than some other rhetorical response—from the President. Minimally, we must understand 
what an apology’s constituent elements are and when it is appropriate to offer an apology (and to 
whom). The following sections offer a conceptualization of apology that will be used to continue 
the genre analysis of Clinton’s speech of May 16, 1997 that was launched in the previous 
chapter. 
4.1.1 Constitutive Elements 
Writers on the subject of apology offer varying definitions of this seemingly common 
phenomenon.3 These definitions indicate that apology is made up of components numbering 
from two (fundamentally, “the offender has to be sorry and has to say so”4) to four5 to as many 
                                                 
2 The White House’s Office of the Press Secretary titled this speech “Remarks in Apology to African-
Americans on the Tuskegee Experiment.” See William J. Clinton, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
33 (1997): 718-720. 
3 Portions of section 4.1.1 were developed as part of my master’s thesis in bioethics. See Autumn R. Boyer, 
“In a ‘Sorry’ State: The Ethics of Institutional Apologies in Response to Medical Errors” (master’s thesis, University 
of Pittsburgh, 2009), 34-39. 
4 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 36. 
5 Aaron Lazare, On Apology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 35. Lazare lists four parts to the 
apology process: “1) the acknowledgment of the offense; 2) the explanation; 3) various attitudes and behaviors 
including remorse, shame, humility, and sincerity; and 4) reparations.” 
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as eleven.6 The definition I offer is derived from these models and is—I trust—sufficiently 
descriptive and simple to serve the purposes of this project. I propose that there are four 
necessary elements in a genuine apology: 1) acknowledgment that a wrong was committed; 2) 
acceptance of responsibility for one’s contribution to that wrong; 3) expression of remorse; and 
4) intent to benefit the victim through the offer of apology. Each of these elements is necessary 
but individually insufficient to constitute an apology. As simple as this definition appears, there 
is much contained implicitly within each of its elements. What follows in this section is an 
explanation and elaboration of each of these constitutive elements of apology.  
 First, the apologizer must acknowledge that a wrong occurred. Without disclosure of the 
wrong to the victim, there can be no apology. Necessarily, as a matter of an interpersonal 
communicative process, this stage involves identifying the victim of the wrong (to whom the 
apology is addressed) as well as coming to a shared understanding with the victim about the 
events that constitute the wrong (for what the apology is offered).7 Additionally, this stage 
implicitly acknowledges the norm that was breached and reaffirms the offender’s commitment to 
the norm as well as to viewing the victim as a moral equal. 
 Second, the apologizer must take responsibility for her part in the commission of the 
wrong. Specifically identifying one’s role in an offense indicates that one is not attempting to 
shirk responsibility or shift responsibility to another person. Rather, offering an honest and 
transparent account of one’s culpability demonstrates respect for the victim and continues the 
                                                 
6 Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
28-107. What Smith calls a “categorical apology” consists of eleven elements. 
7 It may be that the victim and the offender do not initially agree upon the nature of the wrong allegedly 
committed and must negotiate a mutually acceptable interpretation of the incident. Although achieving a shared 
understanding of the wrong is not necessary for the apology offered to be a genuine apology—i.e., to fulfill the 
conceptual and ethical requirements for an apology—achieving such a shared understanding affects the audience’s 
acceptance and interpretation of the apology. If the victim fails to share the apologizer’s understanding of the wrong, 
she may not accept the apology because she will interpret it as being offered for the “wrong wrong.” 
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process of disclosure that must precede contrition. Again, as a practical matter of communicative 
process, in especially complex circumstances it may take days, weeks, or even years for all the 
facts of the case to be discovered; an accurate account of one’s responsibility in wrongdoing may 
be a work in progress while details of the case emerge.  
Third, the apologizer must express remorse for her actions that constituted a breach of a 
norm. Psychologist Aaron Lazare defines remorse as “the deep, painful regret that is part of the 
guilt people experience when they have done something wrong.”8 Without this sense of guilt and 
regret, there can be no apology in the genuine sense.9 Other attitudes related to remorse that 
might factor into an apology include shame, humility, and sincerity.10 While there is no practical 
“sincerity test” to apply to an apology at the time it is given to the victim, expressing remorse 
implies that, at least at the time the apology is offered, the offender desires not to repeat the 
wrong or error. This implicit forbearance is not, however, a requirement that the apologizer must 
demonstrate or prove her intentions to prevent future offenses; it is only an indication that one 
would be justified in believing that the apologizer wants to behave differently in the future. 
Fourth, the apologizer must intend to benefit the victim (i.e., improve her condition) 
through the offer of an apology. However, one’s intent to benefit another by apologizing does 
not require that the offender believe that any benefits will actually result from the apology, either 
immediately or eventually. An offender may believe, in fact, that nothing she says can undo the 
                                                 
8 Lazare, On Apology, 107. 
9 Nick Smith terms this type of regret “categorical regret”—which he distinguishes from mere regret—
defining categorical regret as “an offender’s recognition that her actions, which caused the harm at issue, constitute a 
moral failure.” This definition is more stringent than mere regret (wishing things were otherwise), which can be 
applied to the actions of others, unpleasant results of following the rules, natural disasters or other events for which 
the person expressing regret is not blameworthy. This definition for mere regret is closer an empathic ‘sorry’ 
described later in this section than to the sense of remorse my definition requires, which is more akin to Smith’s 
categorical regret. Smith, I Was Wrong, 68. 
10 Lazare, On Apology, 107, 114. 
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harm she caused or be a sufficient offering to her victim. Still, this criterion serves to guide the 
rhetorical and behavioral choices of the offender as she prepares to apologize directly to her 
victim, including the timing, location, content, and medium of the apology, in order to maximize 
the possibility of improving the victim’s condition. The criterion of benevolent intent also 
assures that our standards for an apology do not allow one to apologize merely for one’s own 
satisfaction. 
The interdependency of these four elements of apology becomes clearer after elaboration 
of their implied commitments. If a person believes his actions were regrettable but maintains that 
he should not have to take responsibility or be blamed for his behavior, his expression is an 
attempt to excuse his actions. He does not offer an apology because he does not accept 
responsibility for wrongdoing. Similarly, if a person admits responsibility for her behavior and 
argues that her actions were right, she is attempting to justify those actions rather than to 
apologize for them since one need not apologize for right actions. If someone admits a wrong 
occurred and is remorseful without acknowledging personal responsibility, the “apology” fails to 
make the relevant meaningful link between the apologizer and the victim. This expression is akin 
to an expression of sympathy or empathy rather than an apology because one can only apologize 
for one’s own wrongs. In this case, too, remorse is a misnomer and is better termed regret or 
sadness. Additionally, a disclosure of wrongdoing and personal responsibility without 
demonstrating sincere remorse takes the legs out from under a would-be apology by leaving the 
discourse at the level of disclosure. Worse, it may be a sign that the offender is actually arrogant, 
defiant, or malicious rather than contrite and apologetic. Finally, without acting with the intent to 
benefit the victim through the offer of apology, an offender may compound the initial harm by 
acting insensitively in the process of trying to discharge her ethical duty to apologize. We would 
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consider an apologizer who acts without regard for the feelings and other needs of her victim to 
lack both true remorse and appropriate humility.  
In the above definition of apology, the reader will note that there is no requirement for 
the word ‘sorry’ to be included. Indeed, a genuine apology may be expressed with or without 
using the words ‘sorry’ or ‘apologize.’ One should also note, however, that use of ‘sorry’ does 
not necessarily indicate that an apology is being offered.11 The word ‘sorry’ can also be used to 
express empathy (“I’m sorry for your loss; I know you really loved your dog.”), to thinly veil 
resentment and hostility (“I’m sorry you’re so touchy. Most people wouldn’t be so easily 
offended!”), and to describe a poor condition (“After weeks of neglect, my yard was in a sorry 
state.”). Each of these examples is obviously not an apology, though the second example may be 
an effort to avoid an apology by shifting blame to the interlocutor. 
Furthermore, this definition does not require the addition of other actions that often 
accompany apologies, though it does not preclude the possibility that actions such as offering 
compensation for damage or promising to reform one’s behavior may be wholly appropriate in 
addition to offering a genuine apology. Such supplements to genuine apology may, in fact, 
contribute substantially to how the apology itself is received by its audience. 
Armed with this definition of genuine apology, we may now consider how well Clinton’s 
speech squares with such a concept. Certainly, ‘apology’ is the predominant label given to his 
speech among the principal figures involved as well as journalists, members of the public, and 
even some academicians.12 Clinton’s own rhetoric seemed to treat the speech as an apology 
                                                 
11 Nick Smith notes that the “most significant words in an apology [are] ‘I was wrong.’ In the context of 
apologizing, these words express not only a cognitive error but also a moral lapse.” Smith, I Was Wrong, 60. 
12 For a few examples, see Clinton, “Remarks in Apology,” 718-720; William J. Clinton, My Life (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2005), 757; Susan M. Reverby, “History of an Apology: From Tuskegee to the White House,” 
Research Nurse 3, no. 4 (July/August 1997): 1-9; Stephen B. Thomas, “Anatomy of an Apology: Reflections on the 
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when he said, “I apologize, and I am sorry that this apology has been so long in coming,”13 “you 
have our apology,”14 and “all we can do is apologize.”15 He also used the word ‘sorry’ 
repeatedly, though these uses could also be interpreted as appropriately empathetic: “what the 
United States Government did was shameful, and I am sorry,” “[t]he American people are 
sorry—for the loss, for the years of hurt,” and “[t]o our African-American citizens, I am sorry 
that your Federal Government orchestrated a study so clearly racist.”16
However, according to the definition of genuine apology, Clinton could not have actually 
been a meaningful, genuine apologizer for the Tuskegee Study. He was able to clearly identify 
and acknowledge wrongs that had been done, meeting the first criterion. He failed to meet the 
second and third criteria, however, because he lacked both direct and vicarious responsibility for 
the wrongdoing and harms of the Study and, thus, was unable to express personal remorse for 
blameworthy actions. He was forthright about his regret for the unethical actions taken by the 
government representatives and physicians affiliated with the Study (his use of the word ‘sorry,’ 
as well as his direct censure of the Study events, serve as expressions of regret), but regret is not 
sufficient for apology. As for the fourth element of apology, Clinton’s apparent intent to benefit 
the victims through his rhetorical action ought to be accepted as genuine, as there is no 
compelling evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, President Clinton was able to supplement his 
words and provide some means of redress and corrective action for the harms of the Tuskegee 
                                                                                                                                                             
1997 Presidential Apology for the Syphilis Study at Tuskegee.” The Academic Exchange. Emory University, 
http://www.emory.edu/ACAD_EXCHANGE/1999/sept99/anatomy.html 
13 Clinton, “Remarks in Apology,” 719. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 720. 
16 Ibid., 719. 
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Study, though I have already clarified that providing compensation is not itself a necessary nor 
sufficient feature of apology. 
In summary, this basic definition of genuine apology is comprised of four elements: 
acknowledging that a wrong was committed, accepting responsibility for one’s contribution to 
that wrong, expressing remorse, and intending to benefit the victim by offering an apology. 
Although the formal qualities of Clinton’s speech fail to meet two of these four criteria, further 
consideration is warranted before concluding that application of the “apology” classification to 
the address is inappropriate. Accordingly, the next section considers additional theoretical 
dimensions of the apology speech act, and how they bear on the question of whether Clinton’s 
address can properly be labeled an apology. 
4.1.2 Goals of Apology 
People may apologize in order to achieve various goals that may result from apologies.17 These 
goals may pertain to the offender, the victim, and others, but in any case point to the belief that 
apology can do something through its expression and reception.18 Additionally, the apologizer 
may be responding to her own internal pressures, pressure from others, or some combination of 
the two when she decides to offer an apology.19  
                                                 
17 Portions of section 4.1.2 were developed as part of my master’s thesis in bioethics. See Boyer, “Ethics of 
Institutional Apologies,” 39-45. 
18 Just as the phrase ‘I do’, offered in the appropriate norm-governed setting can result in the marital union 
of two people, the phrase ‘I am sorry’ (or a similar expression of apology) can produce material results when offered 
under conditions satisfying the norms governing apologies. See section 2.1.6 for a brief discussion of kategoria as a 
speech act that invites a perlocutionary sequel. In the context of this chapter, we can consider apology to be one such 
perlocutionary sequel to kategoria. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1975). 
19 Lazare, On Apology, 134. 
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The call for an apology, then, may come from the offender, the victim, or interested 
others who are privy to the wrongdoing. First, the apologizer may be motivated to apologize to 
those whom she has wronged in order to relieve her own strong feelings. She may hope to 
expiate her shame for wrongdoing by confessing or coming clean to her victim and, thereby, 
maintain her own “moral house.” She may apologize out of personal conviction or professional 
commitment that disclosing her wrongdoing and expressing remorse is the right thing to do. She 
may also apologize in order to seek forgiveness from her victim on the way to achieving her own 
personal peace or closure of the episode. Though these personal and internally motivated goals 
of apology may be sought, it does not follow that the apology itself would then be insincere, 
unethical, or manipulative.  
Second, an apologizer may be motivated to apologize in response to compelling or 
coercive external factors. He seeks to influence how the victim and others think about and act 
toward him; he may want to mitigate the damage to his reputation, avoid retaliation, or avoid the 
loss of social support.20 These externally initiated, self-oriented goals of apology may or may not 
correspond with the offender’s personal convictions; an “apology” offered solely in response to 
external pressures does not fulfill the conceptual requirements of an apology because the would-
be apologizer lacks true remorse for his wrongdoing and does not specifically intend to benefit 
his victim.  
Third, apology may achieve or contribute to goals that pertain to the victim and/or 
witnesses to the offense and apology. These goals may not have personal value to the offender 
but she expects that they will be meaningful to the victim or witnesses. Apology demonstrates a 
respect for others, which may be important for the victim and witnesses to observe of the 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 145. 
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offender (especially presuming the demonstration of respect is authentic). Reestablishing or 
reaffirming the offender’s respect for the offended other, or others in general, may be a step 
toward the offender’s reentry or reacceptance into the social and cultural memberships shared by 
the offender and victim.21 The act of apologizing can thus meet interpersonal and social goals of 
reaffirming and recommitting to the values shared among offender, victim, and their 
community.22 Likewise, receiving an apology may provide some psychological relief for the 
victim who may have been afraid that her suffering was invisible or unimportant to others. The 
victim may feel safer or more secure in her interactions and relationship with the offender after 
receiving explicit confirmation that her offender recognizes previous wrongdoing and is 
remorseful.23 Such psychological relief may contribute to the goal of allowing the victim the 
opportunity to move toward a sense of closure about the wrongdoing, even if such closure is not 
fully achieved until well after the apology is offered. 
In the case of Clinton’s apology, we do not know his personal motivations and 
convictions on the matter. It is unlikely that strong internal feelings motivated his rhetoric, since 
he had no guilt to expiate for the Tuskegee Study. There were, however, strong external 
pressures presented by the Legacy Committee’s request and the associated advocacy by the 
Congressional Black Caucus and key figures at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
Based on the content of the Legacy Committee request, Clinton would have had every 
reasonable expectation that the victims and the Legacy Committee (as witnesses) would have 
found an apology meaningful and morally important. Clinton could also expect that witnesses 
                                                 
21 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 22-3, 31. Additionally, Tavuchis refers to “apology’s fundamental tasks of 
reaccrediting membership and stabilizing precarious relations” following a transgression. Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 20. 
22 Lazare, On Apology, 53. 
23 Ibid., 59. 
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would interpret his speech to be a genuine indication of his values and social commitments. 
Therefore, the second and third types of motivation—external pressures and goals for the 
victim—both contributed to Clinton’s eventual decision to offer official remarks about the 
Tuskegee Study. 
For the offender and the victim there is another possible goal for apology that deserves 
more sustained attention—namely, forgiveness. The issue of forgiveness factors prominently in 
discourse about apology, and though this study cannot give forgiveness the attention it merits, I 
will briefly address the relationship among apology, forgiveness, and—in later chapters—the 
acceptance of apology by broader audiences. Like apology, the concept of forgiveness is both 
foundational and complicated. 
Sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis conceptualizes apology as the “middle term in a moral 
syllogism” that follows a call for apology and is followed by forgiveness.24 Although others may 
argue that forgiveness is not chronologically or conceptually tied to apology in this way,25 it is 
appropriate within this discussion of the goals of apology to consider the offer—or 
withholding—of forgiveness following an apology. 
Forgiveness has ties to religious practices (such as confession, repentance, and atonement) 
that take place between individuals or between a person and God, notably within Judeo-Christian 
traditions. However, we can still understand forgiveness within a secular context as a “process by 
which the offended party or victim relinquishes grudges, feelings of hatred, bitterness, animosity, 
or resentment toward the offender,”26 feelings which may be justifiable in light of the 
                                                 
24 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 20. 
25 Aaron Lazare considers four formulations of the relationship between apology and forgiveness: “1) 
forgiveness without apology; 2) no forgiveness regardless of the apology; 3) forgiveness that precedes apology; and 
4) apology that precedes forgiveness.” On Apology, 231-232. 
26 Ibid., 230-1. 
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wrongdoing. Forgiveness may, additionally, involve the adoption of positive feelings, such as 
compassion or love, toward the one who has caused her harm.27 Like apology, the sentiments 
associated with forgiveness must be expressed voluntarily in order to support the moral weight of 
the gesture. As both an emotional and cognitive activity, offering forgiveness involves 
recognizing the wrongdoing for what it is and making a conscious choice to temper one’s 
thoughts and actions in response to the wrongdoing.28 To forgive does not mean to forget the 
wrongdoing—how would forgoing retaliation have meaning in such a case?—nor to pardon the 
offender, which is the purview of the law or other authority.29
When one offers an apology, he offers simply a speech act, asking in return for 
something “exceptional and urgent: nothing less than forgiveness, redemption, and acceptance 
that serve to restore one’s sense of reality and place in a moral order.”30 The power to offer such 
redemption and acceptance through the act of forgiveness belongs to the victim, and the offender 
cannot demand forgiveness from his victim. A sincere apology may create the conditions 
necessary to allow the victim to detach from the wrongdoing through forgiveness of his offender, 
but forgiveness should not be expected as the “right” of the offender in exchange for an 
apology.31
Although forgiveness is a morally weighty process, it does not follow that it is an all-
or-nothing phenomenon. A victim may still harbor distrust or some anger toward her offender 
despite her detachment from retaliatory impulses and she may forgive her offender without 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 231. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 31. 
31 Nancy Berlinger, After Harm: Medical Error and the Ethics of Forgiveness (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005), 109. While wrongdoing serves as an occasion for apology, apology is not a sufficient 
condition for forgiveness to be offered (ibid., 110). 
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necessarily subjecting herself to the possibility of future harm by that person. The degree to 
which forgiveness is experienced or even possible may depend on the appropriateness and 
reception of the apology, how inclined the victim is towards forgiveness in general, and how 
traumatic or serious the offense was in the first place.32 The issue of forgiveness in the Tuskegee 
Study case is complicated because the one offering an apology is not the one seeking forgiveness 
for the wrongdoing. In the closing of Clinton’s speech, he mentions forgiveness as a goal of the 
apology event, saying to the victims and their family members, “only you have the power to 
forgive. Your presence here shows us that you have chosen a better path than your Government 
did so long ago. You have not withheld the power to forgive.”33 However, it is unclear by what 
evidence or standards he recognizes that forgiveness has been offered other than his assumption 
that the victims’ attendance signaled the offer of forgiveness. One of the Study subjects, Herman 
Shaw, gave a brief message at the White House event before Clinton’s statement, thanking the 
President for his anticipated apology and expressing his gratitude for the opportunity to “close 
this very tragic and painful chapter in our lives,” but did not specifically mention forgiveness.34 
Yet, one newspaper account of the ceremony noted that “forgiveness came swiftly and easily 
from Shaw” and the other survivors in attendance.35 Clinton was right that only those harmed by 
the events of the Tuskegee Study have the power or standing to forgive, but the conceptual 
concern is to whom they can offer forgiveness. Does it make sense to forgive an institution, 
whether in its historical or present form? Certainly, one can forgive one’s individual offender(s) 
                                                 
32 Lazare, On Apology, 231. 
33 Clinton, “Remarks in Apology,” 720. 
34 Herman Shaw, “Herman Shaw’s Remarks,” in Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study, ed. Susan M. Reverby (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 572. In other parts of Mr. 
Shaw’s statement, it appears that he anticipates the apology event at the White House will allow him and the other 
victims to heal psychologically, which may be associated with the act of forgiveness.  
35 Sonya Ross, “Clinton Offers Nation’s Apology for Syphilis Experiment,” New Pittsburgh Courier (June 
7, 1997), Pg 2. 
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even if the offender does not apologize, as is the case in the Tuskegee Study, but that forgiveness 
need not be triggered by an apology offered by a non-culpable person. 
Relevant to this discussion of apology and forgiveness is the rhetoric of atonement, which 
rhetoricians Joy Koesten and Robert C. Rowland conceptualize as a subgenre of apologia. The 
authors differentiate between atonement for past misconduct by institutions (including nations) 
and atonement sought for personal sins.36 Yet both types differ from traditional apologia in that 
“atonement rhetoric does not ‘restore’ the image directly, but admits that sinful behavior has 
occurred in an attempt to gain forgiveness and long-term image restoration. Its goal is both 
forgiveness for a sinful act and restoration of the relationship once the sin has been expiated.”37 
Therefore, we can associate atonement rhetoric more closely with apology than apologia, despite 
Koesten and Rowland’s alignment of atonement rhetoric with apologia. As described above, it is 
nonsensical to interpret Clinton’s rhetoric as seeking forgiveness for himself, though he did 
explicitly seek to rehabilitate the reputation of the U. S. government among those who had 
reason to distrust the government as a result of the Tuskegee Study. 
In summary, apology may be offered in pursuit of various goals that have particular 
implications for the offender, the victim, and the witnesses to the wrongdoing and/or apology. 
Achievement of these goals should not be considered dichotomously, but rather along a spectrum 
that allows for great and small shifts of attitude, behavior, and connectedness among individuals 
and groups. These shifts signal some degree of efficacy of apology, dependent on many 
variables, which should not be constrained by an unreasonable standard of perfection in order to 
be interpersonally and socially valuable. Generally, a non-polar approach to the effects of 
                                                 
36 Joy Koesten and Robert C. Rowland, “The Rhetoric of Atonement,” Communication Studies 55, no. 1 
(Spring 2004): 69. 
37 Ibid. 
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apology is worth introducing here and remembering throughout the forthcoming discussion of 
Clinton’s speech in this and later chapters. What we seek is not a mere label for his speech act 
but, rather, a nuanced exploration of the various meanings it may have, particularly in light of the 
rhetoric that compelled it. Just as the previous chapter foregrounded texture of Clinton's address 
that emerged in light of paired speech set analysis, here additional features of the address emerge 
when we see how the speech squares with formal definitions of apology. In the next section, I 
continue on this vector by discussing the situational features that appropriately call for an 
apology and considering how these situational features affected Clinton’s opportunity for 
rhetorical production. 
4.1.3 What Warrants an Apology 
Since blame for wrongdoing is appropriately attached to an agent in only some cases of alleged 
wrongdoing (as in other instances the agent’s action or behavior may be justified or excused), the 
issues that must be addressed concern the circumstances under which an agent may or must offer 
an apology following wrongdoing and under what circumstances an apology would be 
inappropriate.38 A priori, the definition of apology offered earlier requires that wrongdoing has 
occurred and that the apologizer is able to assume responsibility for all or part of that 
wrongdoing. With these prerequisites in mind, we must turn to the details that so often 
complicate accounts of apology. 
As discussed earlier, sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis conceptualizes apology as the 
“middle term in a moral syllogism” that follows a call for apology and is followed by 
                                                 
38 Portions of section 4.1.3 were developed as part of my master’s thesis in bioethics. See Boyer, “Ethics of 
Institutional Apologies,” 54-61. 
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forgiveness.39 Having already addressed the issue of forgiveness, let us focus on the “call.” For 
Tavuchis, this is a crucial step: “until there is a mutually understood response to a call 
(emanating from the offender, offended, or interested third parties), there is no occasion for an 
apology, and the meaning of the act remains ambiguous or subject to other interpretations.”40 
Before an apology can be offered there must be a precipitating event as well as recognition of the 
event as an offense to which apology may be an appropriate response. Furthermore, it may be 
neither the victim nor the offender who initially identifies the need for an apology.41  
This call, or recognition of the need for an apology, may develop on the basis of varying 
conditions. A sense of duty may be one motivation: “if we believe that apologies convey 
deontological meaning then we might desire them regardless of whether any living person or 
group feels personally wronged.”42 By contrast, one might focus on consequences and advocate 
apology only in cases where the recipient or a witness can respond in such a way that makes the 
effort of apology worthwhile to the offender, for example by withholding retribution or penalties. 
If one’s apology seems to be offered primarily because one fears the consequences of getting 
caught or wants to earn the good favor of others—rather than because one feels remorse for the 
“inherent wrongness of an offense” itself—we would characterize the “apology” as non-genuine 
and criticize the offender as being selfishly rather than ethically motivated.43
Those with special obligations, such as a specific duty to care for others, may have 
particular opportunities to apologize. If those with a professional duty to care (such as a 
                                                 
39 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 20. 
40 Ibid. 
41 However, we should expect that the offender will internalize the need for the apology by the time she 
offers it to the victim, according to the definition of a genuine apology. 
42 Smith, I Was Wrong, 221. 
43 Ibid., 56. 
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physician’s care for a patient) engage in actions that cause harm to those in their care, one can 
make a strong argument that those responsible parties must apologize to the victim of the harm, 
even if the victim may never otherwise be aware of the error or the harm. The extent of the harm 
may be minor—a physician’s delay in visiting the patient because the patient’s chart was 
misfiled—or it may cause increased morbidity and require additional medical care in 
consequence, as in the case of wrong-site surgery. The call for an apology following a harm 
caused by one’s actions is the most cut-and-dry exigence. In the Tuskegee case, exigence for an 
apology was created by the many individuals who, through their morally wrong actions and 
omissions, caused harm to the men in the Study.44 Moreover, those who were blameworthy were 
physicians, nurses, researchers, and policymakers who had a special duty to care for those in 
their charge. President Clinton, the eventual apologizer, was not one of those wrongdoers by this 
criterion, however. 
A more complicated situation is one where a significant moral wrong committed appears 
not to cause harm.45 In cases where the wrongdoing is minor and there is no harm—physical, 
economic, psychological, etc.—there is no clear ethical mandate or rhetorical exigence to 
                                                 
44 I should note that this claim is not universally accepted. Thomas G. Benedek and Jonathon Erlen, for 
example, argue that available therapies for syphilis in the 1930’s were painful and inefficacious and that penicillin 
was unlikely to improve the conditions of the men in the Study, who had been infected for over 20 years by the time 
penicillin was widely available and whose late-stage syphilis yielded good prognoses. Following this argument, the 
Tuskegee investigators should not be blamed for withholding treatment or causing harm beyond what the men 
would have experienced had the Public Health Service not initiated this study. “The Scientific Environment of the 
Tuskegee Study of Syphilis, 1920-1960,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 43, no. 1 (Autumn 1999): 1-30. A 
similar argument is made by Robert M. White, who further contends that the treatment of the men in the Study was 
not racist, based on similar treatment of whites according to best medical practices at the time. “Unraveling the 
Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis,” Archives of Internal Medicine 160 (March 13, 2000): 585-598. 
45 Moral and legal philosopher Joel Feinberg contends that nearly all wrongs cause some degree of harm, 
claiming: “One person wrongs another when his indefensible (unjustifiable and inexcusable) conduct violates the 
other’s right, and in all but certain very special cases such conduct will also invade the other’s interest and thus be 
harmful […] There can be wrongs that are not harms on balance, but there are few wrongs that are not to some 
extent harms. Even in the most persuasive counterexamples, the wrong will usually be an invasion of the interest in 
liberty.” The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 1, Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
34-35. 
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apologize, though an apology may still be wholly appropriate. Whether or not an apology should 
be made likely depends on the magnitude of wrongdoing, the magnitude of harm that was 
(perhaps narrowly) avoided, as well as other features of the situation. In any case, one should be 
careful not to overlook or disregard less obvious harms in order to avoid offering an apology that 
may in fact be warranted. Some have argued that failing to treat the syphilitic men in the 
Tuskegee Study did not cause them any additional harm beyond what the men could have 
expected from the medical resources available to them at the time and the nature of their late-
stage illness.46 This argument attempts to relieve the Study researchers from blame, but historian 
Susan M. Reverby counters the self-defensive claims of the Public Health Service researchers: 
“Their policies and the ways they thought about race’s seemingly biological impact were built 
into their science, and their actions and public health perspective kept them from thinking about 
the individual men.”47 Pursuing data and the focus on pure science took precedence over ethical 
concerns,48 and this moral wrong was likely responsible for increased morbidity and mortality 
among many of the men and their families.49 Even those who were not physically harmed 
directly by the Study were wronged in the sense that their interest in being treated as moral 
                                                 
46 Susan M. Reverby, Examining Tuskegee: The Infamous Syphilis Study and Its Legacy (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009): 148-149. Benedek and Erlen make this argument in “The Scientific 
Environment of the Tuskegee Study of Syphilis, 1920-1960.” 
47 Reverby, Examining Tuskegee, 151. 
48 For example, Dr. O. C. Wenger, an original investigator in the Tuskegee Study, presented findings of the 
Study at the Hot Springs Seminar in September 1950 that indicated a twenty percent shorter life expectancy, greater 
disease in the cardiovascular system, and higher risk of other morbidity among those whose syphilis was untreated. 
Wenger proclaimed, “I heartily support the work that has been done, but it does not go far enough.” He pushed for 
increased federal support to track down the men with whom the investigators had lost touch and to continue to fund 
autopsies of the men when they died so that data would not be lost. O. C. Wenger, “Untreated Syphilis in Negro 
Male,” Hot Springs Seminar, September 18, 1950, in Reverby, Tuskegee’s Truths, 96-99. 
49 Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” in Reverby, Tuskegee’s 
Truths, 560. James H. Jones reports that, in 1975, the U.S. government expanded their compensatory health care 
provision following the termination of the Tuskegee Study to include the wives of Study participants who had 
contracted syphilis and the participants’ children who had contracted congenital syphilis. Bad Blood: The Tuskegee 
Syphilis Experiment, new and exp. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1993), 215. 
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equals was not honored by the researchers who deceived them and may have considered them 
inferior because of their race. 
In cases where there is no wrongdoing, there is no ethical reason to apologize and no 
exigence or compelling argument for an apology. In fact, an apology offered for an 
unpreventable event would be nonsensical and confusing. Tavuchis, for one, claims, “Where an 
actor’s responsibility and intentionality are deemed to be minimal or the consequences as trivial 
or accountable, an apology is superfluous.”50 Instead, an expression of empathy or regret may be 
appropriate and possibly morally required. For Clinton, empathy and regret were all he could 
logically offer, but it is clear from the above criteria that the nature of the Study and its harms 
warranted apologies from many other individuals involved with the Study from its inception in 
1932 to its termination in 1972. This sense that an apology was warranted motivated the Legacy 
Committee and their political allies to push for a presidential apology and it was a constellation 
of factors, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, that made President Clinton the recipient of the 
request. 
Physician Michael S. Woods claims that three groups of people may properly compel a 
clinician to apologize by demanding or mandating such an action: patients, patients’ families, 
and healthcare organization administrators.51 In the case of the Tuskegee apology, by analogy, 
those who have standing to call for an apology include the men in the Study, family members of 
men in the Study, and government leaders in authority over those who designed and directed the 
Study. Examining this position in light of the Tavuchis model of call-apology-forgiveness, we 
more appropriately understand that these particular agents may call for an apology, but the 
                                                 
50 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 21. 
51 Michael S. Woods, Healing Words: The Power of Apology in Medicine (Oak Park, IL: Doctors In Touch, 
2004), 47. 
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apologizer must internalize that call in order to offer a genuine apology. Since remorse cannot be 
coerced, it makes no sense to speak of a coerced genuine apology.52 While Smith maintains that 
a coerced apology can serve as a form of punishment of the offender because it forces a display 
of humility and demonstrates the power that an authority holds over the offender,53 it is more 
appropriate to call that expression something other than ‘apology’ per se due to its insincere and 
forced nature. While Clinton’s speech did not seem to be coerced, it was certainly compelled 
through rhetorical action and advocacy. This speech of apology could not have served as a public 
humiliation for Clinton for reasons already explicated, though it did give him an opportunity to 
enhance his reputation among his various audiences by endorsing particular values and 
expressing regret for historical wrongdoing. 
Sometimes, for pragmatic reasons an offender may delay offering an apology until the 
completion of a full investigation of the potential wrongdoing, for example, so that she may 
know the extent of her responsibility. While an accurate account of one’s responsibility is 
important to genuine apology, a prolonged silence from the offender following a call for apology 
may be interpreted by the victim as avoidance, denial of responsibility, or heartlessness. Thus, 
when one is relatively certain that one played a role in harming another, one should speak to 
what one knows in an apology and leave open the possibility of offering a more comprehensive 
account in a subsequent apology or disclosure when more details are known. The delay between 
the end of the Tuskegee Study and Clinton’s formal statement was addressed in Chapter 3 but 
will also be a point of discussion in Chapter 6 as we consider how such a silence affects the 
receptivity of an apology in this particular case. 
                                                 
52 Similarly, we tend not to give full credence to contracts or confessions derived from coercion. 
53 Smith, I Was Wrong, 151. 
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Finally, it is important to note that there may be empirical conditions that would make an 
apology ethically inappropriate. Consider, for example, a victim who has expressed her strong 
desire not to see or correspond with her offender. If the offender continued to pursue an apology 
encounter with her victim, she would be violating the victim’s expressed wish to be free of 
continued trauma from her offender. In cases where an offender’s apology (or attempted 
apology) is expected to cause harm or distress to the victim, the offender has an ethical duty not 
to apologize.54 The expectation of harm resulting from an unwelcome apology should be based 
upon the expressed wishes of the victim or the reliable account of mutual acquaintances, not 
simply the offender’s resistance to offering an apology. Clearly, this was not a concern for 
Clinton, who was explicitly asked to speak to the victims of the Tuskegee Study and whose 
immediate audience was eager to hear his official apologetic remarks. 
To summarize the theoretical developments in this section, apology is called for when 
one has committed a wrong that causes harm to another person or that person’s interests. If a 
wrong is committed that does not appear to result in harm, an apology may still be warranted; the 
situation may require further discussion between the wronged person and the offender to achieve 
a mutually satisfactory understanding of the situation and the appropriate response by the 
wrongdoer.55 Near misses (errors that are corrected prior to being harmful) and harms that result 
from non-blameworthy causes (such as natural disasters) do not require apology, though one 
might appropriately express empathy for another’s suffering. In any case of apology, the 
rhetorical and behavioral choices of an apologizer should be driven not only by the four 
                                                 
54 Offering such an apology would undermine the fourth element of genuine apology, according to our 
definition, an element included specifically to avoid compounding the harm suffered by a victim. 
55 Lazare maintains, “Like the doctor-patient interaction, an apology is best understood not as what one 
party (the offender) does or offers to another party (the offended), but as a process in which both parties reach 
agreement through a ‘give and take’ as a way to deal with the initial problem.” On Apology, 204-5. 
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conceptual criteria but also by consideration of what a reasonable person in the victim’s position 
would expect (normatively and epistemologically) of a genuine apology. In the language of the 
rhetorical situation, this section has examined some of the situational features that create an 
exigence for apology as a fitting response. While Clinton’s speech has been analyzed as “fitting” 
according to the criteria set forth by the Legacy Committee, this section provided the conceptual 
clarity to explore whether the rhetorical situation 25 years after the Study’s termination 
sufficiently warranted an apology from this particular interlocutor. In the following section, I 
address the issue of ‘standing’ to continue this analysis. 
4.1.4 Standing to Apologize 
The legal notion of “standing” provides a good starting place for determining who may apologize 
and for what.56 This is an important consideration for the forthcoming discussion of institutional 
apology and the continuing analysis of Clinton’s role in offering an apology for the Tuskegee 
Study. Standing is “a procedural requirement ensuring that only legitimate disputants adjudicate 
claims and that random parties cannot bring actions simply because they may hold an intellectual 
interest in the outcome.”57 In the earlier discussion about genuine apologies, I asserted that the 
offender must offer genuine apologies to the correct victim. In the language of standing, we can 
now say that an offender with standing to apologize offers a genuine apology to a victim with 
standing to receive the apology. That is, the person offering the apology must be able to identify 
                                                 
56 Portions of section 4.1.4 were developed as part of my master’s thesis in bioethics. See Boyer, “Ethics of 
Institutional Apologies,” 61-64. 
57 Smith, I Was Wrong, 52. 
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her own causal responsibility for the wrong to particular victim(s), who must be identified as the 
“correct” victims to receive the apology based on their having been wronged by that offender.  
Additionally, there are cases where one has vicarious responsibility for harms caused by 
particular others, as parents may have for their small children and employers may have for their 
employees. The nature of such vicarious responsibility “means that they are agent-responsible, in 
a forward-looking sense, for the state of the world that is free of harm caused by these children 
or employees, and agent-responsible, in a backward-looking sense, for harm the children or 
employees do cause. In these cases of vicarious responsibility, those who are responsible for the 
harm are not those who have caused it.”58 If a supervisor asks her subordinate to administer what 
is an incorrect dosage of medication to a patient, the supervisor has responsibility for the error 
even though she did not personally administer the dose; the subordinate acted as the agent of the 
supervisor. In cases where the one committing the wrong was acting as an agent of another (i.e., 
performing an action at the behest of another), the responsibility for the wrong and standing for 
the apology belongs to the authority on whose behalf the wrong was committed. Had the 
subordinate acted independently in her administration of an incorrect dose (or the child acted 
independently of the wishes of her parent), the superior would not have standing to apologize for 
the error. However, if the supervisor (or parent) had failed to discharge her duties or obligations 
appropriately, thereby causing or failing to prevent the wrong (e.g., by failing to prevent the 
subordinate from acting), the supervisor has standing to apologize for her own failings that 
contributed to the ultimate harm. Additionally, in one’s role as employer, supervisor, or parent, 
one may be liable for damages caused by those within one’s responsibility or influence. 
However, just as one may compensate a victim without accepting fault for the events that caused 
                                                 
58 Kurt Baier, “Moral and Legal Responsibility,” in Medical Innovation and Bad Outcomes: Legal, Social, 
and Ethical Responses, ed. Mark Siegler and others, (Ann Arbor, MI: Health Administration Press, 1987), 104. 
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the harm, one may be liable to compensate (or liable to legal responsibility) without having the 
standing to apologize.  
To say that one is apologizing on behalf of another might indicate to the victim that the 
speaker recognizes the wrong committed against her and demonstrate the speaker’s empathy, but 
it does not make sense as a genuine apology without the personal acceptance of blame and 
responsibility as well as a personal expression of remorse and not merely regret for the 
circumstances. Likewise, it does not make sense for a third party to accept an apology offered to 
another. However, the stipulation of standing does not limit the number of people who may be 
found blameworthy for an offense and, therefore, eligible and responsible to offer an apology, 
nor does it limit the number of people who may be counted among the victims awaiting an 
apology.59 Standing, as it applies to genuine apology, requires that we account for and identify 
the agents most relevantly involved in an offense so that an apology is offered by the 
blameworthy individuals for their own actions. 
Since the Tuskegee Study was not initiated or continued at Clinton’s directive, he bore 
neither direct nor vicarious responsibility for its wrongs and harms. Therefore, he technically 
lacked standing to apologize and no one with standing to apologize delegated that responsibility 
to him (“The dead rarely delegate,” says Nick Smith60). However, any outstanding needs for 
victims’ compensation would still be the responsibility of the U. S. government, despite the 
passage of 25 years, and it can reasonably be argued that President Clinton had standing to 
remediate some of the lingering psychological and sociological damage caused by the Study. As 
it happened, he took the opportunity to provide additional restitution through the establishment 
                                                 
59 Smith discusses the complications of proximate causation as compared to direct causation, concluding 
that the nuances of causation color the meaning of apologies. He favors the reasonable limits of causation provided 
by the proximate causation perspective, and I am inclined to agree. Smith, I Was Wrong, 38-46. 
60 Ibid., 219. 
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of a memorial and bioethics institute at Tuskegee University as well as other corrective 
measures. 
This chapter has, to this point, focused largely on interpersonal apologies and cases 
where institutional members may apologize for their wrongdoing committed in an official 
capacity. I have laid out a four-part definition of genuine apology, considered what goals 
apology may be used to reach, and examined the types circumstances and actors that drive the 
calls for apology. In the next section, I look more specifically at apologies offered on behalf of 
institutions and how these statements complicate the notion of apology discussed thus far. By 
expanding our discussion of apology to include collectives, I hope to provide some degree of 
resolution to the lingering questions about Clinton’s role in apologizing for the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study. 
4.2 INSTITUTIONAL APOLOGY 
A growing area of interest in the study of apologies concerns those made on behalf of institutions 
or groups of people rather than individuals. Since institutional and collective apologies 
complicate the model of genuine apologies explicated above, they warrant extended treatment 
here. Specifically, I will address how theorists’ views of institutional apologies differ from my 
conceptualization of genuine (interpersonal) apologies, how the concept of standing challenges 
some forms of institutional apology, and what reasons institutions may have for offering 
apologies. Finally, I will propose a framework with which we might assess institutional 
apologies in light of the conceptual differences between them and individual apologies. I will use 
this framework to reconsider how Clinton’s speech may be considered an apology in this 
 139
modified sense and what meanings may attach to it as a result.  
4.2.1 Conceptualizing Institutional Apology 
In addition to the basic sense of apology as an interpersonal act, a great deal of literature deals 
with what is variously termed organizational, corporate, collective, official, or institutional 
apology.61 Sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis recognizes four modes of apology interactions: one to 
one (interpersonal apology), one to many (to a collectivity), many to one (from a collectivity), 
and many to many (from one collectivity to another).62 This chapter’s discussion of 
institutional—or collective—apology pertains most closely to the second and third of these 
types, as I will be teasing out how we might understand an apology coming from “many.”63 
Regarding apologies offered by collectives, Tavuchis poses the following questions: “[H]ow is 
an apology formulated in this context and what does it signify? What does it, or can it, render 
when essentially inanimate, and therefore mute, social entities require human agents to speak on 
their behalf? Finally, can we speak of collective sorrow and regret in any sense other than 
metaphorically?”64 These questions are good to keep in mind as we explore how Tavuchis and 
other theorists have attempted to answer them. Furthermore, these concerns about institutional 
apologies bear on our interpretation of Clinton’s speech to the victims of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study—especially as he claims to speak on behalf of the country—and will be addressed, though 
perhaps not answered definitively, later in the chapter. 
                                                 
61 Portions of section 4.1.4 were developed as part of my master’s thesis in bioethics. See Boyer, “Ethics of 
Institutional Apologies,” 64-70. 
62 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 48. 
63 In the case of Clinton’s speech, we may characterize it as an address from “many to many,” even though 
he was a single speaker, since he claimed to speak on behalf of the government and the nation. 
64 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 96. 
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For clarity, let us define institutional apology as an expression of regret65 offered by an 
institution (through a spokesperson or media release) or an individual within the institution who 
responds to alleged wrongdoing by the institution as a whole or select individuals or groups 
acting within their institutional roles. While these ever-increasingly ubiquitous expressions are 
called ‘apologies’ by witnesses, media reports, and theoretical literature, they do not satisfy all 
four criteria for genuine apology as defined earlier in this chapter. Still, for the present purposes, 
it will be convenient to use the broadly accepted terminology of ‘institutional apology’ to avoid 
the clumsy phrase “so-called institutional apologies.” Additionally, adopting the term 
‘institutional apology’ acknowledges that these instances of institutional rhetoric are intended to 
serve some of the same functions as genuine interpersonal apologies, though further analysis of 
particular cases may lead to the conclusion that these statements achieve varying levels of 
apologetic success. 
One version of an institutional apology is an individual apologizing on behalf of her 
institution, what I call the “non-representative institutional apology.” This individual has not 
been delegated the authority of an institutional representative by her institution, but she speaks 
on behalf of the collective nonetheless. However, this would-be apologizer lacks standing to 
apologize for the institution, and her remarks may even be repudiated by the institution. The 
victim(s), too, may be dissatisfied by the speaker’s lack of standing and authority to offer an 
apology. Tavuchis puts it more firmly: “an apology proffered without the proper credentials, that 
is, lacking the moral imprimatur of the group, amounts to no apology at all. It means nothing 
because it represents the unaccredited One and not the mandate of the Many.”66 The non-
                                                 
65 The substitution of regret for remorse is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.2—the assumption of 
responsibility is more complicated in institutional contexts than interpersonal contexts. 
66 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 101. 
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representative may better be considered as expressing shame or embarrassment because of one’s 
association with wrongdoers, as well as sympathy or empathy with the victim. 
A second form of institutional apology is offered by an institutional representative on 
behalf of an employee or member of the institution. The “representative/individual apology” 
affixes blame on an individual within the institution and offers an apology for that individual’s 
actions. The responsible agent may be unwilling or unavailable to offer an apology, or the 
institution may want to control what statements are made publicly by members of the institution. 
Here again, the issue of standing casts light on the conceptual failings of such an apology; the 
institutional representative’s lack of standing significantly diminishes the apologetic meaning of 
such an expression, particularly if the responsible person is unrepentant and refuses to apologize. 
Although someone in authority in the institution has delegated responsibility for the apology to 
the representative (who may be an executive, public relations officer, or department head, for 
example), the culpable person may not have authorized the delegation and, in any case, the 
speaker cannot express remorse for another’s actions.  
The third form of institutional apology relevant here is offered by an institutional 
representative for the institution’s failings. This “representative/collective apology” makes use of 
the same types of spokespersons as the representative/individual apology, but this representative 
purportedly speaks on behalf of the institution as a whole. The representative/collective apology 
is commonly offered following events that are publicly embarrassing to the institution or 
following an accusation of wrongdoing that is considered sufficiently severe or endemic to the 
institution that a collective apology is considered warranted. The critical conceptual concern with 
regard to this form of apology is collective responsibility, which will be discussed at various 
points in the remainder of this chapter. 
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Of these three forms of institutional apology, Clinton’s speech seems to fit best with the 
third—the representative/collective apology that is offered on behalf of the whole institution by a 
legitimate spokesperson. The delegation to Clinton of responsibility for the apology is implicitly 
inherent in his position as United States President rather than the result of the expressed wishes 
of all the institutional members, and the Legacy Committee’s request for an apology 
acknowledges his legitimate authority to apologize on that basis.67 As a representative of the 
government Clinton assumed the position of the apologizer on behalf of the government and the 
American people. However, when the President claimed to apologize on behalf of all Americans, 
he may have overstepped his bounds. As Smith describes this question of representation, “Surely 
the president speaks for the people in some institutional sense, but allowing this to override all of 
the respects in which our leaders do not represent our opinions, values, and commitments 
oversimplifies and misleads.”68 As the President, Clinton had standing to speak on behalf of the 
United States in many instances, but it is not so clear that he had standing to apologize on behalf 
of all Americans regarding the Tuskegee Study as he did in this speech.69
This and other complications of collective apologies have recently been addressed 
systematically by philosopher Nick Smith, who considers both individual and collective 
apologies in his book, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies. Although Smith outlines the 
eleven features of what he terms categorical apologies, he prefers to address the “forms” of 
                                                 
67 Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” 562. 
68 Smith, I Was Wrong, 162. 
69 The mandate for official apologies is not absolute because it depends on the support of the community on 
whose behalf the rhetor speaks. As rhetorician Lisa Storm Villadsen describes, “A speaker unable to gauge and give 
expression to common sentiment will fail to achieve the consubstantiality with the audience necessary for the 
mandate to apologize on their behalf. If the speaker ignores or violates the norms and values of the listeners, the 
apology may be judged empty or disingenuous and the speaker’s mandate null.” Lisa Storm Villadsen, “Speaking on 
Behalf of Others: Rhetorical Agency and Epideictic Functions in Official Apologies,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 
38, no. 1 (January 2008): 34. 
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apologetic meaning rather than approach the analysis of apologies from a binary “is” or “is not” 
perspective.70 According to his analysis, apologies offered by collectives are problematic and 
pose significant challenges to the moral value of such statements, though they can still be 
meaningful speech acts on several levels. Primarily, questions of consensus and representation 
complicate the apology: does the representative issuing the apology properly represent the 
institution and/or the entity on whose behalf he apologizes? Who is included in membership of 
the institution? What kind of agreement or consensus must exist among the members about the 
text of the apology (or offering it at all)?71 Even if these questions cannot be neatly answered or 
addressed in specific instances, we can still understand some of the purposes served by a public, 
official, apologetic statement from a collective. The additional purposes or “important meanings” 
of collective apologies may hold significance for interested third parties in addition to the 
victim(s) and include establishing the historical record of the events and the apology,72 
expressing the representative’s sympathy and regret (although one cannot meaningfully speak of 
an institution’s responsive emotions),73 endorsing moral principles and values,74 rehabilitating 
the institution’s identity in the public eye,75 and recognizing the victims as moral equals.76 
Additionally, official actions might provide redress to victims and serve as a promise not to let 
such wrongdoing occur again.77 One can see, however, that these important functions of 
                                                 
70 Smith, I Was Wrong, 12. 
71 Ibid., 162-165. 
72 Lazare, On Apology, 39-40; Smith, I Was Wrong, 247; Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 108-9. 
73 Smith, I Was Wrong, 174. 
74 Keith Michael Hearit, Crisis Management by Apology: Corporate Response to Allegations of 
Wrongdoing (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2006), 203; Lazare, On Apology, 55; Smith, I Was Wrong, 226-227, 
247. 
75 Hearit, Crisis Management by Apology, 202-3; Lazare, On Apology, 203; Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 108. 
76 Smith, I Was Wrong, 227-229.  
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institutional “apology” need not derive from explicit, anthropomorphized statements 
acknowledging collective wrongdoing or claiming collective remorse. While these goals and 
purposes of collective apology do not meet the four criteria for genuine apology (let alone 
Smith’s eleven criteria for categorical apology) and are apologies in a metaphorical sense alone, 
they nonetheless can serve as meaningful discursive events for the victims of wrongdoing. 
Smith cites several reasons why victims may readily settle for a collective apology from a 
non-blameworthy representative rather than a genuine apology from the culpable parties. He 
notes: 
If the victim is primarily concerned with an institution revising a policy or 
providing redress, a ranking member may be much better positioned to generate 
this meaning than those directly responsible for the harm. […] In these situations, 
the injured and those at risk of injury may prefer apologetic gestures from those 
with the highest rank and most power to control the future regardless of even their 
membership status in the culpable group.78
According to Smith’s caveat, the victim accepts the replacement of genuine apology with redress 
and/or reform, but the apologetic meaning and ethical value of apology itself is still largely lost. 
According to Smith, value-declaring apologies may be called for when a collective lacks 
standing to offer a categorical apology (or where responsible individuals may not be available or 
willing to apologize) and where the rhetorical situation demands that something must be said.79 
                                                                                                                                                             
77 Smith, I Was Wrong, 233-235. Smith also considers how the speaker’s role within the institution may or 
may not have sufficient standing to enforce the institutional commitment to particular values or policies. 
Additionally, the proportion of institutional members who endorse the value will affect the institution’s success in 
upholding the stated standards. Ibid., 247. 
78 Ibid., 220. 
79 Ibid., 248. 
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Such a declaration may be significant to the victim(s), though we can clearly distinguish between 
the ethical significance of genuine and value-declaring apologies.”80
While I have already described some reasons why calling Clinton’s speech an apology—
even an institutional apology—is problematic, his speech may be described more appropriately 
as conveying various forms of apologetic meaning, as Smith describes them. Clinton established 
the historical record of the events and added his official statement to that record, expressed his 
sympathy and regret, endorsed particular moral principles and values, recognized the victims as 
moral equals, and, perhaps, rehabilitated the institution’s identity in the public eye (at least 
among some of his audience).  
By making an official statement, President Clinton corroborated the historical account of 
the Tuskegee Study as asserted by the Legacy Committee in their request for an apology. 
Communication scholars Lynn M. Harter, Ronald J. Stephens, and Phyllis M. Japp argue that 
Clinton’s narrative (re)framing of the Tuskegee Study “was an attempt to rebuild African 
American trust in the medical community” and, therefore, may not have been entirely accurate.81 
Regardless of whether Clinton’s account was perfectly accurate, it still served as an official 
though incomplete account of the events of the Study. 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 203. 
81 Lynn M. Harter, Ronald J. Stephens, and Phyllis M. Japp, “President Clinton’s Apology for the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Experiment: A Narrative of Remembrance, Redefinition, and Reconciliation,” Howard Journal of 
Communications 11 (2000): 28. 
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4.2.2 Additional Considerations of Institutional Apology 
As gestured to above, institutional apologies vary from individual apologies in particular, 
significant ways.82 A key difference is that the apologizer in an institutional apology is not 
necessarily an agent significantly responsible for the wrongdoing at issue. We have already 
discussed how an apology-by-proxy is unacceptable according to the criteria of genuine 
individual apologies, but institutions tend to offer such apologies without considering the logical 
and ethical problems inherent in such an arrangement. The voice of the institutional apology may 
be either an abstraction of the institution (issued as a press release, for example) or a 
spokesperson speaking on the institution’s behalf. The apologizer may even be the head of the 
institution apologizing for the offenses of past administrations, such as in Clinton’s apology for 
the Tuskegee Study. In any case, the voice of the apology is typically dissociated from the 
agent(s) of the wrongdoing. 
Another criterion in the definition of apology that is often omitted in institutional apology 
is the expression of sincere remorse. When a representative is speaking on behalf of others, the 
closest to remorse she can express is mere regret because she does not bear responsibility for the 
wrongdoing. Genuine collective remorse and apology can only be expressed and offered in cases 
where the collective is extremely cohesive, like-minded, and “bound by considerable solidarity,” 
and where each and every member is able and willing to express personal responsibility and 
remorse for wrongdoing.83 Since an institution or collective meeting these requirements is 
extremely rare, we should be suspicious of expressions of remorse by institutional 
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representatives that are offered on behalf of the “institution” in an abstract sense rather than 
offered by identifiable individuals for their particular roles in the wrongdoing. Although a 
representative of a blameworthy institution may not be able to express true remorse, it is 
reasonable to expect that the spokesperson should be able to speak with genuine sorrow about 
the wrong that was committed by others. Her regret and the institution’s disclosure should not be 
self-interested, but should come from an attitude of forthrightness and a policy of transparency. 
A problem with collective apologies is that they can “allow wrongdoers to diffuse blame 
into the ether of institutional doublespeak,” rather than ensure that all responsible will be 
included in the apology.84 It is ethically and rhetorically preferable for each of the culpable 
agents to offer an apology rather than allow the institution to obscure the details of the 
wrongdoing. In the case of Clinton’s apology for the government’s (and nation’s) role in the 
Tuskegee Study, he never identifies individuals who bore direct responsibility. His most specific 
reference to blameworthy agents in the Study was one mention of the United States Public 
Health Service, which betrayed the men who “were offered free medical care.”85 Those who 
were most directly involved in the design and operation of the Study were left anonymous, their 
identities obscured by Clinton’s general references to “the Government,” “our Nation,” and “the 
American people.”86
The “absence of legal and ontological equivalence between the parties” involved in 
institutional apologies differentiates them from interpersonal apologies and raises complications 
for how we might consider institutional apologies and the “nature of the Many.”87 But, as 
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Tavuchis allows, “collectivities can, do, and at times, must apologize to persons they have 
harmed, in a manner of speaking.”88 The constraints of this “manner of speaking” deserve 
explanation. Perhaps because institutional apologies usually become part of the historical record 
and perhaps because some institutional “apologies” are crafted in such a way as to abstract from 
and occlude the specifics of the wrongdoing to which it responds, institutional apologies leave 
little to no room for the spontaneity and dynamics of human conversation. As Tavuchis 
describes, institutional apologies tend to be more formal and indirect as compared to individual 
apologies.89 The formality of the language can shield the institutional representative from being 
candid or direct, or prevent her from admitting more responsibility than officials might want to 
acknowledge, and this poses ethical and conceptual problems. According to my prescription for 
genuine apology, if one may reasonably be left wondering whether the institutional statement 
was an apology, then we may assume that it fails to meet either the reasonable person standard or 
the four conceptual criteria for genuine apologies. Clinton’s speech has no semantic ambiguity 
about its purpose as an apology, but it shares the formal and prepared qualities of institutional 
speeches. Still, Clinton appeared to be direct rather than evasive about the U. S. government’s 
blameworthiness for the Tuskegee Study. It is likely that Clinton had the luxury of such 
admissions given his personal and chronological distance from the wrongdoing. 
Allegations of wrongdoing against an institution generally involve higher stakes than 
allegations against an individual. The purposes of an institutional apology extend beyond 
redressing wrongs between offenders and victims and work further to rehabilitate the 
institution’s reputation and reaffirm its values to members and non-members alike. Institutional 
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apologies, therefore, are offered to wider audiences than individual apologies but may also be 
offered to multiple audiences. A collective apology may explicitly or implicitly address 
concerned third parties, a broader community, and the history and legacy of the institution in 
addition to the specific victim(s).90 Clinton’s prose made it clear that he recognized his broader 
and multiple audiences. He directly named his honored guests present at the White House and 
acknowledged his audience in Tuskegee attending the ceremony via satellite feed.91 He also 
addressed his remarks specifically to “Macon County, to Tuskegee, to the doctors who have been 
wrongly associated with the events there,” and to “our African American citizens.”92 These 
multiple audiences may have had varying expectations of the President and his speech and so it 
is understandable that their reactions to the speech might vary accordingly. The involvement of 
diverse audiences clearly adds to the exigences and constraints facing a speaker in the rhetorical 
situation and affects the nature of an institutional apology. 
These additional motives and concerns mean that an institutional apology is likely to be 
more complex than apologies meeting our four-component definition of apology, incorporating 
additional elements that may not generally be considered apologetic (or that may substitute for 
an apology). Communication scholars Jeffrey Courtright and Keith Hearit discuss one example 
of an additional requirement for institutional apologies. Their description of apologies made by 
organizations inverts Tavuchis’s typology of apologies as from “one to many” or “many to 
many” (in the case of corporate apologies) and takes the stance of the “many to the few 
(institutions to wronged individuals).”93 Courtright and Hearit surmise, “While with individuals 
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a confession is seen as enough, it is apparent that when dealing with institutions, there is an 
expectation that along with confession will come a strategy of corrective action” to prevent 
against a future infractions.94 This expectation for corrective action may exist in interpersonal 
apologies as well, but an individual may still offer a genuine apology without making restitution 
or pledging to reform her behavior.95 Still, Courtright and Hearit may be right that institutions 
should be expected to take specific actions that demonstrate a commitment to preventing future 
wrongdoing of the sort for which they have been found blameworthy. Revising policy, imposing 
sanctions for wrongdoers, and providing compensation for those who have been harmed are all 
common methods institutions use to mitigate the harm done to others and to demonstrate a 
commitment to reform that can protect their images in the future. These actions do not constitute 
an apology on their own, but may supplement or take the place of apology in some cases. 
Moreover, compensation for harm does not indicate remorse for the wrongdoing. Institutions or 
individuals sometimes offer compensation to a victim without acknowledging fault or liability 
(or apologizing), as in legal settlements. Again, these behaviors are sometimes interpreted as 
acknowledgment of guilt or remorse, but they are not apologetic expressions per se. Just as one 
may offer disclosure of an error without apologizing, one can also withhold apology while still 
disclosing and offering compensation for harms.  
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee explicitly addressed this issue of 
corrective action in its request for an apology, saying, “Although a public apology is necessary to 
heal the wounds of Tuskegee, it alone would not be sufficient to assure the nation that research 
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like the Tuskegee Syphilis Study will not be duplicated. Despite the significance of a Presidential 
apology, it must not be an isolated event.”96 Clinton’s response echoed the Committee’s 
assertion: “An apology is the first step, and we take it with a commitment to rebuild that broken 
trust.”97 The policy initiatives he laid out in the last half of his speech are clearly intended to 
meet the specific requests of the Legacy Committee while demonstrating a commitment to 
reforming the institutional failings that allowed the Tuskegee Study to occur in the first place. 
Another consideration of institutional apology concerns the impetus for these 
expressions: What are institutional members apologizing for? Typically, an apology may be 
warranted for faulty or unethical policies that may be unsatisfactory for several reasons, 
particularly if they have led to the harm of others. The policies may be ineffective (e.g., may not 
adequately prevent harm to others), unenforceable or unclear about who is to enforce them, 
unnecessarily complex, vague or loophole-ridden, or contradictory with current laws and 
policies, or they may refer to an abstract goal without specifying implementable procedures. 
Additionally, policies may be unethical because they are discriminatory, infringe unnecessarily 
upon others’ rights and interests, impose an unfair burden on a particular group, require that 
which is itself unethical, or otherwise disregard the status of others as moral beings. (In the case 
of the Tuskegee Study, the policies guiding the Study’s researchers and physicians were 
unethical for each of these reasons.) If the alleged wrongdoing is the poor or inadequate 
implementation of institutional policies, an institutional apology is essentially an apology for the 
behavior of others, which is ethically and conceptually troublesome. When an apology for 
institutional policy is warranted it would be best offered by the policy framers or those who have 
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allowed the policy to remain in effect, rather than by an institutional representative who offers a 
diffuse and impotent apology for the institution at large or for others’ misdeeds.  
Finally, it is important that witnesses and critics of institutional apology differentiate 
between blameworthiness and moral duties to remedy the wrong. Smith writes, “We can inherit 
debts and obligations […] without being blameworthy.”98 This seems to have been the belief of 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, as reflected by its request for an apology—
there was no claim in that appeal that Clinton was blameworthy for the Tuskegee Study, only 
that he bore an inherited obligation to offer the apology that had not been offered at the 
appropriate time by the appropriate agents in the past. Asking Clinton to apologize may not be a 
sign of the Legacy Committee’s confusion about responsibility for the Study but, rather, a 
recognition that “[w]hen an institution recognizes its mistreatment of a group in the past, its 
leaders may feel a special solicitude toward the interests or values of the victims and take 
exceptional care not to repeat offenses against the group.”99
While much more could be said about the way that institutional apologies are used and 
received in the public sphere, it will suffice at this point to summarize the conceptual gap 
between genuine apology and institutional apologies yet retain the understanding that 
institutional apologies can serve multiple ethical, social, rhetorical, and practical purposes 
despite falling short of the standards for genuine apology. Institutional representatives may 
appropriately disclose wrongdoing (our first criterion: acknowledging that a wrong was 
committed) and speak with the intent to benefit the condition of the victim(s) by speaking 
forthrightly (our fourth criterion, more or less). However, a representative cannot typically take 
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responsibility, personally, for the wrongdoing nor offer remorse on behalf of others. She may 
offer an expression of regret for the wrong and resulting harm, but this expression of empathy—
while ethically valuable—is not equivalent to an interpersonal apology for the wrong. My 
reservations about the ethical value of institutional apologies are not shared by Koesten and 
Rowland, however, who claim optimistically that atonement rhetoric “functions as a purgative-
redemptive device for an individual or an entire organization. Through purgation, redemption is 
produced and the relationship between the person or organization and the wronged party is 
healed.”100 Whether by this or other sociological and psychological mechanisms, however, 
statements of institutional apology do hold significant meaning for various audiences and, 
potentially, those who offer such apologies. In the next section, I apply the principles and 
complications of institutional apologies to Clinton’s speech to interrogate the implications for 
audiences and critics of recognizing it as apology and/or apologia. 
4.3 CLINTON’S SPEECH AS APOLOGY AND APOLOGIA 
In light of the conceptual considerations of apologia and apology explicated in this 
chapter and Chapter 3, we are now better situated to assess Clinton’s remarks according to these 
genres. The issue of labeling the speech as “apology” or “apologia” presents some problems, due 
to the various types of rhetoric employed in the speech. More importantly, however, choosing 
one of these genres over the other potentially forecloses the opportunity to understand the 
rhetoric and its implications more fully. In this section, I will consider what meanings we can 
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derive from the speech if we assume it is an apologia, as well as what it may mean to call it an 
apology or institutional apology. 
The title of this dissertation suggests that we ought to characterize Clinton’s speech as an 
apologia.101 But, as discussed in the previous chapter, Clinton’s speech has more affiliations 
with particular conceptions of apologia than others. He was not involved with the Tuskegee 
Study in any way, but he spoke in response to the kategoria that called him out as an appropriate 
government representative. He sought neither to deny that a wrong had taken place nor to foster 
an understanding of motives that might excuse or justify the actions in Tuskegee. Koesten and 
Rowland assert, however, that the President had to carefully balance meeting the expectations of 
those who had been wronged without admitting too much guilt on behalf of the government and 
the country.102 A speech like Clinton’s, offered in part as an image restoration or image 
protection strategy, is a defense of sorts even if it concedes the accusations in the kategoria. The 
nature of his self-defense and defense of his administration is largely preemptive; therefore, the 
postures of bolstering, differentiation, and transcendence described by Ware and Linkugel apply 
to some extent, particularly as they are offered in response to explicit and implicit charges about 
the President’s moral nature and reputation. Benoit’s strategies of image restoration (specifically, 
offering corrective action and perhaps engaging in mortification) were cited as useful tools for 
understanding Clinton’s apologia. Moreover, Downey’s descriptions of contemporary apologia 
were shown to fit tightly with the situational features and constraints facing the President as he 
addressed the misdeeds of prior government administrations.  
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Huxman’s treatment of apologia as a cross-species genre also allows us to think about 
how Clinton’s speech served deliberative and epideictic functions. It is clear that the second half 
of the speech is policy-oriented and makes implicit and explicit arguments that such policies 
reflect the present ethical climate of the government (the auditor is expected to recognize a 
contrast with the administrations under which the Tuskegee Study was conducted). The White 
House event for the Study survivors, family members, and other interested parties also supported 
an epideictic atmosphere, in which Clinton honored his guests and praised their perceived 
forgiveness as well as the science and technological industries for their promises of a “much 
healthier, much more productive and more prosperous” future.103
However, we might also consider what characterizing Clinton’s speech as an apology 
entails. Analysis earlier in this chapter revealed that Clinton lacked the standing to offer a 
genuine apology for the Tuskegee Study and that, at best, he could disclose the wrongdoing and 
seek to improve the psychological condition of the victims by expressing empathy and regret for 
the historical wrongdoing.104 The events of the Tuskegee Study clearly warranted an apology 
from the individuals who designed and carried out the Study, but Clinton opted not to name 
those individuals. His statement of regret and apology may have been genuinely heartfelt, in 
spite of its lack of fit with the requirements of genuine apology, but it was also clearly motivated 
by external pressures from the Legacy Committee. For Clinton, the political consequences of 
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refusing to speak apologetically likely far outweighed his association with the Study by virtue of 
his official remarks. Therefore, his goals for apologizing extended beyond bringing 
psychological closure and healing to the victims and their families to include protection of his 
own political and personal reputations. 
Rather than stop the analysis with a verdict of “not apology,” we can gain a much more 
productive understanding of the power of Clinton’s rhetoric by using different analytical 
standards. The subgenre of institutional apology, for example, allows for more flexibility in the 
agent(s) and recipient(s) of apology than does our definition of genuine apology. According to 
the description of institutional apologies, Clinton had standing to speak on behalf of the U.S. 
government because of his legitimate leadership. Nick Smith’s descriptions of various modes of 
apologetic meaning found in institutional apologies also help to isolate the rhetorical 
opportunities available to the President in his representative apology. He identified values and 
principles that had been violated in the past and explicitly spoke of the government’s renewed 
commitment to those values. Clinton further demonstrated a recommitment to bioethical 
principles by allocating funding for bioethics research and training as well as a renewal of the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission. Moreover, his pledge to corroborate and honor the 
historical record of the Study was reinforced by the funding he pledged for a memorial and 
museum at Tuskegee University.  
The President’s policy initiatives in his speech further served to convey the message that 
the U.S. government is not as evil as it was in the past, which is also a defense of the institution 
that he represents. Financial and medical redress for the harms of the Study had already been 
made through legal action in the years following the Study’s termination. Clinton’s rhetoric, 
paired with his policy initiatives, led Harter and colleagues to ask, “Can Clinton’s address truly 
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be viewed as an apology, or should it be viewed as a sales pitch for the modern medical 
establishment?”105 This is a question points to the challenge and, possibly, the limited usefulness 
of trying to categorize institutional rhetoric as belonging to a single genre, as Clinton’s speech 
seems to be both. 
Aaron Lazare describes Clinton’s speech as “a moral statement on behalf of the United 
States,” but, while he acknowledges that victims found the apology meaningful, he has 
reservations about its overall moral worth.106 Specifically, Lazare is concerned that the apology 
was so late in coming, that Clinton’s true motives for speaking may be in question, and that he 
was “apologizing for someone else’s misdeeds, not his own” when he had sufficient misdeeds of 
his own (unrelated to Tuskegee, of course) for which he could apologize.107 Similarly, Smith 
notes that “political leaders are quick to denounce the failures of their countries—especially 
before they led the country—but slow to apologize for their own misdeeds.”108 Still, Lazare 
asserts that the apology served a healing purpose for the victims who were “acknowledged as 
humans with rights like any others.”109  
When considering whether to classify Clinton’s speech as an apology or apologia, if such 
a choice must be made, the rhetorical exigences that are tied to an audience’s expectations of a 
particular discourse should not be overlooked. As rhetorician Martha Solomon discusses in her 
article about the genre of scientific reporting in regard to published medical research from the 
Tuskegee investigators, “Clearly, a rhetor has some control over any genre, but generic 
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conventions may be so powerful, pervasive, and esteemed by society that they severely restrict 
rhetorical choice. Rhetors inculcated with those generic conventions may become insensitive to 
alternatives and blind to the limitations and assumptions inherent in them.”110 For Clinton, too 
much deviance from the generic norms of (institutional) apology likely would have been 
rhetorically and politically destructive. He had to use apology rhetoric to meet the expectations 
of the Legacy Committee and to avoid looking evasive. However, the norms of institutional 
apology are based in some problematic assumptions about responsibility and representation, and 
possibly in an overestimation of the ethical value of apologies offered on behalf of others, 
especially when one is apologizing on behalf of a collective or institution. These problems may 
lead uncritical audiences to ascribe more value and moral worth to such seemingly apologetic 
statements. 
If we call Clinton’s speech an apology, we can credit him with being responsive to the 
Legacy Committee’s request and appreciate his public and official recognition of historical 
wrongdoing in a manner that honored his guests—particularly the Study survivors—at the White 
House. We can also be optimistic about the power such apologies have to heal sociological and 
psychological wounds for those directly harmed as well as witnesses to the wrongdoing and 
harm. The moral weight we ascribe to such statements is significant. However, this terminology 
requires us to greatly broaden the definition of apology or ignore the ways in which institutional 
representatives speaking about past administrations’ wrongdoing fail to meet the ethical 
requirements of genuine apology. In other words, by calling such statements ‘apologies’ we 
simultaneously diminish their ethical value while trying to credit them with full ethical power. 
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If, on the other hand, we call Clinton’s speech an apologia, a defense, then we cannot 
consider the President as being particularly cooperative with the Legacy Committee’s request. 
We might lapse into cynicism about how Clinton took advantage of a camera-worthy moment to 
secure additional political support among minorities and spoke more for his own image-
protecting benefit (as an individual and as an office-holder) than for the benefit of the Tuskegee 
victims. Since Clinton was not directly blameworthy, his apologia was not necessary to repair 
damage to his reputation (e.g., attempting to set the record straight about his involvement) but 
was an opportunity to enhance his public image regarding issues that were particularly salient to 
his career and reputation. Taking this approach avoids the ethical and conceptual murkiness of 
calling the speech an apology, but it also disallows the possibility that institutional apologies 
(however skeptically we might understand that term) are often meaningful to their recipients. 
Viewing Clinton’s address as merely defensive, whether in response to specific allegations or to 
preempt future attacks, may unfairly reduce our perspective of the President to a manipulative 
and strategizing politician. 
We might consider other factors while interpreting the meanings and value of the speech. 
For example, Clinton made headlines repeatedly during his terms in office for offering apologies 
(and apologiae). Whether for historical wrongdoing such as the Cold War era radiation 
experiments (as the Legacy Committee cited) or for his own personal scandals such as the 
Lewinsky affair, Clinton might be said to have a knack for demonstrating humility. Does this 
mean he is a particularly good apologizer or that he is a particularly savvy public figure? Does 
this diminish the value of an apology he may offer? Additionally, it might matter to the critic 
whether Clinton’s expressions were particularly heartfelt (certainly it matters to the definition of 
genuine apology). For evidence of this, we could turn to Clinton’s autobiography for his insight 
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on the event. There, we will find little substantive mention of the speech—he mentions it in 
passing in exactly one sentence: “Just a month earlier [than my proposal to Congress to ban 
human cloning] I had apologized for the unconscionable and racist syphilis experiments 
performed on hundreds of black men decades earlier by the federal government in Tuskegee, 
Alabama.”111 This brief line does not give the reader sufficient information about Clinton’s 
psychological factors regarding the speech, such as how he understood his role as a speaker and 
how much he could have spoken from the heart. These questions regarding whether Clinton 
meant what he said and whether that matters (ethically versus socially, perhaps) are important 
but, ultimately and unfortunately, may not be answerable. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have explicated an ethically sound definition of apology and then complicated 
that definition by introducing the genre of institutional apology as an additional way to 
understand some instances of institutional rhetoric. These conceptions were then applied, along 
with the genre of apologia, to Clinton’s speech in order to tease out dimensions of this rhetorical 
artifact. Although these theoretical and analytical tools did not directly employ speech set 
criticism as performed in Chapters 2 and 3, they provide a different kind of fixed standard by 
which we may assess and find additional meaning in this example of Clinton’s rhetoric. Whether 
one labels this speech apology, apologia, or some combination of the two, the critic will be wise 
to remember that it is a complex artifact that responds to a longitudinal series of events, as 
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introduced in the first chapter. Furthermore, the question of generic labels is tied up with 
questions of audience. In the next two chapters, I will more closely examine the reactions to and 
receptions of Clinton’s speech among various audiences. Some audiences, including those 
present at the White House event, welcomed the speech enthusiastically. Others in the broader, 
public audience felt differently. These varying reactions bear on the nature of the “Tuskegee 
Legacy,” the topic of the following chapters. 
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5.0  THE TUSKEGEE LEGACY 
The nearly forty years the study has been in the public realm of history, 
imagination, and rumor must now be added to its forty-year existence.1
  ~ Susan M. Reverby 
  
Previous chapters have explored how Clinton’s 1997 Tuskegee Syphilis Study address can be 
understood as a response to a preceding speech act and how the address might properly be 
classified. There remains the question, however: What impact did Clinton’s address have, or 
what insights can be understood from the audience’s uptake of his message? In rhetorical studies, 
audiences are not considered to be passive recipients of texts or inevitable sites of persuasion but, 
rather, active co-constructors of meaning. The audience’s role in shaping the understanding and 
significance of rhetorical events is not necessarily undertaken consciously; Susan Reverby 
argues, for example, that the pervasiveness of myths about the Tuskegee Study and the 
intertwining of the myths and facts affect audiences’ interpretations and understandings of the 
Study and its legacy.2 Still, one way to explore how audiences have made meaning of President 
Clinton’s remarks about the Tuskegee Study is to consider the commentary provided by 
journalists and newspaper editorials. For example, one newspaper documented that the audience 
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present at the White House ceremony was moved to tears and offered a standing ovation to the 
President after his remarks.3 One can interrogate or take at face value the claim that the survivors 
“and their families, to varying degrees, have found it to forgive their government” but that 
regardless of forgiveness “the Tuskegee legacy will live on.”4 Another example of lay 
understandings of the apology event is found in the report of disappointment and hurt 
experienced by deceased Study participants’ family members who assumed they could attend the 
White House ceremony but who had not been included on the exclusive guest list.5
While these newspaper accounts are one way to gauge how the public responded to the 
rhetoric and ceremonial features of Clinton’s address, this chapter analyzes the effects of the 
speech by focusing on a specific dimension of the its impact, one that continues to exhibit 
durable salience and has also been explored by several empirical studies. 
The legacy of the Tuskegee Study has cast a “long shadow,” one that has been said to 
exert material impact by dissuading African Americans from participating in biomedical research 
as study subjects.6 A major impetus for increasing minority enrollment in biomedical studies 
came with the 1994 National Institutes of Health (NIH) guidelines, which called for more 
proportional inclusion of women and minorities in biomedical studies in order to account for “the 
fact that morbidity, mortality, and at-risk behaviors are socially patterned according to, for 
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example, race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, age, and gender.”7 These guidelines provided an 
exigency for researchers who needed minority participation in their studies but who also 
assumed that the Tuskegee legacy was an overpowering obstacle to reaching that goal. The 
question of the speech’s impact, then, interrogates the extent to which Clinton’s speech was able 
to lift the “long shadow.” 
To explore this question, I first examine how ‘Tuskegee’ has circulated in public 
discourse as an ideograph, a theoretical construct conceptualized by Michael Calvin McGee as a 
particularly powerful and rhetorically resonant term, one with unique capacity to shape public 
consciousness. This analysis lays the groundwork for considering a body of empirical research 
designed to measure both the durability of the Tuskegee legacy and the effectiveness of Clinton’s 
speech in mitigating the perceived consequences of that legacy.  
There have been several studies conducted to ascertain the influence of the Tuskegee 
Study over minorities’ attitudes about medical research; four are summarized here. A 1997 focus 
group study in Atlanta, Georgia sought the views of 33 African American adults regarding 
medical research. Among other discussion prompts in the five focus groups were questions about 
whether participants were “familiar with the Tuskegee Syphilis Study” and what they knew 
about it.8 These focus groups took place prior to President Clinton’s speech and the Home Box 
Office release of Miss Evers’ Boys, a film based on the events of the Tuskegee Study.9 Still, 
every participant claimed to be familiar with the Tuskegee Study10 and the Study was cited, 
along with other perceived government conspiracies such as HIV infection and Agent Orange 
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8 Giselle Corbie-Smith and others, “Attitudes and Beliefs of African Americans Toward Participation in 
Medical Research, Journal of General Internal Medicine 14 (1999): 537-538. 
9 Ibid., 543. 
10 Ibid., 541. 
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exposure, as “contemporary evidence that the legacy of abuse continues in [the African 
American] population.”11 One participant even questioned the efficacy of participant protections 
such as informed consent by referring to the Tuskegee Study: “Even if you give informed 
consent, like the Tuskegee thing—those men were told they would be treated but they 
weren’t.”12
Another research team conducted a series of seven focus groups in 1997 in four major 
U.S. cities to learn about African Americans’ knowledge about the Tuskegee Study, attitudes 
about medical research, and reactions to the film Miss Evers’ Boys.13 The 60 combined 
participants were in general agreement “that African Americans should generally avoid 
involvement [in medical research] given knowledge of past abuses and the inability to be certain 
that abuses would not reoccur.”14 Participants’ factual knowledge about the Tuskegee Study 
tended to be overshadowed by their familiarity with common misconceptions about the Study, 
but they considered the Tuskegee Study to be typical of racist treatment of African Americans at 
that time in the United States’ past.15
A 1998-1999 survey of 198 Detroit residents found that awareness of the Tuskegee Study 
was not in itself the cause for diminished trust in medical researchers but was a “contribution to 
the overall distrust of medical research among African Americans.”16 Additionally, the study 
found that African Americans who knew about the Tuskegee Study were actually more likely to 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 544. 
12 Ibid., 541. 
13 Vicki S. Freimuth and others, “African Americans’ Views on Research and the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study,” Social Science and Medicine 52, no. 5 (March 2001): 797. 
14 Ibid., 802. 
15 Ibid., 805. 
16 Vickie L. Shavers, Charles F. Lynch, and Leon F. Burmeister, “Racial Differences in Factors that 
Influence the Willingness to Participate in Medical Research Studies,” Annals of Epidemiology 12, no. 4 (May 
2002): 254. The specific prompt used to determine participants’ awareness of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study is not 
given in the published article. 
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indicate a willingness to participate in medical research than those who didn’t know about the 
Study, especially if they had indicated that the Tuskegee Study did not decrease their trust in 
researchers.17 Another study, published in 2003, surveyed 438 adults over the age of 50 to assess 
their willingness to participate in clinical research studies.18 The researchers found that 
knowledge of the Tuskegee Study was not an influential factor in either African American or 
White participants’ willingness to participate in cancer treatment research, although other factors 
diminished African Americans’ willingness to participate as compared to Whites.19 The 
researchers conclude, “knowledge of the Tuskegee study appears to be a symbol of distrust 
among African Americans, but not necessarily a deterrent to research participation.”20
These and other studies21 shed some light on the Tuskegee legacy’s effects on minority 
involvement in medical research, but one particular research program deserves extended 
treatment for several reasons. The “Tuskegee Legacy Project,” led by Ralph V. Katz, has 
gathered data and analyzed this issue for over 15 years, features a larger and more geographically 
diverse survey population than other studies, and, significantly, was the first to include Clinton’s 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 252. 
18 Diane R. Brown and Meral Topcu, “Willingness to Participate in Clinical Treatment Research Among 
Older African Americans and Whites,” Gerontologist 43, no. 1 (February 2003): 62-72. 
19 Ibid., 67-68. The researchers describe their method of assessing knowledge of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study: “Subsequent to the questions on willingness to participate in clinical cancer treatment trials, respondents 
were asked, ‘Have you heard of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment?’ The responses were coded 1 for yes only if the 
respondents could demonstrate some knowledge regarding the Tuskegee experiment, such as a description of the 
subjects. Otherwise, the response was coded 0 for no knowledge” (ibid., 66). 
20 Ibid., 70. 
21 See, for example: Benjamin R. Bates and Tina M. Harris, “The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis 
and Public Perceptions of Biomedical Research: A Focus Group Study,” Journal of the National Medical 
Association 96, no. 8 (August 2004): 1051-1064; B. L. Green and others, “Participation in Health Education, Health 
Promotion, and Health Research by African Americans: Effects of the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment,” Journal of 
Health Education 28, no. 4 (1997): 196-201; B. L. Green and others, “African-American Attitudes Regarding 
Cancer Clinical Trials and Research Studies: Results from Focus Group Methodology,” Ethnicity and Disease 10, 
no. 1 (Winter 2000): 196-201; and Sohini Sengupta and others, “Factors That Influence African Americans’ 
Willingness to Participate in AIDS Research,” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 24, no. 3 (July 
2000): 275-284. 
 167
speech as a potential contributing factor to public knowledge and understanding of the Tuskegee 
Study and legacy. Katz recognized the need for such research based on the “widespread belief 
that the legacy of this unethical research event is that the African American community has a 
greater reluctance to participate in clinical research studies as a result of the abuses foisted on the 
400 African American sharecroppers in Macon [County]” during the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.22
This chapter, then, considers the rhetorical power of the Tuskegee legacy—the lingering 
pall that accompanies the memory of the Study—and explores the extent to which Clinton’s 
speech may work to lift “the long shadow” of the legacy. In doing so, the following analysis 
sheds further light on the significance of Clinton's address as a rhetorical artifact, while also 
highlighting how the rhetorical criticism advanced in this project engages salient issues of 
ongoing concern. 
5.1 <TUSKEGEE> AS IDEOGRAPH 
The Tuskegee Study has left a lasting impression on medical professionals, bioethicists, and 
laypeople alike, and it is appropriate that such a preventable tragedy should be remembered. One 
concern for this chapter is how the Study has been remembered and how that memory shapes the 
Tuskegee legacy. To guide this exploration, I employ the analytical frame of the ideograph, as 
conceptualized by rhetorician Michael Calvin McGee. 
Ideographs, according to McGee, are “one-term sums of an orientation,” the grammatical 
                                                 
22 Katz and others, “Tuskegee Legacy Project,” 3-4. 
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“building blocks” of ideology.23 These terms, specific to a particular cultural milieu, bear highly 
charged connotations that instruct users about the proper way to perceive and live in their world, 
whether or not they are aware that the terms exert this influence. In this way, ideographs are 
related to “ultimate terms” as described by rhetorician Richard M. Weaver.24 Both ultimate terms 
and ideographs embody particular rhetorical thrust and influence, even as they seem to be simply 
natural within a cultural and political lexicon. However, ideographs attend to the social aspect of 
human experience more than general ultimate terms;25 they perform “a task of socialization, an 
exercise in epideictic rhetoric” that teaches us “to make, or comprehend, judgments of public 
motives and […] civic duty.”26 Ideographs are mobilized through formal and casual discourse 
that circulates without question (unless competing ideographs emerge to create friction, as when 
privacy and security concerns clash).27 Thus, ideographs serve as a persuasive short cut that can 
frustrate attempts at (counter-) argumentation because they have already been mobilized—and 
accepted—to some degree as “prior persuasion” in the service of an ideology.28 They “come to 
be as a part of the real lives of the people whose motives they articulate.”29
For example, one ideograph in American culture is “equality,” a term invoked to 
motivate and justify myriad political and social behaviors. However, the exact meaning of 
                                                 
23 Michael Calvin McGee, “The ‘Ideograph’: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology,” Quarterly Journal 
of Speech 66, no. 1 (February 1980): 7. 
24 McGee acknowledges the relationship between ultimate terms and ideographs, as well: “Ideographs are 
one-term sums of an orientation, the species of ‘God’ or ‘Ultimate’ term that will be used to symbolize the line of 
argument the meanest sort of individual would pursue, if that individual had the dialectical skills of philosophers, as 
a defense of a personal stake in and commitment of the society” (Ibid.). Weaver explains his concept of ultimate 
terms in the ninth chapter of The Ethics of Rhetoric, originally published in 1953 by Regnery/Gateway Inc. The 
reprinted edition was published by Hermagoras Press (Davis, CA) in 1985.  
25 McGee, “Ideograph,” 8. 
26 Ibid., 11. 
27 Ibid., 7. 
28 Ibid., 5. 
29 Ibid., 7. 
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“equality” in these usages not only is left unarticulated but also varies to some degree between 
usages. As McGee describes, we can try to define our meaning of “equality” by referencing 
historical events and previous usages of the term; present uses of “equality” must conform to an 
acceptable degree with the precedent usage. The term’s rhetorical power flows from how and 
why it is invoked in the course of persuasion, rather than from a specifically articulated 
definition.30 The following section considers how the term ‘Tuskegee’ exhibits similar 
ideographic qualities. 
The media coverage that initially exposed the Tuskegee Syphilis Study effectively made 
‘Tuskegee’ a one-word summary of the 40-year study and turned the term into a transcendent 
referent for government deceptions in medicine and bioethics violations generally. We know that 
the name and specter of the Tuskegee Study still circulate in contemporary biomedical, 
bioethical, and cultural discourses—some of these discourses will be identified in this chapter. 
One way to make sense of the persistent invocation of ‘Tuskegee’ as a representative anecdote or 
paradigm example of 20th century bioethical failure in the United States is to consider how the 
term ‘Tuskegee’ operates as an ideograph, complete with particular connotative commitments 
and motivations.  
Since the Study dealt specifically with syphilis and African American men, 
<Tuskegee>31 as an ideograph symbolically evokes the stigma of STDs, class difference, and the 
long history of racial discrimination and slavery in the United States. As McGee writes with 
reference to ideographs, “human beings are ‘conditioned’ […] to a vocabulary of concepts that 
                                                 
30 The significance of ideographs “is in their concrete history as usages, not in their alleged idea-content,” 
according to McGee (ibid., 10).  
31 I use the angle brackets to indicate reference to an <ideograph>, following the lead of Lucaites and 
Condit in their ideographic rhetorical criticism article. See John Louis Lucaites and Celeste Michelle Condit, 
“Reconstructing <Equality>: Culturetypal and Counter-Cultural Rhetorics in the Martyred Black Vision,” 
Communication Monographs 57, no. 1 (1990): 5-24. 
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function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief.”32 Through family 
conversations, community dialogues, media accounts, and written history, the legacy of the 
Tuskegee Study has conditioned <Tuskegee> as a term that transcends generations and locales to 
warrant broad-based distrust of medicine.33 In the words of historian Susan M. Reverby, 
“Nations are built on the myths and stories they tell themselves. ‘Tuskegee’ is one of the 
foundational stories of American racism in the twentieth century, and it anchors our beliefs about 
race, medicine, and science.”34  
As we shall see in the next section of this chapter, the Tuskegee Legacy Project has 
shown that a significant proportion of people surveyed are aware of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
but they know very little, factually, about it. More often, what is “known” about the Study are 
commonly circulating myths or distortions, yet this “knowledge” drives the ideograph of 
<Tuskegee> nonetheless. Reverby postulates that the myths about the Study have developed and 
persisted due to several influential factors: the varied retelling of the Tuskegee Study in theater, 
film, and documentaries;35 conflation of the Tuskegee Study with other contemporary and 
ethically troubling studies such as the Willowbrook and Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital 
cases;36 the similar title given to the World War II Tuskegee Airmen as the “Tuskegee 
                                                 
32 McGee, “Ideograph,” 6. 
33 The Tuskegee Legacy Project’s findings of increased fear of participation in biomedical studies among 
Blacks who were aware of the Tuskegee Study partially confirm this. See Ralph V. Katz and others, “Awareness of 
the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the US Presidential Apology and Their Influence on Minority Participation in 
Biomedical Research,” American Journal of Public Health 98, no. 6 (June 2008): 1140; Ralph V. Katz and others, 
“The Legacy of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study: Assessing its Impact on Willingness to Participate in Biomedical 
Studies,” Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved 19, no. 4 (November 2008): 1175. 
34 Reverby, Examining, 239. 
35 Reverby, Examining, 205-215. 
36 Ibid., 190-192, 201. These two studies are known, respectively, as the Willowbrook Study (at the 
Willowbrook Hospital for children with retardation on Staten Island, 1963-1966, where children were orally given 
the live hepatitis virus with their parents’ permission) and the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital case (at the hospital 
in Brooklyn from 1964-1965, where older patients were injected with live cancer cells). 
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Experiment”37 (and the fact that Laurence Fishburne starred in film dramas about both the 
syphilis study and the airmen);38 the rhetorical link made by some bioethicists between the Nazi 
doctors’ experiments at Nuremberg and the Study;39 and, of course, the ways in which stories 
generally circulate among families and communities.40 The myths about the Study cannot be 
disregarded, however, because they actively contribute to the connotations and rhetorical power 
associated with <Tuskegee>. The myths intertwine with the facts to form the ideograph's mosaic 
of meaning. 
Furthermore, McGee writes that ideographs with negative connotations (like 
<Tuskegee>) “may guide behavior and belief negatively by branding unacceptable behavior.”41 
In the case of the Tuskegee Study, the unacceptable behaviors and conditions included 
deception, absence of informed consent, inability to “unenroll” in the Study, and withholding 
potentially life-saving treatment from participants after it became widely available. Other 
Western ideographs like <science> or <technology> have met their match in <Tuskegee> 
because science, technology, and the government were at the root of the betrayal of hundreds of 
men over four decades of the Public Health Service Study at Tuskegee. The pursuit of medical 
advancement and knowledge led to preventable and curable morbidity and mortality for many of 
the participants of the Study, and that reality is hard to reconcile with the modernist appeal of 
technological progress. Even the establishment of Institutional Review Boards, research 
protocols, and ethics advisors have not necessarily weakened the power of <Tuskegee> for those 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 200. 
38 Ibid., 215. 
39 Ibid., 192-193. 
40 For example, African American minister Melvin Tuggle, who grew up near the hospital at Johns Hopkins 
University, attests, “When I was a child,” distrust of the hospital, with its history of segregation, “was passed down 
from parents and community people.” Christopher Windham, “How a Hospital Works to Gain Trust of Blacks,” 
Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2004, B1. 
41 McGee, “Ideograph,” 15. 
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potential research subjects who continue to be skeptical of medical professionals’ ethics.42
Regarding the relationship between the historical event of the Tuskegee Study and the 
power of its memory, Reverby writes:  
We cannot look at the Study as if the symbolic “Tuskegee” does not exist. The 
symbolism informs how we understand the facts, what questions we ask, what 
explanations we offer. In turn, as with any historical event that becomes mythic, 
examination of the “facts” often does little to undermine a powerful and useful 
story. There is a truth to what actually happened, and trying to understand it does 
matter. In this sense, the counter-narratives should be read, their facts should be 
measured, and the arguments should be considered, if for no other reason than to 
understand why they are being made.43
By this account, the transcendence and recalcitrance of <Tuskegee> poses a significant rhetorical 
challenge. In the next section, I examine a body of empirical research designed to interrogate the 
extent of the influence of <Tuskegee> over Americans’ attitudes and behaviors regarding 
biomedical research and whether Clinton’s speech of apology has inflected <Tuskegee>’s 
influence. 
                                                 
42 For example, the focus group research by Corbie-Smith and others reveals that many laypeople do not 
understand the purpose of informed consent and believe that ethical guidelines for researchers can easily be ignored 
by unscrupulous professionals as they were during the Tuskegee Study. Furthermore, some focus group participants 
were nervous about not being able to understand the technical terminology in an informed consent document. 
“Attitudes and Beliefs,” 540-541. 
43 Reverby, Examining, 233. 
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5.2 TUSKEGEE LEGACY PROJECT 
The analyses in previous chapters have raised questions about the importance and lingering 
influence of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and Clinton’s speech of apology within the context of 
the Tuskegee “legacy.” What is the recurrent rhetorical situation that medical researchers face 
during recruitment for studies? How does Clinton’s apology serve as a rhetorical resource (or 
constraint) for researchers seeking to address the recurrent rhetorical situation of recruiting and 
retaining minorities in medical research? These questions are closely related to those addressed 
through empirical research conducted by public health researcher Ralph V. Katz and his 
colleagues over the course of the past decade or so. The conclusions reached by Katz and 
colleagues are now becoming part of the contemporary understanding of how the Tuskegee 
legacy circulates among both researchers and the lay public. The researchers’ findings also 
present opportunities to explore the effects of Clinton’s speech on audiences, while maintaining a 
reflexive critical stance regarding ways in which the survey research itself may shape those 
effects.  
Dr. Ralph Katz, the principal investigator of the Tuskegee Legacy Project, was prompted 
to undertake this research program as a direct result of his participation in the 1994 University of 
Virginia symposium on the Tuskegee legacy.44 Then a dentist and public health professor at the 
University of Connecticut Health Center’s School of Dental Medicine, Katz was interested in 
issues of minority health disparities and participation in medical research and so he attended the 
                                                 
44 Katz and others, “Tuskegee Legacy Project,” 3. 
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symposium as an audience member.45 According to Katz, when his wife came across the 
announcement about the event, he was immediately interested due to the slate of speakers 
(especially James Jones, whose book Katz had used in his own classrooms), his own research 
interests in minority health and racial health disparities, and his role as director of the 
Northeastern Minority Oral Health Research Center (NMOHRC), which had a clear need to 
successfully recruit participants into its studies about oral health conditions disproportionately 
affecting African Americans.46 Following the symposium, Katz reflected upon the presenters’ 
discussion of the “legacy” of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and their central presumption that 
African Americans were reluctant to participate in medical research due to the abuses of that 
Study. He remarked, “[T]his array of highly qualified speakers had achieved the academically 
impossible. They had collectively talked for over 8 hours and had provided no references on 
which to base, much less judge, the central hypothesis… [that] the USPHS [United States Public 
Health Service]-Tuskegee experiment was at the heart of this reluctance to become a research 
participant.”47 Katz conducted a literature search to find any empirical support for this “legacy” 
that “appeared to be known more in the gut than in the head” of the speakers and came up empty, 
so he initiated the development of an empirical study called the Tuskegee Legacy Project (TLP) 
that aimed to “document, directly address, and hopefully mollify the specific concerns harbored 
by African Americans as they were invited to participate in future studies focused on minority 
health issues.”48 The tool at the heart of the TLP is the Tuskegee Legacy Project (TLP) 
Questionnaire, a 60-item survey instrument developed through several pilot studies between 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 2. Katz is a professor of Epidemiology and Health Promotion at the New York University College 
of Dentistry. New York University College of Dentistry, “Faculty Information,” New York University, http://www 
.nyu.edu/dental/faculty/bios/ft/RVK1. 
46 Katz and others, “Tuskegee Legacy Project,” 2. 
47 Ibid., 2-3. 
48 Ibid., 3. 
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1994-1998 and reviewed by panels of relevant scholars and experts, including those gathered in 
1996 to form the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee.49
As discussed earlier in this chapter, several qualitative and quantitative studies have been 
conducted to determine the degree of influence the Tuskegee legacy exerts over contemporary 
biomedical research. There are several reasons, however, to focus specifically on the work done 
by Katz and his research team. First, Katz’s interest in the legacy of the Tuskegee Study dates 
back over 15 years, and the Tuskegee Legacy Project he pioneered has been active for almost as 
long, starting with pilot studies in the summer of 1994 and generating published articles as 
recently as December 2009. In addition to the longevity of the Tuskegee Legacy Project, this 
research program differs from prior studies in several ways. While developing the TLP and its 
Questionnaire, the TLP researchers conducted literature reviews50 of other research assessing the 
impact of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and identified what they considered shortcomings of the 
other studies, including their limitation to single cities, limited reporting of findings, and use of a 
single prompt about respondents’ willingness to participate in research.51 By contrast, the TLP 
researchers designed their survey instrument to be the first to assess quantitatively the 
“community impact […] of President Clinton’s 1997 apology for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study” 
and to do so with the “largest and most geographically diverse study sample to date.”52 
Additionally, the TLP Questionnaire used multiple and varying probes to assess respondents’ 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 9-10. 
50 Years later, reviews of eight published studies—both qualitative and quantitative—were published as a 
separate article by members of the Tuskegee Legacy Project team. See Jan M. McCallum and others, “Awareness 
and Knowledge of the U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee: Implications for Biomedical 
Research,” Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved 17, no. 4 (November 2006): 716-733. 
51 Ralph V. Katz and others, “Willingness of Minorities to Participate in Biomedical Studies: Confirmatory 
Findings from a Follow-Up Study Using the Tuskegee Legacy Project Questionnaire,” Journal of the National 
Medical Association 99, no. 9 (September 2007): 1052-1053. 
52 Katz and others, “Awareness of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” 1141. 
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awareness and knowledge of the Tuskegee Study, and the specific wording of these probes is 
provided in the articles published about the TLP research. 
In the subsections that follow, I provide a description of several analyses conducted by 
the TLP research team based on data gathered with the TLP Questionnaire. I then discuss the 
“face value” findings of the TLP researchers with regard to the durability of the Tuskegee legacy 
and the efficacy of Clinton’s speech in lifting “the long shadow” of <Tuskegee>. I conclude the 
analysis of the TLP research with a rhetorical assessment of how the TLP research itself 
functions within the Tuskegee legacy and its ideograph. Such analysis promises to shed light on 
the initial questions driving this chapter, especially regarding the rhetorical critic’s opportunity to 
consider audience effects while keeping a broader perspective of the rhetorical artifacts under 
examination. A rhetorical perspective also foregrounds ways that Katz and colleagues’ study 
design is itself constitutive of social meaning. 
5.2.1 Research by Katz and Colleagues 
The Tuskegee Legacy Project Questionnaire has been deployed in a total of seven cities (to 
date).53 The various elements of the gathered data that are presently relevant include 
respondents’ recognition of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (TSS); knowledge and/or recall of the 
TSS—both its facts and its enduring myths; awareness of the presidential apology; knowledge of 
who gave the presidential apology; and the relationship among respondents’ knowledge of the 
TSS and presidential apology, attitudes about biomedical research, and willingness to participate 
                                                 
53 For example, in 2001 the TLP research team began follow-on research using two instruments derived 
from the TLP Questionnaire: “[O]ne focuses on willingness to participate and factors that affect participation in 
cancer screenings, and the other is being used to continue to gather data on the reasons why individuals do or do not 
volunteer to be research participants.” Katz and others, “Tuskegee Legacy Project,” 15. 
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in biomedical research. In this section, I summarize four articles published by the Tuskegee 
Legacy Project research team that focus on the possible enduring effects of the Tuskegee 
“legacy” for biomedical researchers.54 Here, I take the researchers’ methods and findings at face 
value and save my own analysis for a later section. 
In a random-digit-dialed telephone survey conducted between March 1999 and 2000, 
Katz and colleagues administered the TLP Questionnaire to 1,133 adults in four city/county 
areas: Birmingham (Jefferson County), Alabama; Tuskegee (Macon County), Alabama; Hartford 
(Hartford County), Connecticut; and San Antonio (Bexar County), Texas.55 One particular focus 
of this survey was to determine any differences among Hispanics, Whites, and Blacks with 
regard to “the level of awareness of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the U.S. presidential 
apology made to the Black community,” as well as how awareness of either or both might 
influence respondents’ “willingness to participate in biomedical studies.”56 Subjects were asked 
directly, “Have you ever heard of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study?” and, if they responded in the 
affirmative, were asked, “As a result of what you have heard about the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 
how likely are you to participate in a medical research study?”57 Regarding Clinton’s speech, 
subjects were asked, “Has any US President ever apologized for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study?”58 
Follow-up questions to affirmative responses included: “Which US President? Based upon what 
                                                 
54 As my goals are rhetorical rather than statistical analysis, many details about the TLP data are omitted 
from my descriptions, though full citations are provided for readers wishing to learn more about the TLP. 
55 Katz and others, “Awareness of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” 1137. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 1139. Respondents were given a 5-point Likert scale with which to rate their likeliness to 
participate from “much more likely” to “much less likely.” 
58 Ibid. 
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you heard about the apology, would it influence your decision to join a biomedical research 
study today? Did that apology make you more or less likely to join a study?”59  
Three probes were analyzed by the researchers as “key” questions (Have you ever heard 
of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study? Has any US President ever apologized for the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study? Which US President made the apology?).60 Based on the results, the researchers 
concluded that Blacks showed a much higher awareness of both the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and 
the fact that Clinton had offered an apology than either Whites or Hispanics.61 However, Blacks 
and Whites were about the same in their knowledge that there had been a presidential apology.62
The researchers also investigated respondents’ awareness of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
and the apology with regard to their willingness to participate in biomedical studies. They report, 
“Blacks who had heard of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study were much less negatively affected by 
that awareness than were Whites. This was true regardless of whether it was the impact of having 
heard about the Tuskegee Syphilis Study or of having heard of the presidential apology for the 
study.”63 Still, the plurality of Blacks and Whites who knew about the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
indicated that they were less likely to participate in biomedical research studies.64
A follow-up analysis of data gathered through the TLP Questionnaire delved more deeply 
into the differences between Blacks and non-Hispanic Whites to answer the question “Does 
awareness and/or detailed knowledge of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study influence one’s willingness 
                                                 
59 Ibid. Respondents were given a 5-point Likert scale with which to rate their likeliness to join a study 
from “much more likely” to “much less likely.” 
60 Ibid., 1139-1140. 
61 Ibid., 1140. But, according to the researchers, too few Hispanics knew about the apology to make 
comparisons among the racial/ethnic groups regarding the chances that respondents knew Clinton had made the 
apology. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. Later research by the TLP, discussed in this section, disconfirms this finding. 
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to participate in biomedical studies in 1999-2000?”65 This study summarized the findings of the 
“Awareness” study (discussed above) that “Blacks were 2-3 times more likely than Whites to be 
willing to participate in biomedical studies despite having heard of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
or the Presidential Apology.”66 The analysis for this “Assessing” study excluded respondents 
from the San Antonio area and specifically employed two scales derived from the TLP 
Questionnaire, the 17-question Likelihood of Participation (LOP) Scale and the 5-question 
Guinea Pig Fear Factor (GPFF) Scale, as well as a Tuskegee Syphilis Study Facts & Myths Quiz 
of seven true/false questions integrated into the Questionnaire.67
The 68.4% of subjects who said they had heard of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study were 
given the following Facts & Myth Quiz to assess the level of their knowledge of the Study (the 
correct answer is included here in parentheses):  
Introduction: I would like to know what specific facts you remember about the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Would you tell me whether the following statements are 
True or False. If you don’t know, please tell me that. 
1. Black men and women were subjects in the study (F) 
2. The subjects were injected with syphilis (F) 
3. The nurse who recruited them was Black (T) 
4. The study lasted 40 years (T) 
5. The subjects were told they had syphilis (F) 
6. The study was run by U.S. government doctors (T) 
                                                 
65 Katz and others, “Legacy: Assessing its Impact,” 1169. 
66 Ibid. My analysis of how the researchers framed this finding will be discussed in a later section. 
67 Ibid., 1170. 
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7. The study ended when penicillin was discovered as a cure for syphilis68 (F)69 
The results of this quiz were noteworthy: 90% of respondents correctly answered 3 or fewer 
questions and the top scores achieved were 5 (Blacks) and 6 (Whites).70 For example, 65-85% of 
respondents (depending on race and city) incorrectly believed that the subjects of the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study had been injected with syphilis, though it was statistically significant that more 
Blacks held this belief than did Whites.71
The results of the Facts & Myth quiz were analyzed along with the results of the LOP and 
GPFF Scales. The researchers determined that, overall, awareness of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study did not affect the willingness to participate nor the fear about participating in biomedical 
research.72 Detailed knowledge of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study showed only a “weak, albeit 
statistically significant inverse relationship” with the GPFF Scale, indicating an increased fear 
about participating in biomedical research.73 However, a “significant relationship was observed 
among Blacks between awareness of the TSS and willingness to participate but only in the small 
city of Tuskegee, the epicenter of this infamous event.”74 The researchers nonetheless concluded 
that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study is “neither the sole nor primary reason—nor after three decades 
even a distinctly identifiable reason—for poor levels of participation” in biomedical research 
                                                 
68 Later, the researchers realized this statement would have been “more precisely worded as ‘The study 
ended once penicillin became widely available as a treatment for syphilis’” (ibid., 1178). 
69 Ibid., 1171. 
70 Ibid., 1172. 
71 Ibid., 1172, 1174. 
72 Ibid., 1172, 1175. 
73 Ibid., 1175. 
74 Ibid., 1177. 
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and, therefore, study designers and recruiters need to develop strategies to ensure that minorities 
will enroll in biomedical studies.75
In 2003, the Tuskegee Legacy Project researchers sought to retest their findings about 
awareness of the Tuskegee Study and willingness to participate in biomedical research. This 
time, they administered the TLP Questionnaire from September to December 2003 to 1,162 
adults living in New York City; Baltimore, Maryland; and San Juan, Puerto Rico.76 The findings 
supported their earlier research: there was no relationship between awareness of the Tuskegee 
Study and self-reported willingness to participate in biomedical research.77 Considering these 
confirmed findings, the research team suggests five categories of reasons why there may exist 
low participation by minorities in biomedical studies: 
[L]ack of concrete knowledge of how biomedical research has benefited African 
Americans, as well as other groups, in the past; the lack of African Americans in 
visible leadership roles in biomedical studies; distrust of specific research 
institutions based upon the latter’s historical relationship with their local African 
American communities; lack of “endorsement” of the proposed research by 
trusted, grass roots leaders in the community; and lack of time and energy to 
participate in research studies owing to demanding family or job 
responsibilities.78
                                                 
75 Ibid., 1178. 
76 Ralph V. Katz and others, “Exploring the ‘Legacy’ of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study: A Follow-up Study 
from the Tuskegee Legacy Project,” Journal of the National Medical Association 101, no. 2 (February 2009): 180. 
77 Ibid., 181. While the relationship between awareness and likelihood of participation was found to exist 
for Whites living in Baltimore, the researchers believe it likely to be a “spurious finding due to the direction of the 
finding as well as the high number of analyses conducted” (ibid.). 
78 Ibid., 182. 
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The researchers note, however, that each of these reasons is subject to confirmation through 
focus group discussions in local communities or more specifically targeted survey research of 
African Americans.79
The most recent publication from the Tuskegee Legacy Project researchers regarding 
awareness and knowledge of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study was released in December 2009.80 In 
this analysis, 1,162 respondents in New York City, Baltimore, and San Juan were asked both 
recall and recognition questions about their knowledge of any research studies, including the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study specifically, that had influenced their opinion of biomedical research.81 
The first probe to assess respondents’ recall asked, “Have you ever read about, or ever heard of, 
any incidents or events related to medical studies or diseases that have ever affected your trust in 
medical research?”82 The open-ended follow-up question for affirmative responses was: “What 
were the specific events, studies or diseases?”83 The responses were coded hierarchically, based 
on descriptions given by the survey participants, as “definitely” identifying the TSS (by name or 
by clear description), “most likely” identifying the TSS (no name given but some descriptions 
likely linked to the Study), “questionable” identification of the TSS (descriptions given might be 
linked to the Study), and “did not identify” the TSS (no descriptions with reasonable links to the 
Study).84 Ten questions later, respondents were asked a direct recognition probe and an open-
ended follow-up question: “Have you ever heard anything about the Tuskegee Syphilis Study?” 
                                                 
79 Ibid.. 
80 Ralph V. Katz and others, “Identifying the Tuskegee Syphilis Study: Implications of Results From Recall 
and Recognition Questions,” BMC Public Health 9 (2009), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/468. 
81 Ibid. This analysis did not reference participants’ awareness of Clinton’s apology. 
82 Katz and others, “Identifying the Tuskegee Syphilis Study;” Katz and others, “Identifying the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study,” Additional File 1, http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/468/additional/. 
83 Katz and others, “Identifying the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” Additional File 1. 
84 Katz and others, “Identifying the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.” 
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and, if the response was affirmative, “What have you heard about the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study?”85 Responses to the follow-up question were categorized as “Factually Correct TSS 
Details,” “Myth (i.e., factually incorrect) TSS Details,” and “No TSS Details” (those that 
pertained only to syphilis as a disease or that had no relevance to the TSS at all).86
Less than 12% of those surveyed could either “definitely” or “most likely” identify the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study in response to the recall probe (“What were the specific events, studies 
or diseases?” that affected one’s trust in medical research).87 While the rates of awareness were 
much higher in response to the recognition question (“Have you ever heard anything about the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study?”), the results of this probe with its follow-up solicitation of details 
about the TSS confirmed the TSS Facts and Myth Quiz results from the 1999-2000 TLP 
Questionnaire survey—respondents demonstrated a low degree of detailed knowledge of the 
TSS, whether asked open-ended or direct questions about the Study’s attributes.88
The researchers identify three major implications of their most recent analysis. First, they 
caution against assuming what populations “know” about events like the Tuskegee Study, even if 
community leaders seem to be influenced by particular “knowledge” of those events. They write, 
“[I]t appears that more individuals hold a vague impression of having heard of this negative 
medical event which would affect their trust in research, than can actually name or give details 
about that specific event.”89 Second, Blacks’ and other minorities’ awareness or detailed 
knowledge of the TSS is unlikely to have any impact on their willingness to participate in 
biomedical research, “given the extremely low level” of awareness and detailed knowledge 
                                                 
85 Katz and others, “Identifying the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” Additional File 1. 
86 Katz and others, “Identifying the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.” 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
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recorded in the TLP Questionnaire results. This result was acknowledged to be in contrast to an 
earlier TLP finding that awareness of the Study increased respondents’ fear of participation. 
Third, the researchers reached a conclusion about methodology: recognition questions are “more 
likely to trigger memory” than are recall questions because, in recognition questions, some 
information is given as a cue and the questions are less mentally taxing.90
Katz and colleagues have generated several other publications analyzing and explicating 
the data gathered from the TLP Questionnaire, but those described above are most relevant to 
public attitudes about the Tuskegee Study and Clinton’s speech. In the next sections, I discuss 
how these data relate to this chapter’s central research questions about the Tuskegee legacy and 
the role of Clinton’s speech within that legacy. 
5.2.1.1 TLP Findings About the Tuskegee Legacy 
The findings of the Tuskegee Legacy Project research and analyses indicate that the influence of 
the Tuskegee legacy is not as strong as many might have believed, particularly with regard to 
biomedical recruitment efforts. As Katz reported from his experience at the University of 
Virginia symposium, there had been a prevalent assumption among Tuskegee Study scholars and 
experts that the Study was largely responsible for African Americans’ reluctance to volunteer as 
research subjects.91 The empirical research conducted via the TLP Questionnaire contradicted 
those assumptions. 
The TLP results also seem to indicate that the ideograph <Tuskegee> is fading. If the 
memory of the Study is not sufficient to deter minorities from volunteering as research 
participants, the power of the term ‘Tuskegee’ to evoke feelings of anxiety and fear must be 
                                                 
90 Ibid. 
91 Katz and others, “Tuskegee Legacy Project,” 2-3. 
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losing motivational force, at least for the laypeople who were the focus of the TLP research. If, 
as McGee asserts, ideographs work to teach and train our social behaviors, <Tuskegee> no 
longer appears to be “teaching” Americans to fear and reject participation in medical research. 
The beliefs associated with the Tuskegee Study, as assessed by the TLP, concern the facts and 
motivations of the Study but do not seem to translate into behavior-constraining beliefs or 
ideologies about the scrupulousness of present-day physicians and clinical researchers. 
Furthermore, the power of <Tuskegee> and the awareness of the Study were shown not to follow 
race lines—Whites were, in some cases, more negatively affected by their knowledge of the 
Study than Blacks and residents of Tuskegee, Alabama were affected differently than people 
from other regions. This finding seems to indicate that the circulation of <Tuskegee> may vary 
among different communities, which is consistent with McGee’s description of ideographs as 
culturally and socially situated. 
Katz and colleagues concluded that investigators preparing to recruit minorities in their 
research studies should be sensitive to a broader range of constraints that limit minorities’ 
enrollment and not presume that <Tuskegee> is the primary or even a notable influence. 
Researchers should strive to address the real rather than the perceived reasons why minorities do 
not or cannot enroll in biomedical studies. This conclusion points to the power of <Tuskegee> 
over researchers as compared to laypeople; many researchers may believe that the term and the 
memory are more pervasive and harmful than empirical research shows them to be. 
However, the prevalence and persistence of many myths about the Tuskegee Study, as 
revealed in the TLP research, indicate that <Tuskegee> continues to carry powerful connotations 
that influence social judgments. One’s understanding of the government doctors’ motives, for 
example, is certainly affected by the belief that the Tuskegee Study participants were deliberately 
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infected or by the belief that all those involved with conducting the Tuskegee Study were White. 
Ideographs build and support our interpretations of the social world around us, and the particular 
associations that individuals make with <Tuskegee> surely inflect their perceptions of history 
and the present, whether or not they are aware of the influence of the ideograph. 
5.2.1.2 TLP Findings About the Efficacy of Clinton’s Speech 
Although the Tuskegee Legacy Project was the first empirical study to specifically explore the 
effects of Clinton’s speech on people’s attitudes about biomedical research, the findings did not 
indicate that Clinton had an appreciable effect on the perceived Tuskegee legacy. His apology 
was not shown to cure existing fear or distrust in biomedical research nor was it shown to be, by 
itself, a significant reason why people are less likely to participate in such research. Rather, the 
influence of knowing about the presidential apology was in line with the influence of knowing 
about the Tuskegee Study, as indicated by the TLP findings—namely, negative effects on 
respondents’ willingness to participate in biomedical studies were more marked among White 
respondents than Black respondents. 
These findings are curious in light of the claims in the Tuskegee Legacy Committee 
request and those of Study survivors that a presidential apology was important and necessary to 
heal the damage of the Tuskegee Study. Perhaps the apology was more necessary and important 
to those directly involved with the Study than to African Americans in general or to the nation as 
a whole. The question of whether Clinton’s speech effectively lifted “the long shadow” of the 
Tuskegee legacy is not sufficiently answered by the TLP research because the legacy was not 
shown to be a persuasive factor in terms of medical research recruitment in the first place. The 
TLP Questionnaire did not include in-depth questions about respondents’ reactions to Clinton’s 
speech and its content, so we do not have data about whether respondents’ beliefs about the 
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Tuskegee Study shifted at all after hearing Clinton’s account. As discussed in the previous 
section, the common myths and beliefs about the Tuskegee Study that attach to respondents’ 
memories and the ideograph of <Tuskegee> itself persist and Clinton’s address seems to have 
been ineffective in “fixing” others’ misconceptions about the Study. However, the TLP data are 
not sufficiently nuanced to provide information about whether those who knew about Clinton’s 
speech also had detailed knowledge about the speech and whether their exposure to Clinton’s 
speech changed their thoughts about the Tuskegee Study. 
5.2.2 Additional Considerations of the Research by Katz and Colleagues 
Certainly, the research conducted by Katz and colleagues has importance for biomedical 
researchers (including designers, recruiters, and investigators), public health workers, medical 
sociologists, and others, but it is interesting from a rhetorical standpoint, as well. Specifically, 
the wording of the TLP Questionnaire prompts and the manner in which the results are framed 
are ripe artifacts for rhetorical analysis. In this section, I will address the rhetorical dimensions of 
the survey and reports as well as the researchers’ decision to include myths about the TSS in 
their survey. My analysis illuminates the significant ways in which audiences continue to 
construct meaning from the TSS and Clinton’s speech. At face value, the findings by Katz and 
colleagues seem to indicate that the <Tuskegee> ideograph is fading, and Clinton’s apology had 
a minimal effect in contributing to this outcome. Yet, these conclusions are also subject to 
interpretation. Closer analysis of Katz and colleagues’ approach shows alternate interpretations 
of their data and reveals how their study design inflects meaning in their findings. 
Based on the initial four-city study in 1999-2000, the Tuskegee Legacy Project 
researchers concluded that the plurality of those who were aware of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
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or the apology was less likely to participate in biomedical research but that this negative 
influence was more significant among Whites than Blacks.92 The researchers hypothesize that 
this “may reflect the daily cultural reality in the Black community, which has for a long time 
been accustomed to increased risks for Blacks in many activities,” whereas Whites may have 
found the TSS “more shocking and at odds with their daily expectations.”93 These findings and 
their discussion in the published research article indicate that the researchers interpreted 
awareness of Clinton’s speech as a factor that negatively affected attitudes about participating in 
research. The researchers’ write-ups treat knowledge of the TSS and knowledge of Clinton’s 
speech as nearly interchangeable influences, as when they summarize that “Whites who had 
heard either of the study or of the presidential apology were more negatively influenced toward 
participation in biomedical research than were Blacks who had heard of either event.”94 
Likewise, in the introduction to an article about a follow-up study comparing Blacks’ and 
Whites’ knowledge of the TSS, the researchers summarized the “Awareness” article’s findings 
as: “Blacks were 2-3 times more likely than Whites to be willing to participate in biomedical 
studies despite having heard of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study or the Presidential Apology” 
(emphasis added).95
In this construction, the researchers frame awareness of the apology negatively—a factor 
that failed to have the TLP researchers’ expected negative impact upon the Blacks surveyed. 
Once again, the apology is treated as comparable to the TSS itself as a reason why Americans 
may be wary of participating as biomedical research subjects, as though awareness of the 
                                                 
92 Katz and others, “Awareness of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” 1140-1141. 
93 Ibid., 1140. 
94 Ibid., 1141. 
95 Katz and others, “Legacy: Assessing its Impact,” 1169. 
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apology is a stand-in for awareness of the wrongdoing that necessitated an apology. This 
interpretation is not immediately intuitive, considering the various potentially transformative and 
healing powers of apology discussed in Chapter 4. However, the treatment of Clinton’s speech as 
a negative influence on Americans’ attitudes about biomedical research—and the TLP findings 
that indicate the same—illuminate the limitations of institutional apology to perform the same 
healing functions as genuine interpersonal apology. Clinton’s apology for the Tuskegee Study 
likely would have been much more transformative if he had a more direct connection to the 
Study, just as it is more relevant and meaningful to the victims directly affected by the Study 
than other witnesses. 
The phrasing of the apology awareness prompts in the TLP Questionnaire does not 
appear to be slanted toward the negative, however. Questions such as “Based upon what you 
heard about the apology, would it influence your decision to join a biomedical research study 
today?” and “Did that apology make you more or less likely to join a study?” allow respondents 
to respond positively or negatively without feeling as though they are giving a “wrong” 
answer.96 In the 2003 follow-up survey in New York City, Baltimore, and San Juan, the 
recognition prompts were similarly neutral: “Have you ever heard anything about the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study?” and “What have you heard about the Tuskegee Syphilis Study?”97  
Likewise, the statements about the TSS in the Facts & Myth Quiz were presumably 
constructed as non-leading prompts, but may have more complex psychological influence than is 
initially apparent. Of the seven statements that respondents were to identify as true, false, or “I 
don’t know,” four were false and three were true. However, all the statements were phrased as 
                                                 
96 Katz and others, “Awareness of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” 1139. 
97 Katz and others, “Identifying the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” Additional File 1. 
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positive assertions (i.e., a total absence of “not,” “no,” and “none” in the phrases), which can be 
misinterpreted by those without confident knowledge as “true” assertions. For example, one false 
statement reads, “The subjects were injected with syphilis.”98 A respondent who did not believe 
strongly that this was a false statement might interpret it, knowingly or not, as a statement of fact 
about the Study that can then circulate beyond the TLP Questionnaire as “truth” and inflect the 
ideograph of <Tuskegee>. In this way, the survey instrument has the potential to affect the 
beliefs and attitudes of the thousands of respondents who participated in the studies conducted by 
Katz and his research team. Since the influence of ideographs is largely subconscious, it is 
impossible to know just how much the respondents could be affected by hearing untrue 
statements professed as true assertions in the TLP Questionnaire. 
Regardless of the particular phrasing of the Facts & Myth Quiz prompts, is important to 
recognize the TLP researchers’ inclusion of both factually correct statements and prominent 
myths about the TSS in their assessment of respondents’ awareness of the Study because both 
facts and myths circulate in salient ways as part of the contemporary cultural knowledge and 
understanding(s) of the TSS. McGee notes that ideographs are efficacious due to their usage 
rather than their specific “idea-content,” and the <Tuskegee> ideograph is an example of how the 
term still functions and circulates in predictable ways even though the connotations it carries 
may not be entirely factual or even consistent.99 Additionally, trying to “correct” the ideograph’s 
associations to include only known facts about the Study is likely to meet with opposition by 
those who hold strongly their beliefs about what happened in the Study, as occurred during the 
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focus group research by Corbie-Smith and colleagues.100 The “legacy” of the Tuskegee Study 
and <Tuskegee> are bound up in the complexities of these intertwining and recalcitrant beliefs; 
the myth-mixed-with-facts “knowledge” of the Tuskegee Study shapes how people think about 
<Tuskegee>, the Study, and its repercussions even if it does not affect their actual research 
participation rates. 
The analyses of the Tuskegee Legacy Project also belie the researchers’ assumptions that 
there is an objective truth to be known about the Study. They measure respondents’ accuracy in 
identifying historically correct details and common myths, but they stop short of interrogating 
the less “knowable” features of the Study that bear on present attitudes. For example, the 
government doctors’ complex and shifting motives, the indispensable involvement of African 
American nurse Eunice Rivers, and the constraints faced by the Study designers and 
investigators are each difficult to definitively assess but still bear on how we understand and 
interpret the Tuskegee Study in hindsight. These factors may not be consciously contemplated by 
the TLP respondents or systematically measured by the TLP Questionnaire, but they are 
examples of how we can never fully settle what the Tuskegee Study and <Tuskegee> mean. 
Reverby cautions that the incomplete and conflicting records of the Study, the deaths of key 
figures, and the “what ifs” of alternative paths the Study trajectory could have taken all 
complicate how we are to understand the “facts” of the Study.101 Moreover, she writes, “The 
symbolic ‘Tuskegee’ and the historical Study […] feed on one another, as they did from the 
beginning. It is not possible to understand one without the other, to read the ‘facts’ without 
knowing the myths and tropes that shape them; nor is it possible to create the myths without 
                                                 
100 The focus group moderator gave “historically accurate information” about the Tuskegee Study during 
the discussion but was “aggressively challenged” by the participants who thought the moderator was perpetuating a 
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ignoring some of the facts.”102 Perhaps this is why, despite Clinton’s apology for the Study, 
<Tuskegee> remains and resists a redefinition. Individuals’ views about the Study and the 
government’s complicity may have changed but the complex cultural understandings of the 
Study persist. 
It also bears mention that the TLP Questionnaire and TLP researchers uniformly refer to 
Clinton’s speech of May 1997 as an apology, which reinforces my claim in Chapter 4 that the 
speech is nearly always called an apology among academics and laypeople alike. The 
publications do not consider the implications of such a label for their Questionnaire, their 
respondents, or their analyses. Additionally, the researchers describe the apology in specific 
ways, asserting, for example, that the “apology was made to the Black community at large, as 
well as directly to surviving study participants and the families of the nonsurvivors.”103 In 
another article, the researchers claim that the involvement of two of the research team (Drs. Katz 
and Green) in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee and the apology compelled by 
that committee had “unanticipated societal benefits” which “included far-reaching outcomes to 
the African American community for research abuse by the federal government and the 
establishment of a government-mandated National Center for Bioethics in Research and Health 
Care at Tuskegee University.”104 It is likely that the participation by Dr. Katz and Dr. Green in 
the Legacy Committee has shaped their perspective about the nature and value of Clinton’s 
speech and contributed to their commitment to viewing it as an influential, ethical apology. 
The research programs of the Tuskegee Legacy Project remind us of the inescapable 
factor of audience in rhetorical analysis. The development and design of the TLP Questionnaire 
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reveals the researchers’ understanding that individuals have different reactions to the same 
rhetorical event and that individuals’ attitudes about historical events are not shaped by facts 
alone. Each respondent to the TLP Questionnaire was and is part of the audience of media 
reports, educational institutions, family lore, cultural morality tales, and other communication 
sources that influence our perspective of our world and our experience in it. The TLP shows one 
way in which people have constructed meaning of Clinton’s speech. In the next chapter, I 
explore additional public and scholarly reactions to his speech that, combined with my prior 
analyses of the speech as apologia and apology, shed light on the complexity of this artifact’s 
relationship with the Tuskegee legacy. 
5.3 CURING THE LEGACY 
In the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee’s request for an apology, the Committee 
communicated its desire to “transform the legacy of Tuskegee into a positive symbol for all 
Americans” from the present negative symbolism the term carries.105 The Committee argued 
that, in addition to the presidential apology, a bioethics center at Tuskegee University could help 
to demonstrate “the importance of acknowledging past wrongs, rebuilding trust, and practicing 
ethical research.”106 The request specifically indicates the Committee’s recognition that a single 
rhetorical event would be insufficient to shift the beliefs and attitudes of generations of 
Americans. The empirical research conducted by Katz and colleagues found that respondents’ 
awareness of Clinton’s apology was more akin to a reminder of the wrongdoing in the Tuskegee 
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Study than a rhetorical salve to cure the legacy. These observations may serve as evidence to 
support my argument in Chapter 4 that Clinton’s speech was not so much an apology as a 
declaration of the values that Clinton hoped the U.S. government would support through future 
policies and practices. Such a declaration can still be reassuring to the American public, 
however, and ought not be immediately disregarded as political posturing. 
 If Clinton’s speech did not “fix” the anxiety that some feel about being a biomedical 
research subject, nor correct the underlying causes for such anxiety, we may consider what 
lingering and recurrent rhetorical situation faces medical researchers during recruitment for 
studies. If <Tuskegee> circulates as an ideograph or a pervasive “devil term” at least for medical 
study designers and perhaps also for minority populations, the challenge for those who conduct 
research is to find ways of behaving and communicating that disconfirm the suspicions raised by 
the specter of <Tuskegee>. Since ideographs are culture-bound and tied to dominant cultural 
narratives, “to redefine a key term such as an ideograph thus requires the rhetorical 
reconstruction of substantial portions of the community’s ideological substructure.”107 How 
might this take place? Katz and colleagues have demonstrated that Americans’ factual 
knowledge about the Tuskegee Study is patchy but that facts and myths intertwine to shape 
respondents’ perspectives about the historical event and, thus, the present legacy. Simply 
clearing up the knowable “facts” will not overcome people’s deeply held beliefs about the Study, 
particularly because the facts themselves are ethically and scientifically troubling and we cannot 
know, definitively, everything about the Study. The Tuskegee Legacy Project research concludes 
that “awareness of, or detailed knowledge of, the TSS is unlikely to have even a moderate impact 
on recruitment among Blacks (in particular) or other minorities (in general) […] given the 
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extremely low level of both awareness and/or detailed knowledge of the TSS.”108 This 
conclusion takes for granted that “low level” knowledge cannot be influential and presumes that 
myths, while not considered “knowledge” in some of the TLP analyses, cannot stand in for 
“facts” in shaping attitudes about research participation. On the contrary, the meanings that the 
respondents make out of their awareness of the Tuskegee Study may have a significant impact on 
their attitudes toward physicians, the government, and other mainstream authorities even if they 
do not appear to affect respondents’ hypothetical willingness to participate in biomedical 
research. 
The researchers argue that biomedical studies that involve a careful, “genuine effort” at 
recruiting minorities have been able to reach their recruitment goals109 and that the influence of 
the Tuskegee legacy does not extend to dissuading African Americans from enrolling in studies 
that are thoughtfully and ethically designed.110 Since Katz and colleagues postulate that the 
reasons for lower involvement by African Americans in biomedical research stem not from 
Tuskegee specifically but “may be much more deeply rooted in the contemporary life 
circumstances of blacks in the United States, which continue to include instances of 
discrimination and mistreatment,”111 they recommend that recruitment strategies for biomedical 
studies must take the present life experiences of their potential subjects into consideration. 
Potential research subjects may continue to face racial discrimination in other areas of their lives 
and may be unavailable to enroll in studies due to the constraints of family and work obligations. 
                                                 
108 Katz and others, “Identifying the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.” 
109 Katz and others, “Exploring the ‘Legacy,’” 182-3. On this point, see also: Mona N. Fouad and others, 
“Special Populations Recruitment for the Women’s Health Initiative: Successes and Limitations,” Controlled 
Clinical Trials 25 (2004): 335-352; David Wendler and others, “Are Racial and Ethnic Minorities Less Willing to 
Participate in Health Research?” Public Library of Science Medicine 3, no. 2 (February 2006): e19: 1-10. 
110 Katz and others, “Exploring the ‘Legacy,’” 182; Wendler and others, “Racial and Ethnic Minorities,” 7-
8. 
111 Katz and others, “Exploring the ‘Legacy,’” 182. 
 196
Researchers who continue to attribute low minority enrollment in studies to a vague 
understanding of the “Tuskegee legacy” are unlikely to look beyond this potential red herring to 
the other influential factors that dissuade or prevent minorities from participating.112 Katz and 
colleagues recommend, “[I]nvestigators who conduct clinical and community-based studies in 
the future need to recognize and incorporate these racial/ethnic, geographical, and cultural 
differences [as indicated by the TLP data] into their recruitment and retention plans.”113 
Similarly, public health scholars Vickie L. Shavers, Charles F. Lynch, and Leon F. Burmeister 
suggest, “Researchers should encourage open discourse on the past misuse of minority 
participants that generated the overall distrust of researchers and describe provisions that they 
have made to protect participants in their particular studies.”114 Minority health researcher Mona 
N. Fouad argues, however, that “efforts and interventions addressing the problem [of low 
minority enrollment] remain limited, sporadic, and inconsistent” across clinical trials.115 In order 
to benefit from the research already conducted on barriers to minority participation and strategies 
to overcome those barriers, Fouad advocates a “comprehensive strategy” that includes a broad 
range of policies coordinated and instituted from individual to national levels of intervention.116 
Regardless of the mechanism for enacting new strategies, the actions of study recruiters and 
investigators in the present may make the difference for minority enrollment and retention in the 
future if, as Reverby claims, “the continued existence of ‘Tuskegee’ ultimately depends more on 
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what happens every day in medical encounters than on what occurred during those forty 
years.”117
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The high-profile nature of President Clinton’s address about the Tuskegee Study invites 
rhetorical critics to acknowledge and explore the interactions of suasive texts and audiences as 
reported in newspaper and other published accounts. Additionally, a critic can find analytical 
balance by deploying other expository methods that illuminate the texts themselves. The analysis 
of a rhetorical artifact should not be limited to audience effects, nor should possible effects be 
ignored. This analytical balance is particularly relevant in the case of a text like Clinton’s speech, 
which was requested specifically to bring about some effect—lifting “the long shadow” of the 
Tuskegee legacy. 
In earlier chapters, I focused my analysis on the form and content of the speech. In this 
chapter, I have turned to the effects of the speech on the Tuskegee legacy and the ideograph of 
<Tuskegee>. Rather than rely on newspaper accounts, however, I analyzed the empirical 
research of the Tuskegee Legacy Project conducted by Katz and colleagues. By integrating 
McGee’s conceptual tool of the ideograph, I was able to enrich my report of the TLP findings 
with a rhetorical analysis of the TLP methods and analyses. Considering the rhetorical power of 
the Tuskegee legacy in terms of the ideograph allows this investigation to take seriously the role 
of untidy features like myths and the unknowable within the broader Tuskegee legacy. 
                                                 
117 Reverby, Examining, 240. 
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The Tuskegee Syphilis Study resists a universal definition, let alone a radical redefinition. 
The variety of ways that people “know” about the Study and what that knowledge signifies has 
been explored by researchers including Katz and his colleagues, but it is still unclear to what 
degree the Tuskegee legacy influences our beliefs about government, race, medicine and science 
technology, research initiatives (aside from one’s own participation), and the relative importance 
or effect of formal apologies such as Clinton’s. For the Tuskegee legacy and <Tuskegee>, the 
influence of Clinton’s apology is as complicated as the number and variety of audiences his 
address reached. Clinton’s speech garnered widely divergent reactions, from tearful forgiveness 
to “too little, too late” dismissals. Additionally, the meanings made of his speech likely vary 
among his audiences: an apology to the victims, a sign of presidential responsiveness to the 
motivated constituency of the Legacy committee, a declaration of federal values and priorities 
for the broader American public. Multiple audiences, a multi-faceted ideograph, and multiple 
presidential motivations combine to complicate an analysis of the rhetorical effect of Clinton’s 
speech on the Tuskegee legacy. 
What is clear, however, is that the Tuskegee Study and its legacy continue to pique 
scholarly interest, public memory, and historical imaginations for any number of personal and 
political reasons. In the final chapter, I pick up these themes once more and consider where the 
Tuskegee legacy and our rhetorical and cultural uses of that legacy can go from here.
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6.0  CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE TUSKEGEE LEGACY 
Nations are built on the myths and stories they tell themselves. “Tuskegee” is one 
of the foundational stories of American racism in the twentieth century, and it 
anchors our beliefs about race, medicine, and science. […M]ay the Study be 
remembered but may “Tuskegee” be forgotten—because we no longer need it to 
interpret injustice.1
 ~Susan M. Reverby 
 
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study has captured the interest and imaginations of playwrights and 
filmmakers, bioethicists and historians, physicians and researchers, but it has garnered much less 
attention from rhetoricians by comparison. This project provides a unique addition to extant 
scholarship by featuring analyses of two key rhetorical artifacts that were crafted to alter the way 
in which the Study is remembered and to improve materially the health and condition of 
Americans belonging to racial minorities. 
In this final chapter, I return to a discussion of several thematic strands that have woven 
through the earlier chapters. Here, my aim is not to tie up the legacy’s loose ends but to explore 
how those strands may be teased and extended in future scholarship as well as to reflect on how 
                                                 
1 Susan M. Reverby, Examining Tuskegee: The Infamous Syphilis Study and Its Legacy (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 239-240. 
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my findings in the middle chapters contribute to the practice of rhetorical criticism. Specifically, 
I reflect on the value of paired speech-set analysis for rhetorical critics, the opportunities and 
limits of genre analyses, and the power of rhetoric to shape perception about historical events 
and present conditions. I began the dissertation by observing that a speech-set approach was 
worth pursuing in the case of Clinton’s apology for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study in response to a 
specific call for him to apologize. Here, I summarize the findings that emerged as a result of 
taking that analytical path and the implications of my findings for rhetorical criticism and study 
of the Tuskegee legacy. Several questions and critical approaches remain unaddressed, however, 
and I discuss several of these as opportunities for further research. 
6.1 THEORY-BUILDING WITH THE KATEGORIA AND APOLOGIA 
This dissertation has explored the legacy of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study by focusing on key 
rhetorical events that have occurred in the 38 years since the Study was terminated. My analysis 
of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee’s request for a presidential apology and the 
subsequent speech by President Clinton as a paired speech set forms the centerpiece of the 
broader exploration that began with the genesis of the Legacy Committee and concluded with 
recent empirical research on the effects of Clinton’s speech on the lingering Tuskegee legacy. 
6.1.1 The Relationship of Kategoria and Apologia 
In Chapter 2, I explored the genre of kategoria—rhetoric of accusation. After tracing its history 
in judicial contexts and its relationship to stasis theory, I adopted several analytical frames with 
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which to explore and understand kategoria occurring in non-judicial settings. These frames were 
used to analyze the request document crafted by the fourteen members of the Legacy Committee, 
who had organized the group out of a shared passion to bring about a federal apology to the 
victims of the Tuskegee Study. My analysis of the request and its context shows that the 
perspectives of both Lloyd Bitzer and Richard Vatz have merit with regard to the rhetorical 
situation: an exigence left unsatisfied became stale over time but was reinvigorated and made 
viable through rhetorical invention. The situation was neither independently sufficient to compel 
a response nor entirely manufactured by the Legacy Committee’s actions. Though an 
imperfection had been identified (the absence of an apology), the urgency in 1996 was 
apparently lacking. The Legacy Committee’s request was designed to boost the exigence, 
identify the audience for their request (President Clinton), and provide constraints for what they 
considered to be a fitting response. The rhetorical action initiated by the Legacy Committee was 
then taken up and lobbied by other advocates for a presidential apology for the Tuskegee Study, 
including key figures at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Congressional 
Black Caucus, until President Clinton agreed to speak. 
The kategoria functions as a resource for invention of the subsequent apologia by the 
responding rhetor (Clinton), but it is a resource for the rhetorical critic as well: the kategoria 
establishes a reference point and a standard of judgment by which we may assess President 
Clinton’s response. My approach in Chapters 2 and 3 highlights the benefits of speech set 
criticism: by examining the paired provocative/responsive texts in tandem, I have been able to 
compare Clinton’s apologia to the relevant opportunities and constraints identified by the 
Committee in its kategoria rather than assessing the text according to a priori ideals (which may 
be difficult for the critic to defend) or according to audience responses alone. I have considered 
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Clinton’s 1997 Tuskegee speech from a grounded and longitudinal perspective rather than as a 
contextually and temporally isolated artifact.  
As detailed in Chapter 3, my analysis of Clinton’s speech reveals that the President was 
quite responsive to the expectations and goals set by the Legacy Committee. He unequivocally 
identified how the government-run Study was harmful and unethical (accepting each of the 
points of stasis as described by the Committee’s kategoria) and offered words of apology to 
victims ranging from the men in the Study to all African Americans. As revealed through paired 
analysis, the points of convergence and divergence between the kategoria and apologia highlight 
the motives and concerns of the apologist. The fact that Clinton “stuck to the script” of the 
kategoria so closely seems to indicate his interest in being perceived as cooperative and 
concerned with righting a longstanding wrong.2 Certainly, there were political benefits to 
adopting such a stance and I have argued that any implicit defense Clinton offered was a defense 
of his political and personal ethos regarding his present commitments rather than a defense of 
those who actually conducted the Tuskegee Study. 
However, Clinton did deviate from the Committee’s prescription in a particularly 
controversial way. Although the Legacy Committee recommended that Clinton come to 
Tuskegee, Alabama to offer an apology (and Tuskegee University president Benjamin F. Payton 
offered his campus as the setting3), the President opted to speak from the White House instead. 
This choice, while logistically simpler for the President and the press corps, inconvenienced or 
                                                 
2 This perception may, in fact, correspond to the President’s true sentiments, though I cannot claim to know 
those sentiments. 
3 Benjamin F. Payton, letter to the editor, New Pittsburgh Courier, March 22, 1997. 
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excluded the elderly Study survivors by requiring them to travel4 and was interpreted by some—
including Legacy Committee co-chair John Fletcher—as a sign that Clinton was only giving a 
“half-hearted effort” in the event.5 Fletcher even boycotted the event to demonstrate his 
dissatisfaction. Roy Innis, head of the Congress of Racial Equality, was similarly disappointed in 
the choice of venue that made attendance difficult or impossible for the honored guests and 
noted, “It would not have been much of a burden for the president to modify his schedule to 
make that trip for a personal face-to-face apology.”6 Fletcher (and, presumably, Innis) knew the 
details of the Legacy Committee’s request and knew that the setting was a notable discrepancy 
from the recommendations in that document. Perhaps those less familiar with the kategoria were 
not as dissatisfied with the White House setting because they did not have the background 
knowledge to interpret the choice as an overt rejection of the Legacy Committee’s suggestion. If 
this is true, it provides more support for the methodology of speech set criticism: even casual 
assessments by lay audiences can benefit from a more holistic understanding of the events and 
rhetoric that gave rise to the sequel. Without knowing about the particular suggestions in the 
kategoria, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the final product of Clinton’s speech 
may be considered a fitting response to the situated exigence that prevailed in this case. 
                                                 
4 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention paid for the survivors’ travel expenses, which is 
reportedly uncommon for White House events. Sonya Ross, “Clinton Will Apologize to Tuskegee Study Survivors,” 
New Pittsburgh Courier, May 24, 1997. 
5 Mark I. Evans, “In Memoriam: John C. Fletcher, PhD, The Conscience of Our Field,” Fetal Diagnosis 
and Therapy 20 (2005): 80. 
6 J. Zamgba Browne, “Mixed Reception Greets Clinton Public Apology,” New York Amsterdam News, May 
31, 1997. 
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6.1.2 Tuskegee as Metaphor and Symbol 
At several points in this project I have noted that the Tuskegee Study sometimes serves as a 
metaphor—in both academic and lay discourses—for bioethics failings and institutionalized 
racism. Other scholars have identified this phenomenon,7 and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
Legacy Committee even incorporated a description of the metaphor in its request for a 
presidential apology: “In the almost twenty-five years since its disclosure, the Study has moved 
from a singular historical event to a powerful metaphor. It has come to symbolize racism in 
medicine, ethical misconduct in human research, paternalism by physicians, and government 
abuse of vulnerable people.”8 For the Legacy Committee, the apparent pervasiveness of the 
connotations and symbolism of the Tuskegee Study (or, as I describe it, the ideograph of 
<Tuskegee>) constituted a significant exigence that called for remediation through a formal, 
public apology. If the Tuskegee Study had remained a “singular historical event,” free from the 
contingencies and complications that plague analysis of the Study even in hindsight, the Legacy 
Committee never would have formed, let alone crafted a report to advocate the apology.  
As a feature of the kategoria, the Study’s symbolism was used as an argument for 
immediate rhetorical action. The Legacy Committee tied the Study to contemporary health 
disparities, arguing, “the Study has become a powerful symbol for the fear of exploitation in 
research and the deprivation of adequate medical care that is widespread in the African-
                                                 
7 Susan M. Reverby argues that the Tuskegee Study functions metaphorically in several of her works, 
particularly “More than Fact and Fiction: Cultural Memory and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” Hastings Center 
Report 31, no. 5 (September/October 2001): 22-28, and Examining Tuskegee. Also see, for example: Darlene Clark 
Hine, “Reflections on Nurse Rivers,” in Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, ed. Susan M. 
Reverby (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 386-95. 
8 Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” in Reverby, Tuskegee’s 
Truths, 559. 
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American community.”9 The Committee members did not perceive this negative association to 
be irrevocable. If they had, the rhetorical situation would have collapsed due to the impotence of 
rhetoric to bring about change. Instead, the Committee exhorted President Clinton to speak out 
and to fund a memorial center to “transform the legacy of Tuskegee into a positive symbol for all 
Americans by demonstrating the importance of acknowledging past wrongs, rebuilding trust, and 
practicing ethical research.”10 The kategoria was set up to be satisfied by subsequent rhetorical 
action. 
Susan Reverby describes the development of Tuskegee’s symbolic power as accruing 
through multiple means: “The Study’s metaphorical status came about not just through memory 
but also through the written histories, the bioethics textbooks that pick up some of the facts, the 
films and plays that are part imagination, and the rumors that got spread.”11 These sources of 
cultural and symbolic significance operate rhetorically, so it makes sense that the Legacy 
Committee was optimistic that pointed, purposeful rhetorical action by President Clinton could 
remedy the legacy. Still, the symbolism that attaches to <Tuskegee> is not fickle—it has not 
been radically transformed after one speech by one president, nor by federal policy initiatives or 
local memorials. As I describe in Chapters 3 and 4, as well in this concluding chapter, Clinton’s 
speech generated some controversy of its own and has been added to the Tuskegee legacy as 
more fodder for (re)interpretation and misinterpretations of the historical event of the Tuskegee 
Study. Thus, the metaphorical power of <Tuskegee> remains, though perhaps with subtle 
variations, to help us see the relevance of a historical event to our contemporary lives. 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 561. 
10 Ibid., 562. 
11 Reverby, Examining Tuskegee, 235. 
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6.1.3 The Uses and Limits of Genre Analysis 
Genre has been a significant feature of my rhetorical criticism of Clinton’s speech, but there are 
notable limitations to genre analysis in this case. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Legacy 
Committee specifically indicated that the response it sought was an apology from President 
Clinton. Correspondingly, the critic may judge Clinton’s speech according to the characteristics 
of apology. On the other hand, self-defense is a typical response to accusation in the forensic 
applications of the kategoria/apologia speech set. So, we might judge Clinton’s speech by how 
well it performs a defense of the rhetor. But this speech did not occur within an adversarial or 
forensic context—so which is the appropriate genre for the purposes of normative evaluation?  
My analysis has demonstrated that Clinton’s Tuskegee speech has more relevance and 
significance as a response to kategoria than to a set of a priori generic standards. I have 
performed rhetorical criticism of a speech, prompted by a call, according to multiple features of 
the rhetorical situation. While I do consider the speech on its own terms, I first needed to 
contextualize it with the rhetorical appeal that called Clinton to respond. What we discover, 
when taking this paired approach, is that the Legacy Committee request prompted a sequel that 
followed closely from the specific perlocutionary demands in the kategoria—even though the 
sequel it called for diverged from the generic features of apologia. Again, a critic might wonder 
whether this finding renders Clinton’s speech a “fitting” response or not but my analysis moves 
beyond this polarized assessment. 
While using genres of apologia and apology to examine and conditionally categorize 
Clinton’s speech, I revealed the complicated entailments of genre labels. Our expectations of 
“defense” or “apology” color the way we interpret the rhetorical act and the rhetor who 
performed it. Furthermore, Clinton’s speech defies easy categorization. Nevertheless, criticism of 
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apologia that is preoccupied with whether a speech strictly adheres to a formal genre is 
ultimately less illuminating than paired criticism that takes interaction between kategoria and 
apologia as the main point of analytical departure. Genre, by this method, is a critical heuristic 
rather than a definitive conclusion. Paired analysis using the complete speech set allows the critic 
to proceed with a fair and robust assessment of the rhetorical artifacts, as Halford Ryan claimed, 
and frees the critic from the limits of a simple genre analysis. 
6.1.4 History and Future in the (Rhetorical) Making 
Analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 reveal that Clinton’s speech featured specific rhetorical 
choices that seem to have been designed to shift the way in which the Tuskegee Study is 
remembered. As introduced in Chapter 3, Clinton focused almost exclusively on the problems of 
racism that made the Tuskegee Study possible and avoided addressing head-on the problematic 
norms of science and medical research, the economic challenges in Macon County, and 
hierarchical pressure for the Tuskegee Institute to cooperate with the government-run project, all 
of which make the Study a more nuanced constellation of concerns than Clinton portrayed. The 
Legacy Committee set an example for treating the bioethical abuses largely as a matter of racial 
discrimination in their recommendations for the requested apology, but the Committee may not 
have foreseen how narrowing the focus away from other troubling factors can impede the 
subsequent efforts to foster appropriate levels of trust between the public and mainstream 
medical institutions. A focus on the Tuskegee Study as a race issue did not originate with the 
Legacy Committee, however. Attorney Fred Gray, who represented the Tuskegee survivors in a 
class-action lawsuit in 1973, did not name any Black individuals or predominantly Black 
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institutions as defendants in the suit,12 even though African American doctors and, notably, 
nurse Eunice Rivers were pivotal to the Study’s continuation. Historian James Jones comments, 
“Gray obviously preferred to deal with black and white issues, and he hit the issue of race hard in 
the lawsuit.”13 It seems Clinton, like Gray, helped focus public discourse and criticism of the 
Tuskegee Study on the topics with which he was most comfortable. 
Why might Clinton have framed the problems of the Tuskegee Study so narrowly? One 
explanation might be, as indicated above, that he had developed an ethos to speak credibly about 
the problems of racism in the American South, being a Southerner himself and maintaining a 
political platform involving issues of race. It might also be the case that calling out the historical 
and present bioethical issues in medical research and practice was not only beyond his area of 
expertise but also a sticky wicket from political and rhetorical perspectives. Clinton would have 
been ill-advised to assign specific blame to the institutions for which he attempted to drum up 
support later in his speech. Furthermore, had Clinton distributed blame too broadly among 
situational factors in the Depression-Era South (scarce economic and health resources, the 
pressure government doctors could exert over local practitioners, and so forth), he might have 
come across as defending the designers and investigators of the Tuskegee Study. Instead, he 
needed to take a position unequivocally opposed to the Study, which is easiest to do politically 
and rhetorically if the Study is specified as a problem of racism. The other contributing factors to 
the Tuskegee Study leave room for argument and contingency but racism is never a publicly 
defensible position, particularly when such a large and diverse audience stands as witness. 
                                                 
12 James H. Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, new and exp. ed. (New York: Free Press, 
1993), 216. 
13 Ibid. 
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The President did not limit his rhetoric exclusively to racial topoi, however. Clinton 
hailed developments in science and medicine as the solution to racial health disparities but, in 
doing so, turned a blind eye to the fact that prioritizing scientific advancement can lead to the 
dehumanizing treatment and abuses of human subjects, as happened in the human radiation 
experiments and the Tuskegee Study. Furthermore, as Clinton pushed for greater participation in 
clinical trials and organ donation by African Americans, he failed to acknowledge the significant 
psychological barriers built by generations of discrimination, neglect, and abuse suffered by 
African Americans at the hands of the federal government and local institutions. Communication 
scholars Lynn M. Harter, Ronald J. Stephens, and Phyllis M. Japp describe Clinton’s strategy as 
serving to “[reinforce] the metanarrative of science, power, and knowledge that characterizes the 
U.S. medical establishment.”14
Harter and colleagues also criticize Clinton for confusing the issue of who has standing to 
apologize: “Clinton’s speech selectively interprets events surrounding the study and then 
reconstitutes those events in his effort to apologize on behalf of the American people.”15 For 
example, the authors aptly note that Clinton placed blame squarely with the U.S. Public Health 
Service and the U.S. government, generally, but then apologized not on behalf of the government 
but for the American people.16 Clinton said, “[O]n behalf of the American people, what the 
                                                 
14 Lynn M. Harter, Ronald J. Stephens, and Phyllis M. Japp, “President Clinton’s Apology for the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Experiment: A Narrative of Remembrance, Redefinition, and Reconciliation,” Howard Journal of 
Communications 11 (2000): 26. 
15 Ibid., 24. 
16 One New Pittsburgh Courier columnist asks rhetorically, “When President Clinton apologized to Black 
people victimized by the Tuskegee ‘bad blood’ medical experiment, was he speaking for only himself or for the 
nation? Without congressional approval, could he apologize on behalf of the nation?” James E. Alsbrook, “Clinton’s 
Apology to Tuskegee Victims,” Minority Report, New Pittsburgh Courier, June 14, 1997. 
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United States Government did was shameful, and I am sorry.”17 Harter and colleagues observe, 
“The act of apologizing for the people implicitly obscures the villains in the drama.”18 Indeed, 
Clinton did not dwell on the past sins of public health officials nor the medical professionals, 
perhaps because doing so would hamper his own advocacy in the speech for increased 
participation by African Americans in these institutions. President Clinton’s efforts to restore 
minorities’ trust in researchers and optimism about scientific progress were explicitly forward-
looking as persuasive appeals. 
To what degree does Clinton’s Tuskegee speech shift American’s attitudes about clinical 
research? The Tuskegee Legacy Project’s findings shed light on the limited influence of both the 
Tuskegee legacy and Clinton’s speech over biomedical research recruitment. Yet, the manner in 
which the Tuskegee legacy influences our beliefs and constrains the potential efficacy of formal 
institutional apologies such as Clinton’s are still unclear. Both must certainly be more 
complicated than they appear at first blush. 
6.2 FURTHER EXPLORATIONS 
As with any project concerning a subject as complex as the legacy of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study, this dissertation can take only some of the many possible avenues for analysis. In this 
section, then, I introduce a few of the “roads not taken” that may be promising directions for 
future research about the Tuskegee Study and related topics.  
                                                 
17 William J. Clinton, “Remarks in Apology to African-Americans on the Tuskegee Experiment,” Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents 33 (1997): 719. 
18 Harter, Stephens, and Japp, “President Clinton’s Apology,” 25. 
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6.2.1 Silence in the Tuskegee Legacy 
It may seem at first that a rhetorical analysis of silence might stall before it even begins. How 
can rhetorical tools help us understand what was not said, to whom, and when?19 Preliminary 
answers to this question begin to emerge when one considers that it was the U.S. government’s 
silence following the Tuskegee Syphilis Study that drove the formation of the Legacy Committee 
and fueled its formal request for a long-awaited apology from the President. In the case of the 
Tuskegee legacy, the absence of particular rhetoric might be treated as a precipitating “text” to 
the subsequent kategoria/apologia speech set. The Legacy Committee noted in their request that 
“no public apology has ever been offered for the moral wrongdoing that occurred in the name of 
government medical research. No public official has ever stated clearly to the nation that the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study was morally wrong from its inception, and no public official has ever 
apologized to the survivors and their families. Yet, an apology is sorely needed.”20 The 
Committee’s request for an apology clearly indicates its perception that, in spite of legal actions 
settled in the early 1970s that acknowledged harm to the men in the Study, there remained a need 
for spoken action. The Committee and many members of the Tuskegee community understood 
the government’s silence as a poignant imperfection in need of a remedy. 
English professor Cheryl Glenn’s exploration of silence as a strategic rhetoric provides 
inroads for such an examination. She employs Bitzerian language as she notes that “whether to 
speak or remain silent (who gets to speak; who should remain silent) always depends on the 
                                                 
19 Rhetorician Lester C. Olson puts the question this way: “In critical practice, how do we study moments 
when speech might have made a meaningful difference, but there are only voids, gaps, or chasms, where words 
might have been uttered?” Lester C. Olson, “A Cartography of Silence: Bias Crimes and Public Speechlessness,” 
Journal of Intergroup Relations 31, no. 4 (Winter 2004/2005): 77. 
20 Legacy Committee, “Legacy Committee Request,” 561. 
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rhetorical situation.”21 Clinton referred to the 25-year delay in apology in such terms as he 
declared, “[W]e can end the silence. We can stop turning our heads away. We can look at you in 
the eye and finally say […] I am sorry.”22 Here, Clinton rhetorically pairs silence with non-
verbal gestures (e.g., avoiding eye contact) that we associate with one’s denial, shame, or 
disregard of others. He also perceives the locus of control as resting squarely with government 
authority—the silence and lack of acknowledgement can be ended by him. Glenn notes, 
“Whether choice or im/position, silence can reveal positive or negative abilities, fulfilling or 
withholding traits, harmony or disharmony, success or failure. Silence can deploy power; it can 
defer to power. It all depends.”23 From this perspective, silence is not merely a void or an 
absence, but can also be a manifestation of power relationships and a placeholder for potential 
(a)rhetorical action. Put another way: “Like the zero in mathematics, silence is an absence with a 
function, and a rhetorical one at that.”24 This is not to say, however, that all silence is purposeful: 
a study of silence as a rhetoric must attend to the distinction between incidental silence and 
silence deployed as action. 
A study of the silence(s) in the Tuskegee Study and its legacy might consider more fully 
how the silence between the end of the Study and the eventual apology may have affected how 
the apology was received. If Clinton’s apology was “late,” what was the ideal, hypothetical 
kairotic moment? How much silence is too much? 
Silence was not just a phenomenon of and for the government, however. The men, 
families, and communities affected by the Tuskegee Study arguably lacked a “voice” due to their 
                                                 
21 Cheryl Glenn, Unspoken: A Rhetoric of Silence, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2004): 5. 
22 Clinton, “Remarks in Apology,” 719. 
23 Glenn, Unspoken, 18. 
24 Ibid., 4. 
 213
powerlessness during and following the Study. We might pursue an investigation of the various 
forms of silence that were imposed on or experienced by these individuals and groups. In what 
ways does silence and silencing affect perceived self-efficacy and group identity (e.g., as 
victims)?25
6.2.2 The Contested Value of Clinton’s ‘Apology’ 
Although rhetorical critics have a history of swinging too far on the “pendulum” of rhetorical 
effects analysis—either focusing exclusively on audience reactions or neglecting them entirely—
we must remember that rhetoric is profoundly audience-oriented and that an examination of the 
suasive effects of texts on audiences is one of many valuable methods for assessing those texts. 
This approach is significant to the Tuskegee Study speech set because the Legacy Committee 
specifically articulated its expectation that a presidential apology was necessary to restore 
African Americans’ trust in government and mainstream medical practice as well as heal the 
psychological wounds left in the wake of the Study. Whether Clinton’s speech had such effects, 
then, is an important question to explore. Chapter 5 takes on this question to some extent, using 
the findings of the Tuskegee Legacy Project, but the dynamics of audience uptake cannot be 
fully explored by a handful of quantitative research prompts. A look through public reaction in 
newspapers and magazines—particularly those with predominantly African American 
readership—reveals conflicting sentiments about the value of the President’s address and 
                                                 
25 Olson’s work provides a theoretical base for such an inquiry. See, for example: “On the Margins of 
Rhetoric: Audre Lorde Transforming Silence into Language and Action,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 83, no. 1 
(February 1997): 49-70; “A Cartography of Silence,” 76-102. 
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reminds the rhetorical critic that drawing monolithic conclusions about the effect of a text is 
unlikely to be a sufficiently rich perspective. 
Many of the critical or skeptical reactions to Clinton’s apology, sampled below, refer to 
persistent racial discrimination in the United States and the legacy of this country’s history of 
slavery. For example, in an editorial entitled “America: Apologies are in Order for Everything,” 
Akbar Muhammad lays out an argument indicting the U.S. government for consistently racist 
agendas (public or not) and challenges the President’s description of the Tuskegee Study as 
having been orchestrated by only a handful of doctors with racist notions: 
If he was offering a sincere apology, not only to those families, but to the Black 
community of America, why would he make it appear as if white [sic] folks did 
not really mean to do this to us and we accept your apology? […] 
 Mr. President, if this is the season for apologies, you need to re-assess 
offering just this one apology for the terrible Tuskegee experiment! I believe that 
the pope led the way when he said that the Western world needs to apologize for 
participating in the horrors of the slave trade. Behind the apology, there needs to 
be an action to show [that] he is really sincere in the apology. This means more 
than building a $200,000 facility in Tuskegee, Alabama. It goes far beyond that, if 
this is really the season for apologies.26
Similarly, Richard M. Cooper, a professor of social work and African American History, offers a 
scathing response to the President in an editorial entitled, “Be Wary, Black America: Apology 
Not Accepted”: 
[I]n a post-slavery, post-emancipation, post-industrial, post-modern, post-
                                                 
26 Akbar Muhammad, “America: Apologies are in Order for Everything,” New York Amsterdam News 88, 
no. 29 (July 17, 1997): 12-13. http://www.ebscohost.com/. 
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affirmative action, post-Black Power, post-Million Man March and still pro-racist 
society, we African Americans are expected to jubilantly discuss an outdated and 
economically worthless, potential apology as payment for all of the ongoing 
oppression that we continue to combat daily from the bloody hands of Uncle Sam. 
These apologetic sentiments were encapsulated in a recent speech from a good ole 
Southern fox named President William Jefferson Clinton. Apparently, he actually 
believes that all white [sic] America needs is a constructive conversation on race 
to change her racist ways. 
With all due respect Mr. President, unless you are ready to deal with 
mean-spirited welfare reform, reparations for African Americans, or revamping a 
soon to be dismantled set of federal and state affirmative action programs, there is 
nothing else that you can say that will matter. […] 
Is this the new politics of “I'm sorry” or simply a sorry politician[?] Well, 
now that the United States has received atonement for the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Experiment, there’s just this thing called slavery to deal with. Only then can 
Blacks hang Uncle Bill’s picture on the wall right along with Martin’s, Malcolm’s 
and JFK’s for a little multi-cultural decorum.27
Both Muhammad and Cooper adopt a “too little, too late” perspective of Clinton’s apology and 
perceive the President as failing to address the larger issues of slavery and reparations. Both are 
also skeptical (to put it lightly) that Clinton could have been sincere in his remarks, which the 
authors castigate for being politically expedient. 
                                                 
27 Richard M. Cooper, “Be Wary, Black America: Apology Not Accepted,” New York Amsterdam News 88, 
no. 32 (August 7, 1997): 12-13. http://www.ebscohost.com/. 
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Physician Robert M. White opposed Clinton’s apology not because of any particular 
criticism of the President or his politics but because he finds fault with the general framing of the 
Tuskegee Study in contemporary scholarship, which he describes as “confusing, contradictory, 
and condescending in a multitude of ways.”28 White, an African American physician, believes 
that treating the Tuskegee Study as a racial and racist issue (an incorrect interpretation, according 
to White29) serves only to perpetuate fear among African Americans. Just a few months after 
Clinton’s apology, White argued that “the current paradigm about the Tuskegee Study has not 
helped” reduce health disparities between Blacks and Whites and that a Presidential apology that 
follows this common framing of the Study as racist is unlikely to help, either.30 Nearly three 
years after the event, White’s pessimism persisted: 
Let us hope the apology does not backfire by generating desperation and fear. 
Unfortunately, there is evidence that when real or perceived racist events occur in 
America or internationally, the TSUS [Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis] is 
still thought of as an example of racism, deception, exploitation, and/or active 
denial of effective therapy in medical research. Let us hope that the heated 
rhetoric associated with discussions about the TSUS does not continue to replace 
                                                 
28 Robert M. White, “Grand Dragon or Windmill: Why I Opposed the Presidential Apology for the 
Tuskegee Study,” Journal of the National Medical Association 89, no. 11 (November 1997): 720. It is worth noting 
that White disagrees on several points with Susan M. Reverby, whose scholarship on the Tuskegee Study has 
generated two books and several journal articles and who is cited frequently in this dissertation. An example of the 
analytical clash between White and Reverby can be observed, for example, in: Robert M. White, 
“Misrepresentations of the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis,” Journal of the National Medical Association 97, 
no. 4 (April 2005): 564-581; Susan M. Reverby, “‘Misrepresentations of the Tuskegee Study’—Distortion of 
Analysis and Facts?” letter to the editor, Journal of the National Medical Association 97, no 8 (August 2005): 1180-
1181. 
29 Robert M. White, “Unraveling the Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis,” Archives of Internal Medicine 
190 (March 13, 2000): 585-598. 
30 White, “Why I Opposed the Presidential Apology,” 720. 
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reason with outrage.31
A somewhat more moderate reaction comes from James E. Alsbrook in the New 
Pittsburgh Courier. Like Muhammad and Cooper, Alsbrook ponders Clinton’s political 
incentives to offer an apologetic statement to the Tuskegee victims but he takes a more charitable 
perspective when describes the speech as “a well-intentioned expression, even if it is late and 
should have been made long ago by Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, or Bush.”32 Furthermore, 
Alsbrook argues that the government’s provision of $10 million in compensation to the Tuskegee 
victims and their families is analogous to the financial reparations due for the “legally valid 
damages [the U.S. government] permitted to be inflicted on millions of Black people since 
slavery was abolished.”33 He opines, “If Clinton could get this job done, he certainly would be 
ranked among the few best presidents of the United States and best of world leaders.”34
One might contend that Clinton’s apology was primarily to the victims of the Tuskegee 
Study and that the reactions from the broader public are therefore irrelevant. However, as Harter 
and colleagues recognize, Clinton’s stated “commitment to rebuilding broken trust is not just to 
the immediate victims of the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. Rather, Clinton’s dialogue seems to 
make a request for forgiveness from all African Americans.”35 In fact, Clinton explicitly 
addressed part of his apology “to our African-American citizens,”36 and a handful of those 
citizens have expressed publicly their continued distrust of the government in spite of Clinton’s 
rhetoric. Philosopher Kathleen Gill notes, “In an official apology, the highest political authorities 
                                                 
31 White, “Unraveling the Tuskegee Study,” 596-597. 
32 Alsbrook, “Clinton’s Apology.” 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Harter, Stephens, and Japp, “President Clinton’s Apology,” 25. 
36 Clinton, “Remarks in Apology,” 719. 
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acknowledge that the culture of the victim group is not now, and never was, morally inferior to 
that of the offender group.”37 A problem with Clinton’s apology—for those who sympathize 
with Cooper and Muhammad—is that the government’s policies and practices have not 
reinforced consistently the rhetoric about the moral equality of Blacks and Whites. 
Criticism of the apology was not strictly race-oriented, however. A 1997 article in The 
Economist considers Clinton’s apologies for the radiation experiments and the Tuskegee Study: 
“Both apologies are long overdue. But they may also mislead. They seem to imply that such 
unethical experiments will never be repeated.”38 This criticism is explained as the author takes 
issue with the history of unethical medical research funded by the U.S. government and describes 
limitations of institutional review boards (IRBs) and contemporary federal regulations to protect 
vulnerable populations involved in clinical research.39 The author wonders—and we should, too: 
“[I]s there research on humans going on today that the president might have to apologise for in 
2022?”40 For those who discern a discrepancy between the words and deeds of the U.S. 
government, reform rhetoric has no value without widespread, corresponding action. 
These reactions to Clinton’s speech and my analyses in this dissertation shed light on the 
limits of apology—Clinton’s, and probably other public apologies—to satisfy multiple audiences 
to the fullest extent. The broader and more diverse the audience(s), the bigger the challenge for 
rhetors to accommodate audience motivations and expectations. Those who reject the apology 
(including Legacy Committee co-chair John Fletcher) see Clinton’s apology as failing to respond 
to their wishes, needs, and goals. Their reactions constitute a reactive, multi-faceted accusation 
                                                 
37 Kathleen Gill, “The Moral Functions of an Apology,” Philosophical Forum 31, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 23. 
38 “Don’t Let it Happen Again,” Economist 43, no. 8017 (May 17, 1997): 27-28. http://www.ebscohost 
.com/ 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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against the President—another kategoria and exigence in the Tuskegee Study’s legacy and 
another opportunity for paired analysis to help us understand the power and limits of rhetoric. 
6.2.3 Contexts Beyond Tuskegee 
This dissertation has employed several analytical tools and approaches in order to explore the 
interrelatedness of paired rhetorical texts, the factors that compel and constrain speech, how 
historical events persist in the public sphere in the form of myth and metaphor, and the exigence 
for public moral order and ethical rhetoric. These approaches and the lessons gleaned from these 
explorations have the potential to inform and inspire (or, perhaps, instigate) future scholarship on 
the rhetoric of race and reconciliation, public remembering or forgetting of institutional 
wrongdoing, personal features of the representatives involved in apology by proxy, and the 
ethical and rhetorical dimensions of racial discourse in the burgeoning field of genetics. 
As highlighted by some critics of Clinton’s apology, achieving racial reconciliation in the 
United States without specifically addressing the legacy of slavery is problematic. However, 
attempts to secure or deliver an apology and reparations by the nation for slavery have been 
fraught with political turmoil and controversy, as well. Literature in the field of rhetoric that 
attends specifically to race and racial reconciliation may be more attuned to the rhetorical 
constraints and opportunities for those who speak publicly about slavery in order to achieve 
improved conditions for minorities and greater racial harmony in general. John B. Hatch, for 
example, asserts that “rhetoricians would be remiss to continue resorting to traditional apologia 
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for the standards by which to judge apologies offered in the name of reconciliation.”41 He views 
apology as a critical part of a larger program for reconciliation rhetoric and restorative justice42 
and argues that the challenge for the ethical and rhetorically savvy speaker is to authentically 
manage three dialectics: “individual and collective (even cross-generational) responsibility, 
speaking-for and not-for, and personal regret and official pronouncement.”43 Dexter B. Gordon 
and Carrie Crenshaw are also attentive to the particular challenges of racial apologies for abuses 
like Tuskegee and slavery and contend that “racial apologies that advocate no real material 
change in White privilege and construct racism as a past event […] are inherently limited in their 
ability to contribute to antiracist progress.”44 Gordon and Crenshaw, as well as Hatch, are 
concerned with how racial rhetoric, particularly in the name of reconciliation, attends to the 
Other and how self-reflexive rhetors are with respect to their own positions of relative power and 
privilege.  
Similarly, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), founded by 
the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act in 199545, had to navigate such tensions 
of relative privilege and power in its attempts to bring about harmony and racial reconciliation in 
the post-apartheid era. The TRC’s three committees divided the work of investigating human 
rights violations, providing reparations to victims, and granting amnesty for politically motivated 
                                                 
41 John B. Hatch, “Beyond Apologia: Racial Reconciliation and Apologies for Slavery,” Western Journal of 
Communication 70, no. 3 (July 2006): 206. 
42 Ibid., 189. 
43 Ibid., 206. 
44 Dexter B. Gordon and Carrie Crenshaw, “Racial Apologies,” in New Approaches to Rhetoric, edited by 
Patricia A. Sullivan and Steven R. Goldzwig, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 263. 
45 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development [South Africa], “Legal Background to the TRC,” 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/legal/index.htm. 
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crimes in exchange for full testimony of the crimes by the perpetrator.46 Political science scholar 
Robert I. Rotberg argues that apology may be a necessary element in such structured 
reconciliation efforts: “Depending on the quality of a commission’s research and hearings, and 
their integrity, such reports provide a morally defensible basis for apology. The reports may also 
make apologies (and/or prosecutions) imperative.”47 However, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 
Chair of the TRC, was unsuccessful in his direct appeal for apologies from White leaders.48 As I 
discussed in Chapter 4, genuine and ethical apologies may be invited but certainly cannot be 
compelled or coerced. Rotberg argues, additionally, that apologies in the context of truth 
commissions must be closely tied to the commission’s findings of abuse because “apologies 
deeply founded on exhaustive analyses of the old hurts—of the causes of deep fissures in divided 
societies—carry more moral and depositive weight even as they doubtless risk reopening 
national wounds long plastered over.”49 For historians Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, 
apology is only part of the equation. They contend, “Those who wish to take wrongs seriously 
will need to represent and depict historical injustice in a manner that evinces both moral 
indignation and the political will to undertake corrective action.”50 These challenges certainly 
involve rhetorical intentionality and sensitivity. Rotberg’s observations and Elazar and Barkan’s 
                                                 
46 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development [South Africa], “The Committees of the TRC,” 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/trccom.html; Robert I. Rotberg, “Apology, 
Truth Commissions, and Intrastate Conflict,” in Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation, ed. Elazar 
Barkan and Alexander Karn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 43. 
47 Rotberg, “Apology, Truth Commissions, and Intrastate Conflict,” 40. 
48 Ibid., 45. Rotberg describes, “At the center of the TRC’s raison d’etre, at least in the mind of Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, its Nobel laureate and charismatic Chair, was the massing of material sufficient to elicit or demand 
apology from the former regime. He shared with others on the commission the strong sense that a society could only 
move forward after it came to terms with its collective angst. […] Tutu directly asked whites to apologize—to take 
responsibility for their actions during the apartheid era. Is there no leader of ‘some stature and some integrity in the 
white community,’ he pleaded, who will admit that whites ‘had a bad policy that had evil consequences?’ No one 
embraced Tutu’s challenge” (ibid.). 
49 Ibid., 36. 
50 Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, “Group Apology as an Ethical Imperative,” in Barkan and Karn, 
Taking Wrongs Seriously, 22. 
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call for reconciliatory apology point to an opportunity for rhetoricians to take on an expanded 
study of the arguments for offering and withholding amnesty and apology in formal, national 
reconciliation efforts such as the South African TRC.  
As Rotberg describes, apologies for intrastate conflict must be embraced by “victor and 
defeated alike” in order to “possess a transcendent power to promote reconciliation.”51 This is 
particularly important in cases where interaction among former antagonists is expected.52 The 
challenge is developing reconciliation discourse that is mutually satisfactory and meaningful 
when the two sides affiliate with different religions or cultures. In South Africa, Tutu has 
promoted ubuntu as a concept that is morally relevant to both White and Black South Africans 
because each can relate ubuntu to their religious and cultural traditions. Barkan and Karn 
describe ubuntu as it is used in TRC proceedings as “a deeply spiritual appeal to the shared 
humanity and essential unity of all peoples.”53 They note that the development of a shared, 
“bridging” discourse allows apology to be meaningful despite cultural differences and “helps to 
smooth over markers which might otherwise be viewed as partial and one-sided.”54 This 
attention to the rhetorical choices that frame reconciliation efforts of truth commissions is 
another opportunity for rhetorical critics to contribute to scholarship and practice, especially as 
various conceptualizations of apology are mobilized in these efforts. 
Another context of political apology that could benefit from an analytical approach like 
the one in this dissertation is highlighted by the Legacy Committee as evidence of Clinton’s 
willingness to apologize for past governmental wrongdoing: the Cold War-era human radiation 
                                                 
51 Rotberg, “Apology, Truth Commissions, and Intrastate Conflict,” 36-37. 
52 Ibid., 45. 
53 Barkan and Karn, “Group Apology,” 15. 
54 Ibid. 
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experiments. There are clear similarities between Clinton’s remarks in acceptance of the final 
report on the Cold War human radiation experiments and his remarks in response to the Legacy 
Committee’s report. In both form and content, these two speeches about past governmental 
wrongdoing demonstrate Clinton’s familiarity and, possibly, comfort with a particular form of 
institutional rhetoric. However, in the Tuskegee speech, Clinton ups the ante with regard to 
apologetic discourse as compared to the more subtle claims of apology made in the radiation 
speech, where the closest he gets is an expression of personal hope and a statement of a national 
apology. Clinton said, “[T]o all those who represent the families who have been involved in 
these incidents, let me say to you, I hope you feel that your Government has kept its commitment 
to the American people to tell the truth and to do the right thing.”55 The apologetic expression 
followed several paragraphs later, after a direct explanation that those responsible for the 
wrongdoing were no longer available to apologize: “So today, on behalf of another generation of 
American leaders and another generation of American citizens, the United States of America 
offers a sincere apology to those of our citizens who were subjected to these experiments, to their 
families, and to their communities.”56
The analytical tools described, developed, and employed in this dissertation can be used 
in future analyses of speeches like Clinton’s remarks about the human radiation experiments. We 
can interrogate Clinton’s use of all three species of rhetoric within this speech to establish his 
own ethos as an ethical leader, distance himself from the wrongdoing, and advocate for 
continued progress in scientific research, just as he did in the Tuskegee speech.  
                                                 
55 William J. Clinton, “Remarks on Accepting the Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation 
Experiments,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 31, no. 40 (Oct 9, 1995): 1757. 
56 Ibid., 1758. 
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In the discussion in Chapter 4 of the features of ethical apology I introduced the concept 
of standing—whether one has the “place” to apologize—because not just anyone can apologize 
for any wrongdoing. The apologizer must have some direct or vicarious responsibility for the 
harm done. A form of apology that complicates and sometimes contradicts this model, however, 
is institutional apology, where apologies (such as they are) are offered by spokespersons or 
representatives rather than the persons responsible for the wrongdoing.57 When assessing the 
ethical value of apologies offered by institutional representatives in their official capacity, we 
must attend carefully to the rhetorical situation(s) facing and created by such rhetors, 
distinguishing these kinds of statements from what we understand as interpersonal, ethical 
apologies. On a theoretical level, we might ask whether there is a difference between how 
voluntary apologies are received and how compelled or invited (or forced) apologies are 
received. Psychologist Aaron Lazare claims that even insincere apologies can have the 
appropriate effect of restoring relationships and easing hurt.58 While these compelled apologies 
may be effective in some senses, are they as effective as they could be?  
In this vein, additional research needs to focus on apologies offered by the president-as-
spokesperson. Harter and colleagues describe presidential addresses as “symbolic rituals 
occurring in response to specific cultural conditions calling for official attention,”59 and official 
apologies fit well within this genre. Human rights and law professor Ruti Teitel says that 
“presidential apology, building upon the pardon power, reflects the idea of perfecting justice.”60 
But what does it mean when a specific president apologizes? While I have discussed some of 
                                                 
57 Jason A. Edwards’s conception of collective apology shares this trait with institutional apology. See 
“Apologizing for the Past for a Better Future: Collective Apologies in the United States, Australia, and Canada,” 
Southern Communication Journal 75, no. 1 (January-March 2010): 57-75. 
58 Aaron Lazare, On Apology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): 117-19. 
59 Harter, Stephens, and Japp, “President Clinton’s Apology,” 22. 
60 Ruti Teitel, “The Transitional Apology,” in Barkan and Karn, Taking Wrongs Seriously, 102. 
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Clinton’s political pledges and possible motivations for apologizing for the Tuskegee Study, the 
“Clinton mode” of apology deserves more attention. Further work can provide broader 
comparisons and contrasts between Clinton’s official, presidential apologies (such as those for 
the human radiation experiments and the Tuskegee Study) and his personal apologies 
(particularly those concerning his affair with Monica Lewinsky). Teitel, for one, says of Clinton, 
“Despite his general reluctance to apologize for private behavior, there was a contrasting 
willingness to apologize in the political realm.”61 His rhetorical postures in these differing 
contexts may shed light on what apology means to him, personally, as an apologizer. Are these 
rhetorical situations humbling or humiliating? Which apologies were defensive? How did he 
include and/or evade mortification? What goals did he seek in his various apologies? Was 
Clinton a “tainted vessel” for the institutional apologies he offered on behalf of the United 
States? And if there are features of a specific rhetor that bear on the rhetorical situation (as I 
believe there are), how do they constrain which presidents should be called upon to offer 
institutional apologies? More than a year after Clinton’s Tuskegee speech, author Toni Morrison 
famously described Clinton, a White Southerner, as “our first black [sic] President” because he 
“display[ed] almost every trope of blackness” from his working-class upbringing to his love of 
McDonald’s.62 Now that Barack Obama has been elected our real first Black president, how does 
his racial identity shift the pressure for federal apologies for slavery and racist laws and policies? 
Would anyone suggest that he offer a long-awaited official apology for slavery? Could President 
Obama have been called to apologize for the Tuskegee Study had he been in office in 1996-
1997? I suspect not, on both counts. Perhaps an apology from an African American president for 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 105. 
62 Toni Morrison, The Talk of the Town, New Yorker, October 5, 1998, http://www.newyorker.com/ 
archive/1998/10/05/1998_10_05_031_TNY_LIBRY_000016504 
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the Tuskegee Study may have shifted the crux of the episode from race back to medical ethics or 
governmental abuse. The answers to these questions about the personal factors of institutional 
spokespersons have implications for other representatives in institutional apology as well as for 
audiences as we attempt to clarify the relative conceptual fogginess of some apologies and 
consider the opportunities and limits of institutional apology. 
6.3 THE LEGACY'S ONGOING CHALLENGE 
The insights generated from this dissertation have implications for the study of institutional 
apologies (and the closely related forms of public, official, or collective apologies) as well as 
both lay and expert discourse on race and medicine. The study of rhetoric is concerned with 
suasory appeals and audience response but rhetoricians should also be attentive to the rhetor’s 
argumentative position (e.g., standing) and selected interpretive frames, particularly when the 
rhetor purports to speak on behalf of others. General audiences and rhetorical critics alike ought 
to be sensitive to the morally weighty requirements of genuine apology, yet allow for the 
possibility that apologetic meaning may be found in institutional statements that admittedly 
require some conceptual compromise to be considered ‘apologies’ of sorts. We should continue 
to ask ourselves what degree of compromise we will accept while still giving institutional 
representatives “credit” for offering apologies for historical wrongdoing. 
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study and its legacy have generated significant controversy about 
the norms of medical research, the science and politics of race, and the moral significance of 
institutional apology. Emerging scientific developments and technologies, such as the Human 
Genome Project, will continue to pose challenges to application of bioethical principles, the 
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scope of science policy, and lay understandings of science and medicine. Critical attention to 
official rhetoric on these topics is warranted as we navigate paradoxically new and all-too-
familiar territory. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY LEGACY COMMITTEE1 FINAL REPORT 
 MAY 20, 19962
In 1932, the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) initiated the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study to document the natural history of syphilis. The subjects of the investigation were 
399 poor black sharecroppers from Macon County, Alabama, with latent syphilis and 201 men 
without the disease who served as controls. The physicians conducting the Study deceived the 
men, telling them that they were being treated for “bad blood.”3 However, they deliberately 
denied treatment to the men with syphilis and they went to extreme lengths to ensure that they 
would not receive therapy from any other sources. In exchange for their participation, the men 
                                                 
1 The Committee was established at a meeting at Tuskegee University, January 18-19, 1996. All 
communications with the Committee should be addressed to the Chair of the Committee, Vanessa Gamble, M.D., 
PhD, History of Medicine Department, 1400 University Ave., Madison, WI 53706 (608) 262-5319. FAX: (608) 262-
2317; email: vngamble@facstaff.wisc.edu. A list of the Committee members is attached. The Committee wishes to 
thank Judith A. Houck for her assistance in the preparation of this report. 
2 The full text of this report is reprinted here with permission of Legacy Committee Chair Vanessa 
Northington Gamble. All original footnotes and their formatting have been preserved from the printing in 
Tuskegee’s Truths: Rethinking the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, ed. Susan M. Reverby (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000), 559-566. Additionally, the report’s two appendices (“Appendix 1” and “Appendix 2”) are 
reprinted here following the text of the report. This footnote and the two bracketed descriptions in the titles of the 
report’s appendices are the only additions to the original text. 
3 The term “bad blood” encompassed several conditions including syphilis, anemia, and fatigue. 
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received free meals, free medical examinations, and burial insurance.4 On 26 July 1972, a front-
page headline in the New York Times read, “Syphilis Victims in U.S. Study Went Untreated for 
40 Years.”5 The accompanying article publicly revealed the details of the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study—“the longest non-therapeutic experiment on human beings in medical history.”6 In the 
almost 25 years since its disclosure, the Study has moved from a singular historical event to a 
powerful metaphor. It has come to symbolize racism in medicine, ethical misconduct in human 
research, paternalism by physicians, and government abuse of vulnerable people. 
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study continues to cast its long shadow on the contemporary 
relationship between African Americans and the biomedical community. Several recent articles 
have argued that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study has predisposed many African Americans to 
distrust medical and public health authorities.7 The authors point to the Study as a significant 
factor in the low participation of African Americans in clinical trials and organ donation efforts 
and in the reluctance of many black people in seeking routine preventive care. As one AIDS 
educator put it, “so many African-American people that I work with do not trust hospitals or any 
of the other community health care service providers because of that Tuskegee experiment. It is 
like ... if they did it then they will do it again.”8
                                                 
4 For a complete history, see Jones, James H., Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, new and 
expanded ed., New York: Free Press, 1993. 
5 Jean Heller, “Syphilis Victims in the U.S. Study Went Untreated for 40 Years,” New York Times, 26 July 
1972: 1, 8. The story first broke the previous day in the Washington Star. 
6 Jones, Bad Blood, 91. 
7 See, for example, Asim, Jabari, “Black paranoia far-fetched? Maybe, but understandable,” The Phoenix 
Gazette February 23, 1993 Op-Ed: A13; Karkabi, Barbara, “Blacks’ health problems addressed,” The Houston 
Chronicle April 10, 1994 Lifestyle: 3; “Knowledge, attitudes and behavior; conspiracy theories about HIV puts 
individuals at risk,” AIDS Weekly, November 13, 1995. 
8 Thomas, Stephen B. and Quinn, Sandra Crouse, “The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 1932-1972: Implications 
for HIV Education and AIDS Risk Programs in the Black Community,” Am J. of Pub Health. 1991; 81: 1503. 
 230
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Committee is dedicated to preserving the memory 
of the Study while moving beyond it, transforming the legacy into renewed efforts to bridge the 
chasm between the health conditions of black and white Americans. To this end, the Committee 
is pursuing two inseparable goals: 1) to persuade President Clinton to publicly apologize for past 
government wrongdoing to the Study’s living survivors, their families, and to the Tuskegee 
community, and 2) to develop a strategy to redress the damages caused by the Study and to 
transform its damaging legacy. 
In his recent apology for the government’s role in human radiation experiments (1944-
1974), President William J. Clinton claimed that "the American people ... must be able to rely 
upon the United States to keep its word, to tell the truth, and to do the right thing," and that 
“when the government does wrong, we have a moral responsibility to admit it.”9 President 
Clinton is not alone in his belief that an apology for past wrongs is “doing the right thing.” 
Recently, the Southern Baptist Church apologized to all African Americans for its stand on 
slavery during the Civil War and the Prime Minister of Japan similarly apologized to all the 
people of the United States for the attack on Pearl Harbor.10
And yet, these apologies do not merely acknowledge wrongdoing: they act as a first step 
toward healing the wounds inflicted. President Clinton, for example, saw his apology as “laying 
the foundation stone for a new era” in trying to regain the trust of the country.11
It is within the context of doing the right thing that, redressing past injuries, and regaining 
trust, that the Committee adamantly believes that a Presidential apology to the victims of 
                                                 
9 President William J. Clinton, “In Acceptance of Human Radiation Final Report,” Washington D.C., 
October 3, 1995. 
10 See, for example, Niebuhr, Gustav, “Baptist group votes to repent stand on slaves,” New York Times 21 
June, 1995: A2; and Watanabe, Teresa and David Holley, “Japan Premier offers apology for WWII role,” Chicago 
Tribune 15 August 1995: A10. 
11 Clinton, 3 October, 1995. 
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Tuskegee is critical to heal the devastating wounds that remain from this shameful episode in the 
history of medical research. 
1. A Presidential Apology for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study 
a) Moral and physical harms to the community of Macon County 
It is clear that the U.S. government scientists irreparably harmed hundreds of socially and 
economically vulnerable African-American men in Macon County, their family members, and 
their descendants by deliberately deceiving them and withholding from them state of the art 
treatment. When the Tuskegee Study began, the standard therapy for syphilis consisted of painful 
injections of arsenical compounds, supplemented by topical applications of mercury or bismuth 
ointments. Although this therapy was less effective than penicillin would prove to be, in the 
1930s every major textbook on syphilis recommended it for the treatment of the disease. After 
penicillin became available, the researchers withheld its use as well. Published medical reports 
have estimated that between 28 and 100 men died as a result of their syphilis.12 Due to a lax 
study protocol, we cannot be sure that all the men had latent syphilis. It is therefore entirely 
possible that the infected men passed syphilis to their sexual partners and to their children in 
utero.13 Thus the physical harm may not be limited just to the men enrolled in the Study. 
b) No public apology has ever been made 
In the aftermath of a Health, Education and Welfare task force report, a Senate hearing, and an 
out of court legal settlement, the U.S. government provided economic compensation and 
continues to give free health benefits to the surviving subjects and their families. However, no 
public apology has ever been offered for the moral wrongdoing that occurred in the name of 
                                                 
12 Jones, Bad Blood, 2. 
13 Hammonds, Evelynn M., “Your silence will not protect you: Nurse Eunice Rivers and the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study,” in The Black Women’s Health Book: Speaking for Ourselves ed. Evelyn C. White, 2nd ed., Seattle: 
Seal Press, 1994: 323-331. 
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government medical research. No public official has ever stated clearly to the nation that the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study was morally wrong from its inception, and no public official has ever 
apologized to the survivors and their families. Yet, an apology is sorely needed. The Committee 
believes that an apology from the President could facilitate the healing of the victims and the 
nation. 
c) The harmful legacy of the Study 
The historical record makes plain that African American’s distrust of the medical profession 
predates the revelations of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and involves a myriad of other social and 
political factors. Nevertheless, the Study has become a powerful symbol for the fear of 
exploitation in research and the deprivation of adequate medical care that is widespread in the 
African-American community. Recent articles argue that Tuskegee has created a climate of 
suspicion that taints the relationship between many African Americans and the medical 
profession. The Tuskegee Study is offered as the reason why few blacks participate in research 
trials,14 why the need for transplant organs by African Americans widely surpasses the supply,15 
and why African Americans often avoid medical treatment.16 It is also offered as an explanation 
as to why rumors about genocide persist in the African-American community, ranging from the 
notion that AIDS is a plot to exterminate black people to the idea that needle exchange programs 
fuel a drug epidemic that disproportionately affects black neighborhoods.17 For many African 
                                                 
14 Gamble, Vanessa, “A Legacy of Distrust: African Americans and Medical Research,” Am J. of 
Preventive Medicine, November/ December 1993: 35-38. 
15 “Fear Creates Lack of Donor Organs Among Blacks,” Weekend Edition, National Public Radio, 13 
March 1994. 
16 See, for example, Voas, Sharon, “Aging black sick, scared; past abuses, tradition keep them from clinic,” 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 27, 1995: B1. 
17 Bates, K.G., “Is it Genocide?” Essence, September 1990: 76; Thomas, Stephen, and Quinn, Sandra, 
“Understanding the Attitudes of Black Americans,” in Stryker, J. and Smith, M.D., eds. Dimensions of HIV 
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Americans, the fact that the Tuskegee Study occurred at all proves that black life is not valued. 
The Committee believes that an apology combined with a strategy for addressing the damages of 
the Tuskegee legacy would begin the process of regaining the trust of people of color. 
d) The harm done to the community and the University 
Because the name of the study points to Tuskegee Institute (now Tuskegee University) rather 
than the United States Public Health Service, it clouds the funding and responsibility for the 
Study. Although facilities and staff of the Tuskegee Institute were involved, primary direction 
came from the government under the auspices of the US PHS. The notoriety of the Study 
obscures the achievements of the Tuskegee Institute in improving the health care of African 
Americans. These achievements include initiating National Negro Health Week, building the 
John A. Andrew Hospital, creating the John A. Andrew Clinical Society, establishing a nurse 
training school, and organizing a school for midwives. 
The Apology: Context and Opportunity 
The Committee urges President Clinton to apologize on behalf of the American 
government for the harms inflicted at Tuskegee. The apology should be directed to those most 
directly harmed: to the elderly survivors of the Study, to their families, and to the wider 
community of Tuskegee and its university. Also included within the apology should be all people 
of color whose lives reverberate with the consequences of the Study. 
As the highest elected official of the United States, the President should offer the apology 
for the Study which was conducted under the auspices of the United States government. The 
significance of a presidential apology was recognized recently when the President apologized to 
those harmed by Cold War radiation experiments as a way to regain confidence of the American 
                                                                                                                                                             
Preventions: Needle Exchange, Menlo Park: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation; 1993: 99-128; Kirp, David 
and Bayer, Ronald, “Needles and Race,” Atlantic July 1993: 38-42. 
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people. In the context of President Clinton’s stated desire to bridge the racial divide, this apology 
provides the opportunity to begin to heal the racial wounds that persist in this country. 
Given the ages of the living participants and the period of time since the Study was 
disclosed, we believe that the apology should be offered swiftly. There are only eleven survivors; 
a twelfth died as recently as March 3, 1996. We recommend that the government issue the 
apology from Tuskegee University, perhaps linked with an early meeting of the new National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBEAC). Because the Tuskegee study is a starting point for all 
modern moral reflection on research ethics, a meeting of the NBEAC at Tuskegee in conjunction 
with a Presidential apology would be an ideal new beginning. 
Transforming the Legacy 
Although a public apology is necessary to heal the wounds of Tuskegee, it alone would 
not be sufficient to assure the nation that research like the Tuskegee Syphilis Study will not be 
duplicated. Despite the significance of a Presidential apology, it must not be an isolated event. 
Consequently, the Committee also recommends the development of a mechanism to move 
beyond Tuskegee and to address the effects of its legacy. The Committee strongly urges the 
development of a professionally staffed center at Tuskegee University, focused on preserving the 
national memory of the Study and transforming its legacy. 
Regret for past mistakes must be accompanied by a determination to prevent future 
wrongs. Until now for black Americans the legacy of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study has been a 
negative one--a symbol of their mistreatment within American society. The proposed Center 
could help transform the legacy of Tuskegee into a positive symbol for all Americans by 
demonstrating the importance of acknowledging past wrongs, rebuilding trust, and practicing 
ethical research. 
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The new center’s mission would be to preserve the national memory of the Syphilis 
Study for public education and scholarly research, and to analyze and disseminate findings on 
effective and ethically acceptable ways to address the profound mistrust that is the tragic and 
enduring legacy of this Study, especially among African Americans and other persons of color. 
(See Appendix 1.) 
Although the Committee sees the creation of a Center as the most valuable attempt to 
redress the damages of Tuskegee, we envision several possible concurrent programs. These 
include: 
1) a Minority Health Initiative, similar in scope to the newly established Women’s Health 
Initiative; 
2) training programs for health care providers to better understand the social and cultural 
issues of providing health care and of conducting research in communities of color; 
3) a clearinghouse to help investigators conduct ethically responsible research.  
The Committee recommends that funding for the Center must combine government and 
private funding. The announcement of a federal challenge grant would be very useful as a 
catalyst for future fundraising efforts.  
It is undeniable that the Tuskegee Syphilis Study has adversely affected the attitudes that 
many African Americans hold toward the biomedical community and the United States 
government. But despite the long shadow that it casts, we now have an opportunity to challenge 
this legacy and create a more beneficial one. 
 
Appendix 1 [First Appendix to the Legacy Committee Report] 
Possible functions for a Tuskegee research center: 
a) to create and maintain a public museum in Tuskegee, Alabama, to preserve the memory of 
the Study and to provide a focal point for efforts to transform its negative legacy; 
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b) to provide a place for scholars to examine the ethical, legal, and social significance of the 
Study and other issues in bioethics; 
c) to conduct public education on the Study and its legacy in schools, community 
organizations, and medical institutions; 
d) to aid in the production of audiovisual aids for public education that will place the Study 
within its broadest social and historical context and provide suggestions for transforming 
its past legacy; 
e) to assure the rigorous preservation of presently endangered documents and other records to 
further encourage studies of race, ethnicity, and medicine; 
f) to offer support for medical researchers seeking ways to conduct research in diverse 
populations that is both scientifically sound and ethically responsible. 
 
 
Appendix 2 [Second Appendix to the Legacy Committee Report] 
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Dr. John C. Fletcher, co-chair 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
REMARKS IN APOLOGY TO AFRICAN-AMERICANS ON THE TUSKEGEE 
EXPERIMENT1
May 16, 1997 
THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, on Sunday, Mr. Shaw will celebrate his 95th 
birthday. I would like to recognize the other survivors who are here today and their families: Mr. 
Charlie Pollard is here. Mr. Carter Howard. Mr. Fred Simmons. Mr. Simmons just took his first 
airplane ride, and he reckons he's about 110 years old, so I think it's time for him to take a chance 
or two. [Laughter] I'm glad he did. And Mr. Frederick Moss, thank you, sir. I would also like to 
ask three family representatives who are here—Sam Doner is represented by his daughter, 
Gwendolyn Cox. Thank you, Gwendolyn. Ernest Hendon, who is watching in Tuskegee, is 
represented by his brother, North Hendon. Thank you, sir, for being here. And George Key is 
represented by his grandson, Christopher Monroe. Thank you, Chris. 
                                                 
1 Clinton, William J. “Remarks in Apology to African-Americans on the Tuskegee Experiment.” Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents 33 (1997): 718-720. 
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I also acknowledge the families, community leaders, teachers and students watching 
today by satellite from Tuskegee. The White House is the people's house; we are glad to have all 
of you here today. I thank Dr. David Satcher for his role in this. I thank Congresswoman Waters 
and Congressman Hilliard, Congressman Stokes, the entire Congressional Black Caucus; Dr. 
Satcher; members of the cabinet who are here, Secretary Herman, Secretary Slater; a great friend 
of freedom, Fred Gray, thank you for fighting this long battle all these long years. 
The eight men who are survivors of the syphilis study at Tuskegee are a living link to a 
time not so very long ago that many Americans would prefer not to remember but we dare not 
forget. It was a time when our Nation failed to live up to its ideals, when our Nation broke the 
trust with our people that is the very foundation of our democracy. It is not only in remembering 
that shameful past that we can make amends and repair our Nation, but it is in remembering that 
past that we can build a better present and a better future. And without remembering it, we 
cannot make amends and we cannot go forward. 
So today America does remember the hundreds of men used in research without their 
knowledge and consent. We remember them and their family members. Men who were poor and 
African-American, without resources and with few alternatives, they believed they had found 
hope when they were offered free medical care by the United States Public Health Service. They 
were betrayed. 
Medical people are supposed to help when we need care, but even once a cure was 
discovered, they were denied help, and they were lied to by their Government. Our Government 
is supposed to protect the rights of its citizens; their rights were trampled upon—40 years, 
hundreds of men betrayed, along with their wives and children, along with the community in 
Macon County, Alabama, the City of Tuskegee, the fine university there, and the larger African-
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American community. The United States Government did something that was wrong, deeply, 
profoundly, morally wrong. It was an outrage to our commitment to integrity and equality for all 
our citizens. 
To the survivors, to the wives and family members, the children, and the grandchildren, I 
say what you know: No power on Earth can give you back the lives lost, the pain suffered, the 
years of internal torment and anguish. What was done cannot be undone. But we can end the 
silence. We can stop turning our heads away. We can look at you in the eye and finally say on 
behalf of the American people, what the United States Government did was shameful, and I am 
sorry. 
The American people are sorry—for the loss, for the years of hurt. You did nothing 
wrong, but you were grievously wronged. I apologize, and I am sorry that this apology has been 
so long in coming. 
To Macon County, to Tuskegee, to the doctors who have been wrongly associated with 
the events there, you have our apology, as well. To our African-American citizens, I am sorry 
that your Federal Government orchestrated a study so clearly racist. That can never be allowed to 
happen again. It is against everything our country stands for and what we must stand against is 
what it was. 
So let us resolve to hold forever in our hearts and minds the memory of a time not long 
ago in Macon County, Alabama, so that we can always see how adrift we can become when the 
rights of any citizens are neglected, ignored, and betrayed. And let us resolve here and now to 
move forward together. 
The legacy of the study at Tuskegee has reached far and deep, in ways that hurt our 
progress and divide our Nation. We cannot be one America when a whole segment of our Nation 
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has no trust in America. An apology is the first step, and we take it with a commitment to rebuild 
that broken trust. We can begin by making sure there is never again another episode like this one. 
We need to do more to ensure that medical research practices are sound and ethical and that 
researchers work more closely with communities. 
Today I would like to announce several steps to help us achieve these goals. First, we will 
help to build that lasting memorial at Tuskegee. The school founded by Booker T. Washington, 
distinguished by the renowned scientist George Washington Carver and so many others who 
advanced the health and well-being of African-Americans and all Americans, is a fitting site. The 
Department of Health and Human Services will award a planning grant so the school can pursue 
establishing a center for bioethics in research and health care. The center will serve as a museum 
of the study and support efforts to address its legacy and strengthen bioethics training. 
Second, we commit to increase our community involvement so that we may begin 
restoring lost trust. The study at Tuskegee served to sow distrust of our medical institutions, 
especially where research is involved. Since the study was halted, abuses have been checked by 
making informed consent and local review mandatory in federally funded and mandated 
research. 
Still, 25 years later, many medical studies have little African-American participation and 
African-American organ donors are few. This impedes efforts to conduct promising research and 
to provide the best health care to all our people, including African-Americans. So today, I'm 
directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, to issue a report in 180 
days about how we can best involve communities, especially minority communities, in research 
and health care. You must—every American group must be involved in medical research in ways 
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that are positive. We have put the curse behind us; now we must bring the benefits to all 
Americans. 
Third, we commit to strengthen researchers' training in bioethics. We are constantly 
working on making breakthroughs in protecting the health of our people and in vanquishing 
diseases. But all our people must be assured that their rights and dignity will be respected as new 
drugs, treatments and therapies are tested and used. So I am directing Secretary Shalala to work 
in partnership with higher education to prepare training materials for medical researchers. They 
will be available in a year. They will help researchers build on core ethical principles of respect 
for individuals, justice, and informed consent, and advise them on how to use these principles 
effectively in diverse populations. 
Fourth, to increase and broaden our understanding of ethical issues and clinical research, 
we commit to providing postgraduate fellowships to train bioethicists especially among African-
Americans and other minority groups. HHS will offer these fellowships beginning in September 
of 1998 to promising students enrolled in bioethics graduate programs. 
And, finally, by Executive order I am also today extending the charter of the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission to October of 1999. The need for this commission is clear. We 
must be able to call on the thoughtful, collective wisdom of experts and community 
representatives to find ways to further strengthen our protections for subjects in human research. 
We face a challenge in our time. Science and technology are rapidly changing our lives 
with the promise of making us much healthier, much more productive and more prosperous. But 
with these changes we must work harder to see that as we advance we don't leave behind our 
conscience. No ground is gained and, indeed, much is lost if we lose our moral bearings in the 
name of progress. 
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The people who ran the study at Tuskegee diminished the stature of man by abandoning 
the most basic ethical precepts. They forgot their pledge to heal and repair. They had the power 
to heal the survivors and all the others and they did not. Today, all we can do is apologize. But 
you have the power, for only you, Mr. Shaw, the others who are here, the family members who 
are with us in Tuskegee—only you have the power to forgive. Your presence here shows us that 
you have chosen a better path than your Government did so long ago. You have not withheld the 
power to forgive. I hope today and tomorrow every American will remember your lesson and 
live by it. 
Thank you, and God bless you. 
 
 
NOTE: The President spoke at 2:26 p.m. in the East Room at the White House. In his remarks, 
he referred to Tuskegee Experiment survivors Herman Shaw, who introduced the President, and 
Frederick Moss; and Fred D. Gray, attorney for the Tuskegee Experiment participants. The study 
was the “Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male.” 
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